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  Abstract 
Transforming economic growth into tangible benefits for poor communities appears to have 
frustrated development practitioners and policy makers. Despite the net positive growth 
achieved between 1994 and 2014 the face of poverty and inequality remains largely unchanged 
in South Africa. In such circumstances there is a pressing need for scholars to rethink the social 
foundations of economic activity and policy (Chang, 2006; Fine, 2001, 2005).  
One specific line of enquiry that has attracted attention among economists (Stiglitz, 2000; 
Woolcock, 2001; Fine, 2001) is that of social capital. This thesis seeks understanding of the 
relationship between social capital and the socioeconomic advancement of poor African/Black 
residents, particularly those in rural municipalities where there is a lack of financial and other 
resources. With this in mind, Robert Putnam’s path-breaking theory will be reformulated to 
explore the relationship during the mid-2000s between social capital, trust, political 
participation and socioeconomic outcomes in two rural municipalities in the Western Cape 
province of South Africa, namely Cederberg and Matzikama.  
The research questions the adequacy of Putnam’s theory of social capital, arguing that it is 
conceptually simple and inadequate as a description of how membership in social groups 
(networks) lead to better socioeconomic outcomes in the context of marginal, rural 
African/Black communities residing in under-capacitated municipalities. The thesis argues that 
an alternative conceptual framework is required, capable of depicting the complexity of the 
social processes required to translate social group membership into tangible benefits for poor 
households, as an explanation of why African/Blacks in Cederberg experienced better 
socioeconomic outcomes than their counterparts in Matzikama. 
To answer the address the research question, a number of sub-questions are investigated: 
• What are the different levels of social group membership in Cederberg and Matzikama 
amongst the African/Black population group? 
• To what extent is the Putnam thesis adequate as an explanation of the transmission 
mechanism from social group membership to better socioeconomic outcomes in the 
context of marginal groups residing in rural municipalities? 
• What are the insights from the literature that needs to be considered in the design of an 
alternative conceptual framework which is more nuanced and complex, capable of 
 
 
 
 
explaining the social processes in the transmission mechanism from social group 
membership to better socioeconomic outcomes?   
• Which forms of organisations are best suited for transmitting social capital into 
socioeconomic outcomes? 
• What type of leadership is necessary for transmitting social capital into socioeconomic 
outcomes?  
The thesis postulates an alternative to Putnam, arguing that social groups (networks) differ in 
terms of the characteristics with which they are imbued, making some of them more effective 
than others and that agency, often in the form of community or state agency, is more likely to 
be the driving force in the transmission from social networks to better socioeconomic 
outcomes.   
The scope of the research is limited to the municipal boundaries of Cederberg and Matzikama 
municipalities in the West Coast region of the Western Cape province of South Africa. 
Although the quantitative findings are reported for all race groups for illustrative reasons, the 
research is primarily focused on the comparative experiences of the African/Black residents. 
The study uses a mixed method approach—i.e. both qualitative and quantitative methods to 
measure social capital. The quantitative research method entailed the conducting of 
municipality-wide surveys in both Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities. A fully structured 
face-to-face interview technique was used for the survey method. The data was analysed using 
descriptive and inferential statistics and path analysis.  
The findings shed light on the nature of social capital in rural municipalities and showcase how 
social capital impacts on socioeconomic outcomes. It is hoped that the research will deepen 
our understanding of how communities can mobilise their social capital more effectively 
towards the improvement of public policy outcomes. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
Transforming economic growth into tangible benefits for poor communities appears to have 
frustrated development practitioners and policy makers. Despite the net positive growth 
achieved between 1994 and 2014 the face of poverty and inequality remains largely unchanged 
in South Africa. In such circumstances there is a pressing need for scholars to rethink the social 
foundations of economic activity and policy (Chang, 2006; Fine, 2001, 2005).  
One specific line of enquiry that has attracted attention among economists (Stiglitz, 2000; 
Woolcock, 2001; Fine, 2001) is that of social capital. This thesis seeks understanding of the 
relationship between social capital and the socioeconomic development of poor African/Black1 
residents, particularly those in rural municipalities where there is a lack of financial and other 
resources. With this in mind, Robert Putnam’s path-breaking theory will be reformulated to 
explore the relationship during the mid-2000s between social capital, trust, political 
participation and socioeconomic outcomes in two municipalities in the Western Cape, South 
Africa, namely Cederberg and Matzikama.  
The two South African municipalities under study are similar in socioeconomic status, are in 
the same geographic region, and are characterised as rural municipalities with severe capacity 
constraints. These municipalities differ from the Italian municipalities in the northern and 
southern regions of Italy studied by Putnam (1993) and described in his famous study, Making 
Democracy Work—they are more ethnically heterogeneous and have a much shorter history of 
electoral politics than the Italian regions in the Putnam study. Despite the differences 
                                                 
1 A note of explanation is necessary here: The terms African and Black have been used to describe the ethnic identity of that 
segment of the two communities that formed the focus of the study. The reason for this is that “Black” in the South African 
context includes those formerly designated as “African,” “Coloured” and “Asian.” “African/Black” is therefore a subset of 
Black people. The use of racial categories in this study should not be interpreted as acceptance of the system of racial 
segregation practiced under Apartheid. They have been used purely because the legacy of racial division, both in social and 
spatial terms, persists in many forms and continues to influence a range of outcomes in South African society. 
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highlighted above, this thesis will explore the value of Putnam’s thesis in a South African rural 
municipal context. 
1.2. RATIONALE/BACKGROUND  
Approximately 33% of South Africa’s population and 55% of South Africa’s poor households 
live in rural areas (Statistics South Africa, 2014, p. 46). Apart from the desperate social 
conditions faced by most residents of rural municipalities, the local authorities (sometimes as 
a consequence of the environment in which they find themselves) also have to deal with myriad 
challenges—they have a meagre tax base to draw from because they have poor industrial and 
commercial sectors and are institutionally weak and have severe capacity constraints that make 
it difficult for them to fulfil their mandates. They are also less resourced to nurture state-civil 
society participation which is paramount to legitimising what “government wants to 
implement” and, more essentially, “achieving power in terms of access to, and control of, 
resources necessary to protect livelihoods" (Hemson, Meyer, & Maphunye, 2004, p. 38). 
Given the desperate conditions faced by rural populations and the constraints that rural 
municipalities face, this research investigates whether social capital improves the 
socioeconomic status of communities. In addition to the common characteristics shared by the 
two municipalities mentioned above, they are also predominantly agricultural, with their 
populations dispersed in rural areas and small towns, a large proportion of which are poor. 
They have high unemployment rates and the local economic base lacks diversity which limits 
their ability to increase revenues. A consequence of this is that it is difficult to raise 
development finance. In many ways their characteristics mirror those of other rural 
municipalities in South Africa.  
It is with these conditions in mind that the proposed research aims to ascertain whether social 
capital can improve the wellbeing of poor communities in rural areas which are governed by 
resource-constrained local authorities. Drawing on data collected in the mid-2000s, the 
research explores the relationship between social capital, trust, political participation and 
socioeconomic outcomes in Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities. It examines how under 
certain circumstances, social capital can be developed spontaneously by communities 
themselves, of their own volition and without relying on external resources. The research also 
shows how, when social capital is mobilised or activated in poor rural municipalities, it makes 
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a positive difference to the way in which poor communities can influence the allocation of 
state/public resources towards their needs.  
1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH  
The aim of the study is to assess the effect that social capital has on developmental outcomes 
in the municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama in the mid-2000s. The study examines the 
Putnam thesis in the context of marginal rural African/Black migrant communities that are 
governed by poorly resourced local authorities.  
The specific aims of the thesis are to:  
• Ascertain whether the presence of social capital can improve the wellbeing of poor 
African/Black residents in resource-constrained local authorities in rural areas.  
• Rework Putnam’s theory of social capital so as to provide an analytical framework 
capable of describing the transmission mechanism necessary for social capital to impact 
on socioeconomic outcomes in the South African small towns and rural context. 
• Examine how marginalised African/Black rural residents who belong to networks and 
associations bring pressure to bear on municipalities to deliver better services. 
1.4. RESEARCH PROBLEM  
The research questions the adequacy of Putnam’s theory of social capital, arguing that it is 
conceptually simple and inadequate as a description of how membership in social groups 
(networks) lead to better socioeconomic outcomes in the context of marginal, rural 
African/Black communities residing in under-capacitated municipalities. The thesis argues that 
an alternative conceptual framework is required, capable of depicting the complexity of the 
social processes required to translate social group membership into tangible benefits for poor 
households, as an explanation of why African/Blacks in Cederberg experienced better 
socioeconomic outcomes than their counterparts in Matzikama. 
 
To answer the address the research question, a number of sub-questions are investigated: 
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• What are the different levels of social group membership in Cederberg and Matzikama 
amongst the African/Black population group? 
• To what extent is the Putnam thesis adequate as an explanation of the transmission 
mechanism from social group membership to better socioeconomic outcomes in the 
context of marginal groups residing in rural municipalities? 
• What are the insights from the literature that needs to be considered in the design of an 
alternative conceptual framework which is more nuanced and complex, capable of 
explaining the social processes in the transmission mechanism from social group 
membership to better socioeconomic outcomes?   
• Which forms of organisations are best suited for transmitting social capital into 
socioeconomic outcomes? 
• What type of leadership is necessary for transmitting social capital into socioeconomic 
outcomes?  
The thesis postulates an alternative to Putnam, arguing that social groups (networks) differ in 
terms of the characteristics with which they are imbued, making some of them more effective 
than others and that agency, often in the form of community or state agency, is more likely to 
be the driving force in the transmission from social networks to better socioeconomic 
outcomes.   
Many studies have attempted to examine the relationship between social capital in the form of 
networks and associations and socioeconomic outcomes but the Putnam thesis has not been 
applied to study a specific marginalised racial group living in rural areas governed by local 
authorities that have capacity constraints. The municipalities that are studied here have been 
identified as ‘Project Consolidate2’ municipalities because they lack the necessary financial 
and human resources to fulfil their legislative mandate and operate efficiently according to 
criteria established by central government. This marks the point of departure of this research 
                                                 
2 Introduced in 2005, Project Consolidate was the government’s strategy to transform underperforming municipalities into 
entities capable of service delivery. 
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from the Putnam thesis in that it questions whether his theory applies to marginalised rural 
communities governed by poorly resourced local authorities with severe capacity constraints.  
The scope of the research is limited to the municipal boundaries of Cederberg and Matzikama 
municipalities in the West Coast region of the Western Cape province of South Africa. 
Although the quantitative findings are reported for all race groups for illustrative reasons, the 
research is primarily focused on the comparative experiences of the African/Black residents. 
The dissertation has several limitations. Firstly, the research is limited in that it investigates 
social capital and its impact on socioeconomic outcomes of African/Black residents of 
Cederberg and Matzikama. The reason for this was to focus on the experiences of the 
African/Black residents with a view of determining possible features that differentiate them 
from one another. In addition, the broader aspects of political economy such as the social, 
political and institutional make-up which favours elite formation were also not brought into the 
purview of this study.    
It was initially thought that the findings would be discussed and interpreted according to the 
broad thesis of the Putnam model. As the findings were interpreted and analysed, however, it 
led to further refinement and subsequent development of an augmented analytical framework. 
This can best be described as a deductive process that flows from repeated iterations. The 
implications of such a deductive approach means that data collected did not always lead to a 
point of convergence to some of the refinements to the framework that were later added. 
The thesis examines the impact that networks and associations have on socioeconomic 
outcomes. In the measurement of socioeconomic outcomes, technical criteria such as increases 
in per capita income or variations in the distribution of products were firstly difficult to obtain 
by race, and secondly considered to be influenced by factors that were partly exogenously 
generated. Thus socioeconomic outcomes were largely measured as residents’ perception of 
their quality of life and access to the provision of basic services. 
1.5. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. 
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Chapter One presents background information on social capital, trust and participation in 
contemporary South Africa and the Western Cape. This is followed by the problem statement, 
purpose and objectives of the study, the questions posed in the research as well as the scope 
and limitations of the study.  
Chapter Two reviews the latest international and local literature on social capital. The 
literature review covers the divergent views expressed on social capital, particularly its 
attitudinal and structural components and highlights the dominant schools of thought on the 
subject. The topics discussed include the different definitions and conceptions of social capital 
as well as the key criticism levelled at the social capital premise.  
Chapter Three discusses Putnam’s thesis on social capital. The aim of this literature review 
chapter is to provide an overview of Putnam’s framework as a reference point to develop a 
comprehensive account that depicts how associations/networks impact on socioeconomic 
outcomes. Putnam’s work will be augmented with other insights from the literature.  
Chapter Four develops an augmented framework of the Putnam thesis. It unpacks the salient 
features of networks, trust, political participation and government effectiveness that were 
discussed in Chapter Two. A typology of networks is developed which identifies different 
network characteristics including horizontal versus hierarchical characteristics, active versus 
passive membership, homogeneous versus heterogeneous membership, public versus private 
goods provision and political versus non-political characteristics. The framework further 
defines trust as being either formal or informal and examines state-civil society interactions. 
The augmented framework is used to analyse the quantitative and qualitative findings in later 
chapters.  
Chapter Five discusses the research methodology employed in the study. It deals with the 
research design, methods, tools and instruments that were used throughout the research project 
life cycle of data collection, analysis and interpretation. It demonstrates how the approach and 
methodology that was developed is relevant and appropriate given the research question and 
how, in addition to standard analysis, innovative instruments were employed to capture the 
information required. Both quantitative as well as qualitative methods were used in the research 
process. In Cederberg, the sample was selected to be representative of approximately 800 
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households, for 2,900 persons. In Matzikama the sample was designed to be representative of 
approximately 667 households in the municipality, for a total of 2,200 persons.  
For data collected, path analysis was used to estimate whether there was a significant 
relationship between networks and associations, trust, political participation and 
socioeconomic outcomes. Data obtained from the qualitative interviews was used to further 
augment the research findings.   
In Chapter Six data collected from the household surveys is presented and evaluated. A profile 
of social capital, trust and participation in both Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities is 
presented. This is supplemented with the results of the qualitative interviews with the sample 
of informants. The research findings form the basis of Chapter Six.  
Chapter Seven outlines the main conclusions from the research and explores some possible 
contributions that could be made to the theory of social capital.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW                     
SOCIAL CAPITAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The term social capital entered the vocabulary of the social sciences in the 1990s. Portes (1998, 
p. 3) and Sobel (2002, p. 139) credit the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1986) with the first 
contemporary exploration of the term social capital. Coleman (1988) introduced the concept to 
American sociology. However, it was Putnam (1993) who catapulted the concept to the 
forefront of political science and economics with his famous study of Italian politics—Making 
Democracy Work.  
This does not mean that the underlying ideas in the concept were not alive in economic 
scholarship before this period. Economists as early as Adam Smith acknowledged the role that 
social values and moral sentiments play in the economy. According to Van Staveren (2000, p. 
11) social capital (although not by that name) has been in the discourse of the economic 
sciences literature since the time of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor and Thorstein 
Veblen—all of whom recognised the economic value of moral sentiments. Although not termed 
“social capital” at the time, these early economists acknowledged that caring values or ”moral 
sentiments” were essential for well-functioning markets and states but this was never fully 
explored in a coherent manner in the economics literature. Van Staveren (2000, p. 11) also 
states that  
the lack of attention (until recently) to social capital in economic science, and the attempts to explain 
social capital within the neoclassical framework can at least be partially attributed to the 
marginalisation of research on the care economy.   
Spies-Butcher (2003, p. 183) investigated the emergence of social capital in the economics 
discourse and implicitly questioned the sociological roots of the concept. He concluded that 
the concept of social capital was better understood as a result of the changes within economics 
rather than the coming together of economics and sociology. According to Spies-Butcher 
(2003, pp. 183–187) the rebuttal of the “abstract and reductionist methodology of rational 
choice theory” is in part a result of attempts by some economists to develop a more complex 
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“social methodology in economics that takes historical and social context seriously.” It is also 
part of a “broader move in economics to recast economic methodology in a way that takes 
complexity, contingency and agency more seriously” (Spies-Butcher, 2003, p. 187). He 
observes that this was especially prevalent in the development of game theory (2003, p. 188). 
He points out that North, Ostrom, and Putnam all used game theory’s “empirical evidence of 
how decisions at times contradicted the traditional account of rationality” in their 
understanding of collective action situations to inform their own work and in the build-up to a 
theory on social capital (Spies-Butcher, 2003, p. 187).  
It is important to note that Putnam’s original work on social capital was informed by the work 
of Douglas North who is a “significant contributor to the new institutional economics which 
has been at the centre of both the development of social capital and broader moves in economics 
to include social structure” (Spies-Butcher, 2003, p. 191). According to North (1997, p. 4) 
economic growth is primarily dependent on the structure of incentives and disincentives that 
make up the institutional framework of an economy and polity and that it is the belief system, 
social values or both that ultimately determine the institutional framework. In his view, “the 
structure of incentives and disincentives that make up the institutional framework of an 
economy and polity is more important than the superficial aspects of economic growth such as 
technology, human and physical capital.” In one way economic growth is contingent on stable 
political and economic institutions which provide low transaction costs in impersonal political 
and economic markets (North, 1997, p. 4). The underlying belief systems of societies and the 
way in which these systems evolve is a key determinant “of institutions and their evolution” 
(North, 1997, p. 5). 
There appears to be consensus among most of the authors considered here that an 
understanding of social values—the way in which they are constructed and their effect on 
incentives (how they shape the institutional framework of the economy)—is vital to grasping 
the economic performance of societies.  
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
As noted in the previous section, early economists acknowledged the role that social 
values/belief systems play in the functioning of the economy and state. Although not theorised 
as social capital at the time, the role of social values was discussed by economists particularly 
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as they attempted to move away from rational choice theory toward a more comprehensive 
social methodology in economics—a methodology that attempted to incorporate social 
structure more solidly in economics (Spies-Butcher, 2003).  
The term social capital has been open to many interpretations in the literature. According to 
Spies-Butcher (2003, p. 184), the literature on social capital “prior to the 1980s was isolated 
and lacking in analytical foundation.” It is interesting to note that economists were not the first 
to theorise the concept even though a debate was raging in the discipline as to how to 
incorporate more historical, contextual and social aspects into economics thinking. Spies-
Butcher noted that a “theoretically grounded conceptualisation (of the term social capital) was 
developed by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam” (2003, p. 184).  
This “theoretically grounded conceptualisation” of the term social capital in the literature has 
its roots in sociology albeit in a discussion on the political economy of class and the 
reproduction of privilege.  
Portes (1998, p. 3) and Sobel (2002, p. 139) attribute the first3 contemporary analysis of the 
term social capital to Bourdieu (1986) who introduced the concept in an article on “Forms of 
Capital.” In his work, Bourdieu (1986) contends that one’s connections play an important part 
in the reproduction of class and privilege. In a sense, Bourdieu sees social capital as an 
instrument of power (Harriss, 2002, p. 4).  
Bourdieu defines the concept as “the aggregate actual or potential resources which are linked 
to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
                                                 
3 Note: In the mid-1980s several articles appeared about research into the use of social networks (not necessarily expressed 
in these terms) in job search and employment activities in the labour market. In general, these studies found that people 
with stronger networks were more successful at finding work or getting promoted in jobs they already held. Among the 
interesting findings in these studies was that social networks were more important among marginalised sections of society 
such as immigrant communities. While not using the term, these researchers were essentially discussing the idea of social 
capital around the same time as Bourdieu, although he was among the first to articulate a more coherent theoretical 
framework of social capital. 
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acquaintance or recognition” (Portes, 1998, p. 45). Portes believes Bourdieu’s analysis is 
arguably the most theoretically refined among those that introduced the subject. Bourdieu’s 
treatment of the subject focuses on the accrual of benefits to individuals by virtue of their 
participation in groups and on the deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of 
creating this resource. Bourdieu also acknowledged that social networks must be deliberately 
created through investment strategies so that group interactions and relations can be used as a 
reliable source of potential benefits. In Portes’s view, Bourdieu’s definition of social capital 
reduces all forms of capital, including cultural capital, to economic capital.  
Hence through social capital actors can gain direct access to economic resources (subsidized loans, 
investment tips, protected markets); they can increase their cultural capital through contacts with 
experts or individuals of refinement . . . or they can affiliate with institutions that confer valued 
credentials . . . Bourdieu insists that the outcomes of possession of social or cultural capital are reducible 
to economic capital. . . . For example; transactions involving social capital tend to be characterized by 
unspecified obligations, uncertain time horizons and the possible violation of reciprocity expectations. 
But, by their very lack of clarity, these transactions can help disguise what otherwise would be plain 
market exchanges (Portes, 1998, p. 45). 
Lin (2001, p. 25), Khan, Munir, and Willmott (2007, p. 7) and Baron, Field, and Schuller (2000, 
p. 8) suggest that Bourdieu’s (1986) analysis is primarily focused on the use of contacts or 
networks by the dominant class and nobility to reproduce their privileges. In this instance 
Bourdieu’s analysis provides a structural view of social capital. A structural view relates 
primarily to the structure of networks—in terms of who interacts with whom, how frequently, 
and on what terms—which have a major bearing on the flow of resources through that network. 
Those who occupy key strategic positions in the network, especially those whose ties span 
important groups, can be said to have more social capital than their peers, precisely because 
their network position gives them heightened access to more and better resources (Burt, 2000, 
cited in Bayat, 2005, p. 3). Baron et al. (2000, p. 8) point out that in contrast to Bourdieu (1986), 
who used social capital to denote the ways in which elite groups used their contacts to 
reproduce their privilege, Coleman (1988, 1994) expanded the concept to include the social 
relationships of non-elitist groups.  
Coleman is cited as being instrumental in introducing the concept in American sociology (Lin, 
2001; Portes, 1998). In his paper, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, Coleman 
put forward his definition of social capital. He describes it in the following terms:  
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Social capital is not a single entity, but rather a variety of different entities that have two characteristics 
in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of 
individuals who are within the structure (Coleman, 1994, p. 16). 
Coleman’s (1994) definition of social capital is primarily written from the perspective of a 
sociologist and also emphasises the role of network structure—thus reiterating the structural 
aspect of social capital. In his definition, Coleman (1994, pp. 19–22) explained that virtually 
all social structures facilitate some form of social capital since it is common that individuals 
purposefully establish relations for benefit and they continue with such relationships for as long 
as benefits are expected. However, Coleman is of the opinion that there are certain kinds of 
social structures that are more important in facilitating social capital, such as where there are 
greater levels of expectation, obligation and trustworthiness.  
In Coleman’s view (1994, p. 22), norms can sometimes also act as a fragile form of social 
capital. He explains that if A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future then 
this establishes an expectation in A and an obligation on the part of B. Coleman states that this 
form of social capital depends on two elements: (i) trustworthiness of the social environment 
(which means that obligations will be paid), and (ii) the extent of obligations held. He gives 
the example of the rotating-credit associations of Southeast Asia and elsewhere where friends 
or neighbours meet (typically) on a monthly basis, each person contributing to a central fund 
that is then given to one of the members on an arbitrary basis, until, after a number of months, 
each of the n persons has made n contributions and received one payout. But without a high 
degree of trustworthiness among the members of the group the institution could not exist, since 
a person who receives an early payout could abscond and leave the others with a loss.  
Coleman (1994, p. 22) is of the opinion that individuals with high levels of obligations 
outstanding at any time have more social capital on which they can draw. Individual actors in 
a social system also differ in the degree of obligations outstanding. He illustrates this with the 
example of a village chief who, by virtue of his power and influence, has more social capital 
to draw from. Similarly certain wealthy families, because of their wealth, have built up credits 
that they can call upon. Woolcock (2001, p. 12) concurs with this by observing that family, 
friends and associates can be called upon in a crisis as well and can be leveraged for material 
gain.  
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Coleman (1994, pp. 19–22) emphasises the nature of social structures and the assemblage of 
norms governing interpersonal behaviour as important underlying factors, explaining that 
social capital has both an attitudinal and a structural aspect. Both Coleman and Bourdieu speak 
of social capital as being embedded in groups and social networks which can be realised by 
individuals.     
According to Crudeli (2002, p. 3), the original theoretical contributions on social capital were 
in the field of sociology where social capital was primarily used and analysed in the context of 
small groups and individuals. However a subtle transition took place when the concept was 
exported to other disciplines and the unit of analysis moved from individual and small groups 
to the community and later, to nation states. This jump is credited to Robert Putnam and his 
book, Making Democracy Work. Putnam has been criticised for this because he was seen as 
simply aggregating individual level data upward to the geographical unit required, leaving 
unexplored the dynamics of participation and engagement (De Filippis, 2002, p. 791). Crudeli 
(2002, p. 19) asserts that because this transition was never theorised it has led to the current 
state of confusion around the nature of social capital in the literature. Unfortunately very little 
has been done in the past few years towards providing a theory that harmonises individual and 
group (micro aspects of social capital) to the broader macro aspects of social capital. This is 
quite a moot point as macroeconomic theory without clear microeconomic foundations is 
frowned upon in the discipline of economics.  
Crudeli echoes the sentiment of Harriss (2002, p. 6) who points out that it is Putnam who 
suggested that social capital could become the property of a whole society, departing from the 
ideas of Bourdieu and Coleman.  
Thus social capital is either defined as personal or individual social capital—which is 
concerned with a private individual’s special access and advantages as a result of his or her ties 
(the Coleman tradition), or is defined (the Putnam tradition) in terms of a group/community or 
nation state realising benefits because of their participation in social networks and groups 
(Savage, Tampubolon, & Warde, 2004, p. 26).    
Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organisations such as trust, norms, and 
networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” 
(1993, p. 167). Dasgupta (2005, p. 2) contends that this description suffers from a weakness in 
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that it combines strikingly different concepts, namely “beliefs, behavioural rules and such 
forms of capital assets as interpersonal links (or ‘networks’), without offering reasons as to 
why such an inclusive definition would prove useful for our understanding of the social world.” 
In Dasgupta’s view, social capital should be primarily understood as interpersonal networks.  
While I find the more intangible features of social organisation such as beliefs, attitudes and 
values to be present in Putnam’s work, they are not fully analysed and contextualised in his 
discussion. It is not clear from Putnam’s theory how these intangible features of social 
organisation influence the nature and character of networks/associations nor does his theory 
explain how beliefs, attitudes and values are formed or evolve in a given society. These 
intangible features can influence the formation of informal associations but they can also 
influence other formal institutions such as those found in local government. In Chapter Four, 
an attempt is made to incorporate these intangible features into an augmented analytical 
framework based on Putnam’s thesis to illustrate how they can affect the character and nature 
of networks /associations and how these, in turn, influence the effectiveness of institutions. 
Coleman (1994) and Bourdieu (1986) emphasised that attitudes and norms play an important 
role in social capital. Putnam (1993, pp. 172–177) postulated that the nature of economic 
outcomes is not only dependent on the relationships and networks an individual establishes but 
is strongly influenced by social norms, particularly attitudes towards trust. Certain social and 
cultural norms are also characterised as cognitive or attitudinal dimensions of social 
interactions (although many researchers see “trust” not so much as social capital but an 
outcome of social capital). Norms related to trust include such things as the keeping of 
promises, maintaining strong family ties, and so on.  
In the same vein, and using Putnam as a reference point, Ostrom (2000, p. 176) defines social 
capital as  
the shared knowledge, understanding, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of interaction that 
groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity. They are more productive with whatever physical and 
human capital they draw on if they agree on the way that they will coordinate activities and credibly 
commit themselves to a sequence of future actions. 
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The National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) takes the view that social norms and shared 
values which underpin behaviour and motivation are broader dimensions of social capital 
(OECD, 2001 and Fukuyama, 1997). These shared norms and values  
such as believing that it is unacceptable to cheat, take money not belonging to oneself or treat others, 
especially strangers, with disrespect or violence are seen as an integral part of the context in which 
social norms of behaviour and co-operation work. Citizens decide to vote even when one extra vote, of 
itself, is most unlikely to change the overall outcome. Neighbours watch out for an elderly person living 
on their own or report child abuse. These, and many other examples of civic behaviour, constitute a 
vital and beneficial community-level resource. They are reinforced by patterns of co-operative 
behaviour and interaction at the community level and as well they contribute directly to civic 
engagement (OECD, 2001, p. 32).  
Since Putnam’s work the definition of social capital has been expanded to areas beyond the 
personal and community units of analysis. Narayan and Pritchett (2000), as cited in Bayat 
(2005, p. 4), also separated social capital into three streams. The first stream is concerned with 
country-level politics (including the growth aspect), whereas the second focuses on the meso-
level (efficacy of institutions). The third stream views social capital as a resolution of market 
failures at the micro-level.  
Turner (2000, pp. 94–95) holds that narrow views of social capital as “social networks” or 
“civic associations” are useful but if integration of sociological knowledge into economic 
thinking is to occur, a broader conception of the term needs to be developed. He defines social 
capital “as those forces that increase the potential for economic development in a society by 
creating and sustaining social relations and patterns of social organisation.” He advances the 
notion that there are different levels of analysis that represent ways of looking at the ebb and 
flow of how social activity at a macro, meso and micro-level gives us a somewhat different 
picture of how social capital is formed. At the macro-institutional level, Turner (2000, p. 95) 
holds that social capital is formed as a population becomes organised to meet its basic needs 
of production, reproduction, regulation and coordination. Turner (2000, p. 95) states that at the 
meso-levels, “social capital is formed as corporate units organize human capital and as 
categoric units generate social distinction influencing how members of society are treated,” 
while at the micro-level social capital is formed as social encounters in the form of face-to-face 
interaction.   
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In brief, the easiest way to think about social capital is to see it as a benefit that exists because 
of an individual’s social relationships (Portes, 1998, as cited in Lesser, 2000, p. 50). From the 
various definitions given of the term, much of the characterisations speak explicitly or 
implicitly of the benefits of social capital. These benefits are often indicated as positive 
externalities that are generated in the process of social interaction. Gillinson’s view (2004, p. 
25) is that society benefits from the positive externalities of cooperation of others and the 
networks they create. These externalities could potentially manifest, for example, in the form 
of a crime-free neighbourhood thanks to the activities of a neighbourhood watch group4.  
Collier (2003, p. 19) believes that social capital is social because it generates externalities 
arising from social interaction. It is capital only if its economic effects persist. Externalities are 
the benefits that arise as a result of interaction. Social capital is thus the economic benefits that 
arise from social interaction. He also observes that social capital enhances the capacity for 
coordinated action and solves the free rider problem. 
Collier (2003, p. 19) sees social interaction as also providing knowledge with regard to the 
reliability of the network. For him it does so through the gossip that (the network) assigns and 
updates a reputation for each agent known to the network. He observes (Collier, 2003, p. 19) 
that in more traditional societies social interaction within the village solves the problems of 
asymmetric information since the reputation of virtually all agents are known.   
The benefits accruing from social relationships discussed by Collier are formally described by 
Sandefur and Laumann (1988, p. 486) as information, influence and control, and social 
solidarity. The authors hold that benefits arise from the timeliness, relevance and 
trustworthiness of the information provided. In their view, access to diverse sources of 
information help individuals to access timely reports on relevant facts which could lead to 
socioeconomic attainment and labour market success. Sandefur and Laumann (1988, p. 487) 
describe influence and control benefits as the ability to influence others and the ability to be 
free of others’ influence. They define influence as the ability to induce another to behave or 
think in a certain way. An individual’s ability to influence the behaviour of others can be 
                                                 
4 The negative side of social capital will be discussed in section three of this chapter.  
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attributed to his position in the social structure. The authors describe social solidarity benefits 
as  
those that arise out of conditions of repeated interaction among the same actors over time, during 
which forms of capital such as trust and mutual obligations accumulate . . . solidarity relationships are 
characterized by some degree of cooperation in which all parties contribute to collective gain (Sandefur 
& Laumann, 1988, p. 487).   
Social capital can be used as a resource by either individuals or groups and communities and 
can therefore play itself out at the micro, meso or macro-levels.  
2.3 TYPES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
The literature on social capital often refers to different types of social capital in the form of 
bonding, bridging and linking social capital.   
The concept of bonding refers to the links that individuals form with people perceived to be 
similar to themselves who may aid them in some or other aspect of their lives (Amlani, 2010, 
p. 12). Bridging social capital, in contrast, refers to the links individuals have with people 
perceived to be dissimilar to themselves who may aid them in some or other aspect of their 
lives. Linking in social capital literature, on the other hand, refers to the links individuals form 
with people at a different level on the social ladder to gain access to resources and/or knowledge 
(Amlani, 2010, p. 13). For Woolcock (2001, p. 13) it is the different combinations or mix of 
bonding, bridging and linking social capital that explain the various outcomes observed in the 
literature.  
Bonding occurs more frequently in families or other relatively similar groups and can provide 
important emotional, personal, financial and other benefits to its members through close ties 
and support (NESF, 2003, p. 34). Bonding typically arises in homogeneous groups, based on 
connections among families and, ethnic groups, may include class and religion-based groups, 
and seems to be more common in more traditional societies (Mani, 2001, p. 3). These groups 
often have strong levels of internal solidarity and trust. For example, poor people in both urban 
and rural contexts rely on bonding social capital for access to credit during periods of crisis 
(Mani, 2001, p. 5). This is part of their survival strategies. Using the example of immigrants as 
a case in point, Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 2) note that, without initial financial support from 
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strong community groups, small businesses fail to get started or go bankrupt in the early stages 
of their development in their adopted countries. 
Bonding social capital represents the construction of intra-group ties (Woolcock & Narayan, 
2000, p. 239). There are, however, cases in which bonding social capital can be harmful. 
Hjerppe (2003, p. 12) cites the example of criminal groups like the Mafia who have strong 
internal “bonding” social capital that is not meant to be used for the good of society. Hjerppe 
(2003, p. 13) also observes that strong group formation may be harmful to economic growth if 
such groups prevent innovation and flexibility. Narayan and Cassidy (2001, p. 2) hold that 
social groups embedded in tightly knit social orders that are not accountable to citizens at large 
could fuel corruption and cronyism and impact on the functioning of political and government 
institutions. Bonding social capital is also negative when “groups who are not alike” are 
excluded from the “club” or “mainstream group” and do not enjoy mutual support. 
Bridging social capital connects different types of people and groups (e.g. ethnic, social, 
gender, political or regional) and can be particularly effective for people seeking social and 
economic gain beyond their immediate society. It can be categorised as horizontal links 
between distinct communities (Mani, 2001, p. 3). This type of social capital arises when 
associations and connections are made across social, geographical, race or identity lines. 
Varshney (2000, cited in Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 242), notes that cross-cutting ties that 
connect different groups give groups a better chance of dealing with differences than groups 
that lack such ties. Narayan and Cassidy (2001, p. 12) concur with this by observing that the 
influence of social capital is most profound when networks and associations exist between 
heterogeneous groups. Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 242) appropriately see bridging social 
capital as referring to extra-group networks. Weak levels of bridging social capital are seen as 
a possible reason for conflict between groups. 
“Linking’ social capital connects groups and individuals to others who occupy a different social 
position (e.g. more powerful or socially advantaged persons)” (NESF, 2003, p. 34). Mani 
(2001, p. 3) sees linking social capital as establishing vertical linkages between communities 
and institutions in a socioeconomic hierarchy. Woolcock (2001, p. 13) is of the view that 
linking social capital is characterised by the connections between those with differential levels 
of power or social status, for example links between the political elite and the general public 
or between individuals from different social classes.  
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As for the effects of either too much or too little of these types of social capital the National 
Economic and Social Forum (NESF, 2003, p. 34, and cited in Healy, 2003, p. 8) had this to 
say: 
Too much bonding and too little bridging can stifle and restrict personal initiative and innovation. Too 
much bridging and too little bonding can leave individuals personally vulnerable. On the other hand, 
insufficient linking social capital can leave specific social groups isolated from the centres of power and 
influence necessary for the realisation of their rights and interests.   
Research conducted by Fox (1996) and Heller (1996), cited in Woolcock (2001, p. 14), found 
that poverty is largely a function of exclusion and powerlessness which can be better tackled if 
development practitioners and policy makers reach out and scale up (through linking social 
capital) the activities of the poor. This means that policy makers can facilitate the establishment 
of vertical linkages between communities and institutions in a socioeconomic hierarchy. 
However, Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 3) observe that communities often develop along a path 
where extensive intra-community ties (or extensive internal “bonding” ties) progress with time 
to more extra-community ties (bridging social capital). Initial bonding is thus important in the 
development of communities or groups. 
Once this initial bonding has taken place, Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 3) note that the poorer 
communities need to  
forge and maintain linkages transcending their community so that: (i) the economic and non-economic 
claims of community members can be resisted when they undermine (or threaten to undermine) the 
group’s economic viability and expansion; (ii) entry to more sophisticated factor and product markets 
can be secured; and (iii) individuals of superior ability and ambition within the business group itself are 
able to insert themselves into larger and more complex social networks. In successful community-level 
development programs, linkages to outside institutions are forged incrementally; a community's stock 
of social capital in the form of internal ties can be the basis for launching development initiatives, but 
it must be complemented over time by the construction of new forms of social capital, i.e. linkages to 
non-community members (Rao & Woolcock, 2001, p. 3).  
A deficiency in bridging and linking social capital can leave communities underdeveloped and 
vulnerable. This is particularly the case among certain ethnic groups and minorities where a 
lack of bridging and linking social capital can expose them to continuing marginalisation and 
disempowerment.  
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Jooste (2005, p. 5), in a study using data from the Cape Area Study (CAS) 2003, found that 
bonding social capital appeared to be more widespread than bridging forms of social capital in 
the Western Cape.  
The review of this aspect of the literature suggests that a mix of bonding, bridging and linking 
social capital is desirable to maximise developmental outcomes for communities, particularly 
if they are poor and marginalised, and interested primarily in their own survival. Furthermore, 
the review reveals that poor communities are able to improve their wellbeing when they 
develop their networks beyond their own community.   
2.4 PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL CAPITAL  
In the literature reviewed there is a body of thought that sees social capital as encompassing 
several dimensions, each of which relates to different social formations. Woolcock and 
Narayan (2000, pp. 228–239) suggest that there are various perspectives that one can take on 
social capital, whether it is used at a micro, meso or macro-level. They classify the four 
perspectives as (i) the communitarian, (ii) the network, (iii) the institutional and (iv) the 
synergistic perspective. 
Social capital in the communitarian perspective is equated with local organisations such as 
associations and social and civic groups in a given community. Woolcock and Narayan (2000, 
p. 230) see this perspective as measuring social capital by the number and density of groups in 
a given community and by how social ties are used to reduce the vulnerability of the poor. For 
them, the communitarian downside is when productive social capital is replaced by perverse 
social capital which hinders development. They point out that even though there are 
considerable benefits to being part of a group there may be several disadvantages which could 
outweigh the benefits. The communitarian perspective sees communities as homogeneous 
entities that include and benefit all, ignoring inequality, ethnic exclusion and gender. They state 
that even though some communities have dense and integrated groups, these groups might 
provide social solidarity and cooperative behaviour but do not necessarily lead them to 
economic prosperity. For Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 230) it is conceivable to have high 
social solidarity yet have pervasive poverty. The negative side of social group membership will 
be further discussed in this chapter.  
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For Woolcock and Narayan the “network perspective” emphasises the role of vertical and 
horizontal linkages and associations between people and the relations within and among other 
organisational entities such as community groups and firms. In the network view social capital 
is a double-edged sword. It can provide a range of valuable resources for community members, 
but there are also costs when these same ties place considerable non-economic claims on 
members’ sense of obligation and commitment that have negative economic consequences 
(Woolcock, 2000, p. 230).  
Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 232) show that as the diversity of the networks increases, so 
does the welfare of the poor. The optimal amount of intra and extra-ties changes throughout 
the life cycle of the person. The nature of the networks is also different among the poor and the 
rich. The rich may have networks that advance material enhancement while the poor are more 
likely to use them for protection and risk management. Solidarity networks that reduce risk and 
uncertainty among the poor involve sharing personal information. For Woolcock and Narayan 
(2000, p. 233) the clear challenge to social capital theory, research and policy from the 
networks perspective is to identify the conditions under which the many positive aspects of 
bonding social capital in poor communities can be harnessed and its integrity retained  
and, if necessary, its negative aspects dissipated, while simultaneously helping the poor gain access to 
formal institutions and a more diverse stock of “bridging” social capital. It is a process fraught with 
multiple dilemmas, however, especially for external NGOs, extension services, and development 
agencies, since it may entail altering social systems that are the product of long-standing cultural 
traditions or powerful vested interests (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 233).  
Studies on social capital in poor communities in South Africa such as by Jooste (2005) point 
to the strong bonding social capital prevalent in these communities, primarily on the basis of 
race. Very little bridging social capital seems to be present. These findings are also manifested 
in the areas of Cederberg and Matzikama among the poor African/Black community. A deeper 
analysis of the findings of this research will shed light on which factors give rise to this situation 
and how important bridging and linking social capital are to the development of better 
socioeconomic outcomes in these communities. In the typology of Woolcock and Narayan 
(2000) the network  
minimizes the “public good” nature of social groups, regarding any benefits of group activity as 
primarily the property of the particular individuals involved. As such it is highly sceptical of arguments 
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that social capital can (or should) be measured across larger social aggregates, such as societies or 
nations. Neither does it explicitly incorporate macro-level institutions such as the state, and their 
capacity to both shape and be shaped by local communities. To be sure, the networks perspective 
recognizes that weak laws and overt discrimination can undermine efforts by poor minorities to act in 
their collective interest, but the role communities play in shaping institutional performance generally, 
and the enormous potential of positive state-society relations in particular, is largely ignored (Woolcock 
& Narayan, 2000, p. 234).   
In the institutional perspective, Woolcock and Narayan stress the centrality of the state in 
facilitating the capacity of social groups to act in their collective interests. The institutional 
view also differs from the network and communitarian perspectives in that social capital is not 
treated as an independent variable. Instead, it is treated as a dependant variable influencing the 
behaviour of groups. In their view, “performance of states and firms themselves depends on 
their own internal coherence, credibility, and competence, and their external accountability to 
civil society” (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 234). 
The synergistic perspective is an attempt by a number of scholars to integrate the various 
perspectives discussed above. Woolcock and Narayan summarise three of the more important 
arguments of this new perspective: 
• The first proposition is that  
contrary to some public choice and communitarian theorists, neither the state nor societies are inherently 
good or bad; governments, corporations, and civic groups are “variables” in terms of the impact they can 
have on the attainment of collective goals (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 236). 
• The second proposition is that  
states, firms, and communities alone do not possess the resources needed to promote broad-based, 
sustainable development; complementarities and partnerships forged both within and across these 
different sectors are required. Identifying the conditions under which these synergies emerge (or fail 
to emerge) is thus a central task of development theory and practice (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 
236).  
• The third proposition is that the state’s role in facilitating positive development outcomes 
is both problematic and important. According to the authors this is so  
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because the state is not only the ultimate provider of public goods (stable currencies, public health, 
universal education) and the final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law (property rights, due process, 
freedom of speech and association); it is also the actor best situated to facilitating enduring alliances 
across the boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, gender, politics, and religion. One of the primary 
contributors to this view concludes that synergy between government and citizen action is based on 
complementarity and embeddedness (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 236).  
Therefore the synergy view stresses that inclusive development takes place when 
representatives of the state, the business sector, and civil society establish common forums 
through which they can identify and pursue common goals thus having important impacts 
on development outcomes (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 238).  
These perspectives are important in highlighting the different permutations of 
networks/associations in poor communities. They also provide an important lens through which 
to interpret the findings in the rural Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities.  
2.5 SOCIAL CAPITAL DEBATES IN THE ECONOMIC 
LITERATURE 
Social capital entered the realm of economics as economists tried to understand the nature of 
several problems related to collective action and the management of issues related to market 
failure (Serageldin & Grootaert, 2000; Ostrom, 2000). Many of the benefits of social capital 
(as outlined in the earlier section) arise in some way or the other out of the need to improve 
individual and community outcomes through collective action and improved market efficiency.   
Stiglitz (2000, p. 64) sees the one important function of social capital as the complementarity 
or substitutability it provides for market-based exchange and allocation. This was particularly 
true in primitive economies and in the early stages in the development of market economies, 
when markets were thin and incomplete and a thick network of interpersonal relations 
functioned to resolve the allocative and distributive questions. 
Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 45) observe that at the micro-level, social capital can 
improve the way markets function, especially in the case of market failure. Where there is 
information asymmetry, according to them, optimal decisions are often difficult to make 
because of uncertainty (2000, p. 47). In this instance “social” institutions can help disseminate 
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accurate information that allows market players to make appropriate, efficient decisions. The 
authors looked at group-based lending schemes such as the Grameen Bank as a case in point. 
This role of social institutions is confirmed by Arrow (2000, p. 3) who concurs that social 
networks guard against market failure caused by asymmetric information. In the words of the 
above authors, social networks are “supplementary activities that exploit monitoring devices 
not otherwise available.”  
Social capital also helps in making collective decisions—a necessary element in the provision 
of public goods. It resolves problems relating to collective action by allowing individuals, 
groups and communities to address these problems more easily. In the view of Côté (2001, p. 
30), collective action involves use of norms and networks in situations where individuals might 
otherwise be reluctant to be cooperative or socially engaged. Thus, norms of reciprocity and 
networks help ensure compliance with collectively desirable behaviour. In the absence of trust 
and networks to ensure compliance, individuals tend not to cooperate because others cannot be 
relied on to act in a similar way. Many social scientists refer to such coordination problems by 
various labels including “the prisoner’s dilemma” or the “free rider problem.”  
Ostrom (2000, pp. 194–198) finds that in coordination problems humans recurringly face a 
wide range of “potential equilibria”, that is, when they face a social dilemma or circumstance 
involving collective action, she finds that participants may easily follow short-term, 
maximising strategies that leave them worse off than other options available to them. Somehow 
participants must find ways of creating mutually reinforcing expectations and trust to overcome 
the inefficient short-run temptation they face. This is akin to the classic case of the prisoner’s 
dilemma in which both prisoners are worse off if they do not cooperate. Thus, through the 
sharing of information, associations can also help disseminate reliable information that allows 
groups and communities to make efficient and appropriate decisions (Ostrom, 2000, p. 198). 
For Mani (2001, p. 4), where social capital is high, there are strong interpersonal 
communication channels improving the likelihood of innovation being diffused to members of 
a specific community. 
Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 48) reinforce this idea and note that uncoordinated or 
opportunistic behaviour by economic agents lie behind the failure of many irrigation projects 
because these projects often lack formal or informal means of imposing equitable agreements 
for sharing water. According to the authors this often leads to some farmers either using the 
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water needed by others or failing to contribute to the maintenance of irrigation projects. In their 
view effective social capital in the form of water use groups can overcome such uncoordinated 
behaviour since these associations reduce opportunistic behaviour and create a framework 
within which individuals interact repeatedly—instilling trust among members.   
There are conditions under which such institutions have positive “collective action” outcomes. 
Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 49) concur that local and voluntary associations do not 
always effectively maximise their ability to make collective decisions. They find that local 
institutions are more effective at enforcing common agreement and cooperative action when 
the assets are distributed relatively equitably and benefits are shared equally. Sharing provides 
an incentive for improved coordination and the management of local public goods, increasing 
productivity for everyone.  
Furthermore, Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 49) observe that social interaction can either 
produce coordinated action spontaneously or result in conscious decision making. Spontaneous 
coordination generally occurs as a result of established norms and other initial conditions.    
The authors offer four reasons why coordinated action works. The first involves the use of 
social sanctions which are used against opportunism to lower transaction costs. In addition, it 
enables common pool resources to be managed, economies of scale to be reaped in non-market 
activities and public goods to be provided. In this scheme of things, the need for social capital 
diminishes as the market becomes capable of performing a wider range of activities. In Africa, 
where firms and governments are under-developed and transaction costs high, there is a need 
for greater coordination through social interaction (Serageldin & Grootaert, 2000, p. 49).   
For Mani (2001, p. 4), social capital also serves as an informal social safety net for the poor. 
Where social capital is high there is a greater sharing of household risks. This happens in the 
form of help from relatives and the community (for example, through the informal issue of 
credit provision). In this way, social capital provides insurance for the poor where markets fail 
to do this.  
It would appear that theorists do not agree on the reasons for differential levels of social capital 
within or between countries. The view of Stiglitz (2000) that social capital is likely to be strong 
in less developed economies where functions of resource allocation have to be carried out 
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seems plausible. This, however, would have to be contrasted with the theory of Serageldin and 
Grootaert (2000) that social capital diminishes as markets perform a wider range of activities. 
But is social capital largely a response to market conditions? Even in more developed markets 
social interaction increases in response to what groups see as infringement of their rights, a call 
for moral imperatives or a relegation of their economic status by market forces. Environmental 
groups, anti-abortion coalitions and anti-crime forums may be some of the best examples of 
this. 
The importance of social capital to economics is still a fertile field for research not least because 
it postulates a form of capital that purportedly influences socioeconomic development, albeit 
not with the same quantitative rigour that is to be found in physical or finance capital. This is 
perhaps best articulated by Coleman and others as the section that follows will show.   
2.6 THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
Since the publication of Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, a considerable body of literature 
has emerged that is either critical of the fundamental thesis of social capital or has sought to 
reveal its negative aspects (Fine, 2001; Harriss, 2002; Portes, 2014). This section reviews some 
of these published works on social capital. 
Baker and Faulkner (2004, p. 104) highlight the negative side of social capital with reference 
to white collar criminals who exploit social ties and networks for their own selfish ends. They 
note that when people use social ties to make economic decisions they are “substituting trust 
in social relationships for due diligence” (Baker & Faulkner, 2004, p. 104). They found that 
investors who only use within-network exchange have a higher probability of loss of capital 
than investors who use the same network exchange and still conduct due diligence. Their 
conclusion is that the harmful role of social networks may be limited to pre-planned frauds, 
that is, in those cases where businesses are created for the sole purpose of economic crime and 
where the sellers have only criminal intentions. When this happens social ties facilitate 
economic crimes (Baker & Faulkner, 2004, p. 106).  
Ostrom (2000, p. 177) also speaks of the negative side of social capital. She shows how gangs 
use social capital as the foundation for their organisational structures and how cartels use social 
capital to keep control over industry so as to reap more profits than would otherwise be the 
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case. The main reference points of the criticisms of the social capital thesis, though, are its 
economic aspects and that of social history.  
2.7 CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
From a social history perspective, Krishna (2000, p. 72) criticises Putnam’s view that social 
capital is a legacy of long periods of historical development. Present generations cannot, in his 
view, add productively to their inherited stock of social capital in the short run. Krishna, by 
deduction, argues that this view leads to accepting that people are destined to live with the 
fruits of their legacy—if they are rich in social capital then they will develop faster and vice 
versa. If this is true then prospects for the mobilisation of social capital for better developmental 
outcomes are dismal. However, this dismal prospect is disputed by a number of recent 
empirical studies, some of which have been briefly articulated earlier in the literature review. 
For example, a study undertaken by Schneider 1997 (cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 
72) shows that the design of the institutions delivering local public goods can indeed influence 
levels of social capital.  
Another criticism leveled at Putnam is that he does not indicate the transmission mechanism of 
how civil society actually impacts on government performance. According to Booth and 
Richard (1998, p. 782) there is no clearly defined explanation of how group involvement 
(networks and associations) affects citizen behaviour so as to influence government 
performance. Is Putnam implying that people are socialised through their involvement and 
participation in social groups to take a greater interest in political issues and engage in greater 
political participation (unfortunately this question is not tackled in the literature examined and 
will be dealt with in the qualitative part of the dissertation)?  
In their criticism of Putnam’s theory of social capital in North America, Portes and Vickstrom 
(2011, p. 468) argues that history, particularly historical patterns of migration in the USA, are 
the most important predictors of social capital. Non-Southern states in the USA  
with a homogenous white and better educated population are the places where you find higher stocks 
of social capital. One group of Europeans like Norwegians, Finns and Icelanders (who migrated to the 
USA and) who tended to settle in the harsh areas of America had to form tightly knit, self-sufficient 
communities where strong egalitarian traditions and participation in collective activities required for 
survival were the norm. No other group migrated so disproportionately to northern Michigan and 
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Wisconsin, Minnesota and the Dakotas and no other group established such strong, independent 
institutions of community life. . . . These are the states that show the highest stocks in the map of social 
capital.  
Portes and Vickstrom (2011, p. 468) go further to state that  
these historical traditions may be at the root of both different levels of economic inequality and of civic 
and social activism observed a century later. The percentage of Scandinavian origin in a state’s 
population becomes, by far, the strongest influence on social capital.    
Thus for Portes and Vickstrom (2011, p. 469)  
social capital is an outcome of historical forces buried deep in a nation’s past and there is little point in 
promoting it as a cure for social ills or exhorting citizens to become more participatory. Because social 
capital cannot be willed into existence but arises out of complex historical processes, such exhortations 
would have little effect on alleviating present social problems.  
From a political economy perspective Harriss (2002, p. 2) illustrates how work by well-
intentioned social scientists draw from and add to a “hegemonic social science that 
systematically obscures power, class and politics.” He goes further to state that the work on 
social capital (particularly the work on trust and participation) has come to “constitute new 
weapons in the armoury of the ‘anti-politics machine’ that is constituted by the practices of 
international development” (Harriss, 2002, p. 2). He states that these ideas suit the interest of 
global capitalism because they present problems that are rooted in the political economy of 
power and class as “purely technical matters that can be resolved outside the political arena.” 
He goes on further to infer that the social capital theses are directed against “the movements of 
the political left for progressive socio-political and economic change which do identify roots 
of poverty and social deprivation in class differences” (Harriss, 2002, p. 2).  
According to Harriss (2002, p. 7) the book Making Democracy Work has become “a charter 
for the view that social capital is crucial for economic development.” In fact, Putnam’s work 
on social capital has  
been purported as the missing link and as such provides strong conceptual support for programmes 
that emphasise such tasks as identifying pockets of social capital and using participation to deliver 
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projects or programmes that identify the construction of social capital with encouragement for 
participation (Harriss, 2002, p. 7).   
Harriss (2002, p. 7) states that in the end funds are channelled to non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) rather than local government bodies. Yet according to Harriss (2002, p. 
7), these NGOs are not necessarily  
democratically accountable institutions and might appear to offer the possibility of a kind of democracy 
through popular participation but without the inconveniences of condensational politics and the 
conflicts of values and ideas which are a necessary part of democratic politics.  
Harriss (2002, p. 9) also shows that the political economy issues of power and class cannot be 
ignored in the context of local associations. These associations are not always neutral. He 
points to research showing “that when assets are unequally distributed local associations may 
well be dominated by and used to further the interests of more powerful people” (Harriss, 2002, 
p. 8). In fact the research shows that locally powerful people can capture these arenas to project 
their agendas. He concludes that “the application of social capital in development is not a 
distribution neutral process and that by themselves—without other resources—local 
associations may not make very much difference” (Harriss, 2002, p. 9).  
Ben Fine (2001, p. 15) who is probably one of the fiercest critics of social capital, shares views 
with Harriss, particularly with respect to the issues of class and power. Fine (2001, p. 15) 
believes the term social capital, as an economic category, is an oxymoron because capital is in 
itself social. For Fine all capital is social and historical especially that which is rooted in 
capitalism (2001, p. 25). However, he acknowledges that the positive side to the interest in 
social capital is that it attempts to integrate economic with non-economic analysis, since one 
of the features of modern mainstream economics is that there is an explicit understanding that 
capital is first and foremost to be understood as asocial (2001, p. 26).  
For Fine (2001, p. 28) the recent interest in social capital  
can be seen as an intellectual product of the crisis of faith in both the capitalist state and the capitalist 
market in late twentieth century capitalism since it represents a desire in both analytical and policy 
terms to find alternatives to the neo-liberal agenda of market versus state.  
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He implies that the term social capital should be rejected because the use of the term would 
mean an  
“implicit” acceptance of the stance of mainstream economics in which capital is first and foremost a set 
of asocial endowments possessed by individuals rather than an exploitative relation between classes 
and the broader social relations that sustain them. The social can only be applied to capital because it 
has been forcibly and artificially torn away in the first place (Fine, 2001, p. 38).  
Fine’s rejection of the term social capital manifests the stark contrasts between the concept of 
capital in Marxist and mainstream vocabulary. The use of the word “capital” in the mainstream 
lexicon does not denote the accumulation of material wealth and the exploitative relationship 
between classes that accompanies such an accumulation process. The agglomeration of social 
processes, however, yields forms of wealth that precede capital accumulation as emerged in 
the period of early industrialisation. Pre-capitalist “tribal” societies are an example of this—
communities that were self-sufficient in the absence of capital and the “state and state 
institutions” for centuries.    
Social capital can then be said to be an intrinsic part of material progress, albeit not sufficient 
on its own. While its impact on socioeconomic outcomes cannot be dismissed, its theoretical 
plausibility (meaning a theory of change) still poses some daunting challenges.  
2.8 CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THESIS  
The literature review reveals the intense debates and discussions around the theoretical 
concepts and constructs articulated in the social capital debate. Unpacking the types and 
approaches to social capital showed the importance of social capital to economic theory.  
The main conclusions that can be drawn from this section is that social capital can be either 
structural or cognitive or both at the same time. However, it is the structural part of social 
capital—that is, the network aspects—that has been endorsed in the literature.  
Social capital can be used as a resource by individuals, groups and communities and can 
therefore be found at the micro, meso and macro-levels. Social capital can also be broken down 
into different types in the form of bonding, bridging and linking social capital.    
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This chapter examined the views of analysts who are critical of social capital as an economic 
and historical theory of development. In the overview of their work, this brief sample of the 
works of analysts who are critical of the social capital thesis has given an indication of the 
theoretical debates that have been raging in the literature on the subject. Their contributions 
continue to shape the discourse on what is a relatively young school of thought. Whatever the 
standing of social capital theory at this stage, it has nevertheless cast its influential net over 
several disciplines in the social sciences and it is only the continuing accumulation of empirical 
evidence that will pronounce a verdict on its efficacy as a mode of analysis for the development 
of societies. It is in the analysis of research findings that I try to add to this body of empirical 
evidence.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
32 
 
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
ACHIEVING SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES -           
THE PUTNAM THESIS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
In his pioneering work, Putnam (1993) advanced the theory that social capital in the form of 
networks and associations had an impact on economic and political outcomes even if these 
associations had no connection to politics or the economy. In Putnam’s (1993, p. 91) view, 
members of associations displayed more political sophistication, and had higher levels of trust, 
political participation and civic competence. His explanation was that this was because civic 
participation instils skills of cooperation and a sense of shared responsibility in individuals. 
This, in turn, results in a better quality of government and better social and economic outcomes 
for more civic communities. He elaborated on this by saying that this is because citizens in 
civic communities demand more effective government and are more prepared to act 
cooperatively to achieve their shared goals. Those in less civic regions are distrustful of others 
and likely to be less prosperous than the former group. Putnam concluded that social capital is 
a powerful variable affecting the overall level of achievement in a society (or among a 
particular group).  
The Putnam framework illustrated in Figure 3-1 depicts how associations/networks impact on 
socioeconomic outcomes. In this chapter the various key concepts and constructs of the Putnam 
thesis are reviewed. Each aspect of the framework is discussed and the shortcomings 
highlighted. The different characteristics of associations/networks are explored and assessed, 
including how they function and under which circumstances they arise. The relationship 
between networks/associations, trust and participation is also explored. The concept and 
definition of the term “generalised trust” are examined. In particular, its limitations and 
alternatives to the concept are considered. In unpacking the concept of civic engagement and 
participation, different modes of engagement are described, with the focus on the factors that 
impact on civic engagement and participation, how they affect the functioning of government 
and, ultimately, how they impact on development outcomes.  
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Figure 3–1: A Graphical Illustration of my Interpretation of Putnam’s Framework
 
The reasons for cataloguing the criticisms levelled at Putnam and probing the insights in the 
key concepts of Putnam’s framework lie in the need to augment the framework (Chapter Four) 
so as to describe a detailed transmission mechanism from social capital to socioeconomic 
outcomes in the context of rural municipalities in South Africa. The augmented analytical 
framework will later be used to explain the different outcomes in the two study areas of 
Cederberg and Matzikama. 
This section is organised according to the concepts articulated by Putnam and illustrated in my 
interpretation of the Putnam thesis:  
• Networks and associations 
• Trust 
• Civic participation 
• Government effectiveness  and  
• Socioeconomic outcomes. 
3.2 NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONAL ACTIVITY 
In the literature on social capital, the terms “networks” and “associations” are often used 
interchangeably. Yet networks and associations are not completely the same thing. Networks 
are distributed groups of people that communicate with one another and work together as a unit 
or system for a joint purpose. Networks are more characteristic of individuals and small groups 
while associations are broader than networks.  
From the review of the literature, what is clear is that both networks and associations are vital 
components of social capital. Networks are often characterised as informal links while 
associations are deemed to be formal entities. According to Rose (2000, p. 149), networks are 
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defined as face-to-face relationships between a limited number of individuals who know one 
another and who are bound together by “kinship, friendship and propinquity.” For Rose, 
networks are institutions in the sociological sense of having patterned and recurring interaction. 
He sees networks as generally lacking in legal recognition without written rules or funds. This, 
according to Rose, is what gives them their informal status. He further notes that even if 
networks have a formal identity (formal networks), such as a choir or rural cooperative, face-
to-face networks tend to be horizontal and diffuse. They generally have a reputation for helpful 
cooperation which is more important than cash payments and bureaucratic regulations. He 
notes that most outputs of networks are unrecorded in national accounts.  
In the literature, associations are sometimes characterised as organisations. In Rose’s view 
organisations are different to networks in that they are generally constituted as formal entities 
and hence, are rule bound, bureaucratic, have a legal personality and obtain some form of 
revenue from the market, the state or donations from philanthropists. A formal organisation 
can have individuals as its members or its members can be organisations. Formal organisations 
for Rose (2000, p. 149), are a feature of modern society which requires functional units that 
are made up of impersonal bureaucratic organisations of the state, the market or both, that 
routinely produce a range of complex goods such as automobiles and university education.  
3.2.1 Characteristics of Networks 
Networks and associations provide a host of benefits at an individual level as well as at the 
level of the community, the state or both. According to Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, pp. 
48–49) associations and institutions provide a framework for sharing information, coordinating 
activities and making collective decisions. Bardhan (1995, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 
2000, p. 46) argues that what makes this model work is peer monitoring, a common set of 
norms and sanctions at the local level.  
The broad utility of networks, as noted earlier, is that they are a means through which 
opportunities can be accessed. But networks can also close off opportunities to others. For 
example, Tonkiss (2004, p. 21) points to the role of trade unions in keeping black workers and 
women out of certain jobs in the USA. Similar arguments have been used to understand why 
certain family businesses have problems expanding—because they are closed to outside 
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expertise and financial assistance (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 21). Closed networks, are characteristic of 
“bonding” behaviour.   
Networks can be interpreted from the perspectives of the individual and small groups and the 
perspectives of the community and state. The individual perspective usually forms part of the 
sociological branch of social capital. Lin (2001, p. 45), a sociologist by training, observes that 
social capital provides benefits for individuals who act for a purpose. In this context interaction 
in a network is seen as a means to attain the goal of action. For Lin there are motives for 
interaction in a network. The primary motive is to protect existing resources and gain additional 
ones. Thus the actions of individuals in a network are rational and are motivated to maintain or 
gain valued resources in order to survive. In his discussion on action, he deals with the concept 
of instrumental action, which he defines as triggering actions and reactions from others leading 
to more allocation of resources (2001, p. 46).  
In his seminal work, Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1993, pp.172–173) reinforces the 
positive role of networks and associations, remarking that membership in associations 
strengthens political and economic efficiency even if the associations themselves play no role 
in either the polity or the economy. Putnam distinguishes between the effects of different types 
of associations. In his work on Italy, Putnam also found that the northern parts of Italy have 
been richer than the southern parts for several centuries despite having been on par at the 
beginning of the second millennium5. Helliwell and Putnam (1995, cited in  Dasgupta & 
Serageldin, 2000, p. 253) found that the differences in associational life were matched by 
differences in societal structure with horizontal structures in the north and hierarchical 
structures in the south, and by differences in the extent of civic community, citizen involvement 
and governmental efficiency. According to Putnam (1993, p. 116) these “horizontal” networks 
can be characterised as social networks since they are not hierarchical. In his opinion 
communities in social networks often value social solidarity, civic engagement, cooperation 
and honesty more than in hierarchical ones.  
                                                 
5 That is, from the 11th century of the Christian era. 
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For example, Putnam (1993, pp. 107–108) found that membership in hierarchical associations, 
such as the Catholic Church in Southern Italy, “which do not create mutuality and equality of 
participation,” do not have the same effect as membership in more “horizontal” groups such as 
civic associations. He also found that civic associations contributed to the effectiveness and 
stability of democratic government because these networks and associations instil in their 
members “habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness.” Civic associations were 
also found to be more equitable and more densely populated than hierarchical ones.  
Putnam (1993, p. 173) also found regions characterised by horizontal networks had more 
cooperatives, cultural associations, mutual aid societies, neighbourhood associations, religious 
fraternities and guilds. These Italian regions have been able to establish higher levels of output 
per capita by virtue of greater endowments of social capital. According to Helliwell and Putnam 
(1995, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 265) social capital was linked to higher levels 
of regional satisfaction and greater economic growth in the northern regions of Italy which 
were endowed with more horizontal or “social networks”.   
Boix and Posner (1996, p. 3) remark that  
the difference between horizontal and vertical associations lies in the fact that vertical relationships, 
such as exist between patrons and clients, are characterized by dependence instead of mutuality, and 
are thus highly limited in their ability to generate norms of reciprocity, social trust or a shared sense of 
responsibility for collective endeavours. 
Putnam (1993, p. 174) explains how networks of “civic engagement” or horizontal networks 
have this powerful side effect in that it fosters norms of reciprocity, facilitates communication 
and improves the flow of information.  
One of the correlations drawn from Putnam’s work is that the higher the number of networks 
and associations, the greater the capacity for community members to collaborate for mutual 
benefit. Network density and horizontally structured networks impact positively on civic 
participation.  
Both these arguments were somewhat contested by Ikeda (2002) and Savage et al. (2004) who 
carried out work in Japan and the United Kingdom respectively. For Japan, Ikeda (2002, p. 17) 
found that membership in both horizontal and vertical associations impacted positively on 
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political participation, with the effect of vertical associations being stronger than that of 
horizontal associations. His observation that vertical associations “influence the fermentation 
of civic mindedness” opens up an area that warrants further investigation. 
In their work on two organisations in the UK, Savage et al. (2004, p. 35) concurred with Putnam 
that hierarchically structured organisations had lower levels and a lower quality of activism 
than that of more horizontal organisations. The structure of membership also differed between 
the two organisations studied. However, unlike Putnam, Savage et al. found that density of 
membership is not vital for organisational vibrancy and “that membership figures are not an 
adequate proxy for the internal features of processes within associations” (Savage et al., 2004, 
p. 35). It is not the number of associations but rather the degree of activism in these associations 
that impact on development outcomes. 
For Savage et al. (2004, p. 24) there is a need to know exactly what the features of networks 
are as well as the precise mechanism through which associational activity leads to engagement. 
Essentially Savage et al. ask about the mechanisms through which networks generate trust and 
activism. In the development of the analytical framework in Chapter Four, an attempt will be 
made to identify which characteristics of networks have the greatest impact on trust and 
participation. Later in the chapter on findings, I explore how networks evolve to incorporate 
these more important characteristics which result in improved impacts on trust and 
participation, using the example of the rural African/Black communities in Cederberg and 
Matzikama.    
3.2.2 Networks: Scope, Intensity and Type  
Associations socialise their members by instilling in them “habits of the heart” Putnam 
observed in 1993 (cited in Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 35). Associations also perform an 
educational function by schooling members in public life and encouraging them towards civic 
engagement. Wollebæk and Selle (2002, p. 35) sought to discover the types of participation (in 
associations) that are likely to generate the benefits of social capital by tackling the question 
along three dimensions—intensity, scope, and type. When examining the first dimension of 
intensity, they looked at the types of associational affiliation more likely to provide the intensity 
of face-to-face interactions to promote social capital—or differently put—the type of 
interactions that lead to generalised trust and civic engagement. They examined memberships 
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in both secondary and tertiary associations where secondary institutions are civic organisations 
and tertiary institutions are characterised by “centralized, paid-staff leadership; they tend to be 
non-democratically structured; and the support of the members tends to be channelled through 
money rather than time” (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 35).    
The authors find that even though membership in secondary institutions can increasingly be 
characterised as “passive” rather than “active”, this passive form of membership is not 
necessarily negative “since the longer individuals remain in their passive roles, the more 
influence the association has on their attitudes” (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 37). Since this 
may be the case, the authors feel that the role of passive membership in associations may be 
understated.  
The second dimension of scope examines the extent to which the number of affiliations (to 
voluntary organisations) impacts on social capital. It was found that belonging to dense, 
multiple cross-cutting organisations is much more conducive to creating social capital than 
(intensely) belonging to just one association. Even if one passively belongs to many 
associations it may be more beneficial than being actively engaged in just one association. 
Their empirical estimation of data reinforced this statement, indicating that scope matters in 
the promotion of social capital (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 53). 
The third dimension of “type” tests whether certain types of association activities are more 
conducive to social capital formation than others. Wollebæk and Selle (2002, p. 38) point out 
that Putnam (1995) implicitly gives priority to non-political associations rather than political 
associations in promoting social capital. The authors quote a few influential studies that 
question the effectiveness of associations (without an expressed political purpose) to act as 
intermediaries between the individual and the state. In their empirical studies they show that 
membership or participation in multiple associations with different purposes was the best way 
of forming social capital.   
Using data from the USA, Sweden and Germany, Stolle and Rochon (2001, pp. 154–155) found 
that membership in different types of associational activities have different impacts on aspects 
of the social capital thesis. For example, membership in cultural associations exhibit high levels 
of public social capital. Membership in community associations exhibit high levels of 
generalised trust and reciprocity; membership based on personal interest and economic groups 
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have higher levels of political trust and efficacy; membership in political associations have the 
least levels of generalised trust, political trust and efficacy, and so on. 
Even though Putnam’s theory describes how individual, micro-level interactions aggregate and 
influence institutions at wider scales, Prakash and Selle (2001) are critical of the fact that it 
does not refer to how macro-level phenomena, such as changes in political institutions 
influence and, in turn, are affected by, micro-level interactions and behaviour. They are 
therefore concerned that social capital is treated as an exogenous variable which is not impacted 
on by the institutional context in which it is situated. In this regard, Prakash and Selle are 
embracing what Woolcock calls an “institutional” view of social capital where social capital 
gets impacted on through the institutional context in which the social groups reside. In a sense 
then, social capital is also a dependent variable rather than a purely independent catalyst. 
In their work on citizenship and civic participation, Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005, p. 235) 
argue that the voluntary associations that people are most likely to join are homogeneous and 
incapable of generating the benefits claimed. In particular they theorise that membership in 
homogeneous groups would not improve the extent to which trust would be generalised to 
people outside the group. In their view it is not membership in associations per se that impact 
on generalised trust but rather the nature of such memberships. To get the full benefits of 
associational involvement, they argue that groups must be heterogeneous so that people interact 
with others who hold different opinions from them. Even in this context social capital is 
dependent since empirical investigations show that there is no consensus on the extent to which 
diversity builds trust. There are strong regional differences that exist in this regard. For instance  
McLaren & Baird (2003) find that, among Italians, heterogeneous group members have higher 
generalized trust than homogeneous group members; however, Stolle (2001) finds that this 
relationship obtains only in certain countries. In Sweden, group diversity (defined as involvement of 
foreigners in the groups) was significantly and positively related to generalised trust, but in the United 
States, group diversity (defined as racial diversity) was significantly and negatively related to 
generalised trust (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005, p. 235). 
Even if it has not been conclusively established that heterogeneous networks build generalised 
trust, Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 233) contend that as the diversity of the networks 
increase so does the welfare of the poor. The authors also assert that the nature of the networks 
is different among the poor and the rich. In their view, the rich may have networks that advance 
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material enhancement while the networks of the poor are primarily there for protection and risk 
management. The authors believe that these networks can best be described as solidarity 
networks which reduce risk and uncertainty among the poor through the sharing of personal 
information and resources. This resonates with the work on social capital in South Africa by 
Adato, Carter, and May (2004, p. 26) who found that most bonding networks are “subsistence” 
rather than “development” networks. 
In order to understand the significance of social capital, Rose (2000, p. 166) feels that attention 
should be drawn to the functioning of networks in specific situations. For him this is a logical 
step because the output of the network depends on the situation. Networks that are used to 
maintain health are, for him, different to those that are used to produce food or repair homes. 
This confirms Coleman’s (1994) proposition that networks differ greatly between situations. 
He therefore finds it problematic to collectively add up membership in associations and 
networks into a single index or number. 
3.2.3 Networks and Ethnicity 
Campbell and McLean (2002, p. 4) examine the role that ethnicity (ethnic identity) plays in the 
likelihood of people’s participation in local community networks. In their study they found that 
members of Black and minority ethnic groups (particularly African-Caribbean residents in a 
small suburb in London) had difficulty in participating in beneficial community-level networks 
that would advance the interests of their community. In their view there are circumstances 
where certain ethnic groups may face barriers in accessing beneficial community-level 
networks.  
Even when ethnic minorities access community-level networks, research has shown that it is 
often the wealthiest and educated members of a community who participate in beneficial 
community-level networks with the unintended consequence of increasing, rather than 
decreasing, social equity (Baum et al., 2000, cited in Campbell & McLean, 2002, p. 9).  
The aforementioned authors turn to the literature on social psychology to point out the obstacles 
that some minorities face in participating in community-level networks. Here the literature 
indicates that a precondition for participation in community-level networks is a sense of 
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collective identity and collective agency or collective efficacy—factors which are often lacking 
in such communities. The authors found that even though the  
African-Caribbean identities played a key role in inter-personal networks (family and friends) the strong 
sense of interpersonal solidarity did not serve to unite the African-Caribbean people at the community 
level even though numerous opportunities existed for them to become involved in a range of activist 
networks including the provision of facilities for children . . . policing and leisure and entertainment 
facilities” (Campbell & McLean, 2002, p. 12 and p. 16).  
Furthermore, the sense of exclusion in school and the workplace constructs collective identities 
that makes it unlikely that people will identify with local community networks as representative 
of their needs and interests in the public spheres of local community, work or politics. In 
addition to this, African-Caribbean communities were not often located in the same 
geographical neighbourhood making it difficult to draw on a critical mass of people for 
collective agency.  
The ability of the African-Caribbean communities to act as a collective was undermined 
because they were small in number, dispersed and lacking in economic and political power, as 
well as psychological confidence. That this is sufficient explanation for the lack of social 
capital is doubtful and it would appear that research on other communities who possess similar 
characteristics would be useful (e.g. people who migrated from countries with similar histories 
as the Caribbean, are geographically dispersed, had similar experiences with regard to 
settlement, and share the same socioeconomic status), if only to understand the factors that 
influence the formation of social capital in immigrant communities. It is my intention to 
examine which factors are responsible for the different outcomes in Cederberg and Matzikama 
municipalities, with their large African/Black migrant population which experienced similar 
cultural and social displacement to the African-Caribbean communities in London.  
In summary, the review of the literature on networks and associational activity shows that the 
effectiveness of networks and associations is dependent on a host of variables and is often 
influenced by the environment in which they operate, particularly the underlying belief system. 
They can be either vertical or horizontal, have active or passive membership, be homogeneous 
and heterogeneous and differ in the activities they undertake. The literature also showed that a 
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sense of collective identity and collective agency are key factors influencing the ability/desire 
to participate in networks and this is often determined by the underlying belief system/values.   
These variables do not necessarily refute the central idea of Putnam’s thesis but are meant to 
show that studies on associational activity can be enriched by incorporating them to give a 
nuanced and comprehensive understanding of social networks and their impact on 
socioeconomic outcomes. This is taken up in the development of the augmented framework in 
Chapter Four. 
3.3 TRUST  
According to Putnam (1993, p. 171) social trust arises from networks of civic engagement. 
Hence after networks, an important concept in Putnam’s framework (See Figure 3-1) involves 
trust. There is a tendency among some analysts to use the terms social capital and trust 
interchangeably—as one and the same thing (Fukuyama, 1995, 1997). This is also evident in 
some of the empirical studies undertaken to measure the effects of social capital where trust is 
used as a proxy variable for social capital. Some scholars see this as problematic since trust 
(especially the term generalised trust) is a specific component of social capital (e.g. Hooghe, 
2007, p. 3, and Adler & Kwon, 2000, as cited in Lesser, 2000, p. 101). If trust is social capital 
then high levels of trust are required to facilitate cooperation and coordination. Yet Adler and 
Kwon (cited in Lesser, 2000, p. 101) refer to Granovetter’s (1973) discussion on the importance 
of weak ties in facilitating access to jobs as evidence that trust is conceptually distinct from 
social capital. According to Granovetter, weak ties do not require high trust since the levels of 
trust required for weak ties are close to neutral.  
Trust has been defined in many different ways in the literature on social capital. Uslaner (2006, 
p. 3) sees trust as allowing us to  
put greater confidence in other people’s promises that they mean what they say when they promise to 
cooperate. The “standard” account of trust presumes that trust depends on information and 
experience.   
The concept of trust refers to the understanding that individuals or members of social groups 
will operate in a manner that is equally advantageous and that the norms established through 
that relationship will ensure that they adhere to shared values. 
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The concept of trust also implies the presumption that organisations and institutions (not just 
individuals and groups) are worth the confidence ascribed to them (Crête, Pelletier, & Couture., 
2006, p. 4).  
For some analysts like Denzel and North (1994, cited in Rothstein & Eek, 2006, p. 5) trust can 
be seen as an informal institution based on the established systems of beliefs about the 
behaviour of others. The authors contend that informal institutions such as trust lower 
transaction costs facilitating many mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.  
3.3.1 Generalised Trust  
The theory on social capital draws heavily on the notion of “generalised trust.” According to 
Muhlberger (2003, p. 7)  
generalised trust is an expectation that other people in society will generally abide by commonly held 
social norms, roles, and ethical dictates. People who have generalised trust expect their society to 
function as it should.  
James and Sykuta (2004, p. 1) see generalised trust as relatively stable and independent of 
group characteristics since it is  
considered alongside with associational activity (networks) to be the core of social capital, although it 
is also seen by some researchers independently from associational life as a constituent part of social 
capital.   
In the literature the term generalised trust is often used interchangeably with the term social 
trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). According to Putnam (1993, p. 171) social trust arises from 
networks of civic engagement. Trust can further be characterised as being either thick or thin. 
Thin trust is trust among individuals having weak social ties, such as strangers. Thick trust 
refers to trust among family and friends or individuals having strong, close personal ties (James 
& Sykuta, 2004, p. 7). Thin trust is associated with the notion of generalised or social trust, 
whereas thick trust has stronger affinity with the concept of particularised trust. Thin trust is 
based on norms and beliefs about society in general whereas thick trust is based on information 
and the nature of a particular group. Generalised trust diminishes with greater uncertainty and 
particularised trust increases with interaction (Uslaner, 1999). 
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According to Uslaner (2006, p. 6) the differences between particularised and generalised trust 
is similar to the distinction drawn between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital. 
Homogeneous group members develop “personalised” trust among themselves that may 
exclude “outsiders”. The evidence gathered by some analysts’ shows that strong bonds between 
members increase participation and mutual help. Heterogeneous groups’ members develop 
generalised trust (learning to trust others that are not necessarily like them).   
Pollitt (2001, p. 3) observes that both generalised and particularised (or specific) trust have an 
impact on economic activity. He argues that generalised trust impacts on the level of aggregate 
economic activity and particularised trust affects the distribution of economic activity. In his 
view, trust is especially important within cooperative economic activity where transaction costs 
of enforcing and drawing up contracts is high (Pollitt, 2001, p. 3). 
Supporting the points made above, Putnam (1993, p. 171) states that the social trust that exists 
in complex modern settings arises from “norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement.” He also states that such “trust is generated . . . within a larger structure of 
personal relations and social networks” (1993, p. 172). Where people believe that “trusting” 
will be reciprocated rather than exploited, there is bound to be lower transaction costs, greater 
cooperation and reduced transaction costs (Putnam, 1993, pp. 172–173).    
3.3.2 Problems with the Concept of Generalised Trust 
Prakash and Selle (2001, p. 2) contend that there are problems with the measurement of the 
concept of generalised trust “since the instrument measures micro-level interactions of 
individuals and researchers make assumptions and draw conclusions from this data concerning 
civil society and political governance.”  
They point out that other studies have found little evidence that trust can be generalised 
perfectly or equally across a society. They believe that the consequences of  
membership in different types of associations—political or social, deliberative or interest-based, 
hierarchic or egalitarian, voluntary, ascriptive or hybrid—need to be further analysed and differentiated 
in terms of their impacts on civil society (Prakash & Selle, 2001, p. 2).   
 
 
 
 
45 
 
This is echoed by Fatorre, Turnbull, and Wilson (2003, pp. 172–173), who argue that trust in 
neighbours, friends and governments cannot be amalgamated into one variable called 
generalised trust because we expect different things and have different relationships with each 
of these groupings. They assert that personal trust (family and friends) cannot be lumped 
together with impersonal trust (government and other public sector organisations) into a 
variable called generalised trust. They devised a set of econometric tools to test whether the 
factors that explain trust in friends, neighbours and governments are the same. Not only did 
they find that there are different factors explaining personal and impersonal trust, but they also 
found that trust in government and strangers cannot be explained by associational density as 
implied by Putnam.  
Apart from these concerns, Hooghe (2007, p. 714) also finds  
that generalized trust should not be considered as an attitude that exclusively entails positive 
consequences for a community . . . since trust functions as a mechanism of social control, as dominant 
groups in a society have more resources available allowing them to express more trust than 
marginalised groups.  
A critical issue emerging from the literature on generalised trust is the way it is measured, 
which affects the validity of empirical work on the subject. In particular, scholars are concerned 
about the question from the World Values Survey that is used to measure generalised trust. The 
question is usually phrased as “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Some analysts have expressed 
concern with the wording of the question. For Nannestad (2008, p. 417), the generalised trust 
question is underspecified and may not be able to be partially or totally compared because it 
lacks the quality necessary for comparison across individual groups or countries. It might also 
result in unreliable information. Nannestad uses this as evidence that groups have limits when 
it comes to trust since the boundaries of their trust are not fully declared. In summary, the 
notion of generalised says little about the nature of trust, its limits and boundaries.   
There have also been studies that indicate that some respondents could apply a political 
interpretation to the question of generalised trust. Brehm and Rahn (1997, cited in Muhlberger, 
2003, p. 22), caution that people could in part be interpreting questions about generalised trust 
as questions about a more politically related type of trust. For the authors there is the danger 
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that some respondents confuse questions about generalised trust with political trust. If true, 
then for Muhlberger (2003, p. 21) the relationship between civic engagement and generalised 
trust may prove to be dependent on the degree to which respondents interpret the generalised 
trust questions in a political way for a given survey.  
Drawing on Fukuyama’s work, Tonkiss (2004, p. 18) believes that trust leads to associational 
activity. Hence the levels of associational activity in a country can be indicated by the levels 
of generalised trust. In Fukuyama’s work, countries are characterised as either being high trust 
or low trust societies on the basis of levels of associational activity. Tonkiss (2004, p. 18) sees 
this as problematic since the formation of trust in different societies stems from diverse sources. 
To aggregate levels of trust and lump countries into high trust and low trust, in his view, 
undermines the role of history and path dependency.  
3.3.3 Political Trust and Generalised Trust 
Social capital as a resource available to groups can only be realised (or spent) between trusting 
individuals. This is the view of Sturgis, Patulny, and Allum (2007, p. 2), who ask whether trust 
in neighbours, family and friends automatically leads to trust in institutions of the state—or 
whether a well-functioning state impacts on personal trust in other members of the community. 
Sturgis et al. (2007, p. 5) discuss three perspectives from the work of Newton and Norris (2000) 
that influence trust. The first perspective, based on social and cultural theory, sees trust as an 
outcome of people’s congregation in voluntary organisations (networks and associations). This 
endogenous approach to social trust resonates with the work of Putnam (1995) and Nannestad 
(2008). Theorists, including Putnam (1995), seem to underscore the role of networks and 
organisations in the development of trust. Cohen and Prusak (2001, cited in Pollitt, 2001, p. 5), 
observe that networks are important for the development of norms and trust since they facilitate 
the efficient gathering of information. One is more likely to cooperate in a business deal with 
members of one’s own network because of the relationships that have been developed already. 
A similar argument is made by Newton and Norris (2000, cited in Sturgis et al., 2007, p. 3) 
who note that the  
ability to trust others and sustain cooperative relations is the product of social experiences and 
socialisation, especially those found in the sorts of voluntary association of modern society that bring 
different social types together to achieve a common goal.  
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The second perspective sees social trust emerging as a result of good governance. This 
perspective has much in common with the work of Uslaner (2002, pp. 245–246) who believes 
that good governance is the most essential condition for generating trust and creating a space 
for voluntary organisations to flourish. In his study on Nigeria and Ghana, Kuenzi (2008, p. 
22) finds that confidence in public institutions impacts on interpersonal trust. In Kuenzi’s 
words, “where people see the political institutions that govern society are trustworthy, that 
perception is likely to trickle down to the individuals who make up that society.” This confirms 
the second perception on generalised trust—that public institutions and governance impact on 
public trust.  
The third perspective relates to socio-psychological perspectives of trust. For example, 
empirical work by Allum et al. (2007, p. 22) found that generalised and political trust are stable 
within individuals and are primarily influenced by early experience, socialisation and learning, 
which differs from the two perspectives discussed above. The second and third perspectives 
are not mutually exclusive since trust can be instilled through socialisation and early experience 
as well as through the actions of good governance6.   
Proponents of the second perspective have influenced the literature on political trust. For 
example, Muhlberger (2003, pp. 9–11) examines the notion of political trust and defines the 
concept in relation to generalised trust. Political trust, according to Muhlberger (2003, p. 10), 
refers to the expectations that other members of a community will abide by norms that make it 
possible to act collectively to achieve political ends. These include perceptions that “people in 
the community are willing to work together on common problems, that they are willing to talk 
reasonably to each other and that they care about community problems.” His view is that 
political trust might be a more politically relevant concept than generalised trust. Muhlberger 
                                                 
6 There are other socio-psychological perspectives on the emergence of trust. One aspect is that social trust 
emerges as a result of personality—meaning one’s propensity to trust. This perspective is not reviewed here as 
it does not relate to the subject of generalised and political trust.   
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(2003, p. 22) finds political trust to be superior to generalised trust in explaining civic 
engagement involving political action.   
While Muhlberger defines political trust as a relational concept centred on civic engagement 
involving political action, Kim (2004, p. 3) sees it as the trust that citizens put in their political 
institutions and actors. Here the political actors and institutions are central to the notion of 
political trust. Stokes (1962, cited in Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005, p. 122) and Miller (1974, cited 
in Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005, p. 122) conceive of political trust  
as a general evaluative orientation towards the government based upon citizens’ normative 
expectations of government operation and effectiveness or it can be viewed as an individual’s 
assessment of how well the government is performing compared with how well they think it should be 
performing. 
Low political trust can, according to Kim (2004, p. 3), have quite serious consequences. This 
is particularly so in  
fledgling democracies where there are no dependable cultural and historical roots of democracy and 
where citizens have high expectations and a very instrumentalist conception of democracy, political 
distrust can easily develop into a menace to democratic stability. 
Low political trust coupled with poor institutional development at the level of the state could 
either lead to more or less political participation depending on whether communities are 
cohesive and/or have effective leadership.   
This link of trust with political participation is important because trust relationships in and 
within public institutions are crucial for ensuring social and economic outcomes. In the words 
of the proponents of this view  
participation in local networks reinforces attitudes of mutual trust which make it easier for groups to 
agree on collective decisions and implement collective action. Thus trust makes it easier for people to 
enter into relationships of dependency and cooperation since people are willing to take more risks and 
make themselves vulnerable in order to attain a good they could not get on their own. In trust 
relationships people become less inclined to claim protection against the possibility of betrayal and 
they tend to avoid costly sanctioning mechanisms to defend their interests (Askvik & Bak, 2005, p. 5).  
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Brehm and Rahn (1997, p. 1002) use structural modelling to tease out the relationship between 
(civic and political) engagement and trust and find a stronger relationship from engagement to 
trust than from trust to engagement. Muhlberger (2003, p. 4) also cites numerous studies that 
find a weak or non-existent link between generalised trust and (civic and political) engagement. 
He contends that where trust is high people may have an incentive to either participate or not. 
High levels of trust may therefore become an inhibitor of collective action because people trust 
that community and political leaders will act in their best interest—decreasing the propensity 
to participate. Increasingly the argument is made that political trust rather than generalised trust 
is correlated with participation. In their analysis of the Canadian elections, Bélanger and 
Nadeau (2005, p. 137), found that politically distrustful voters were significantly more likely 
to abstain, indicating that trust impacts on participation.  
It is useful to note here that in the literature, the term “political trust” or “institutional trust” 
emerges as a concept that captures trust in government, rather than the more vaguely defined 
term generalised trust.  
Given the difficulty with the term generalised trust, Putnam’s theory can be developed further 
to incorporate the concept of political trust. It is the contention of the authors cited in this 
section on trust that political trust is an important concept (less amorphous than generalised 
trust). In the development of the augmented framework in Chapter Four, I explore how political 
trust can be incorporated into the Putnam framework thereby further describing the 
transmission mechanism from social capital to socioeconomic outcomes.   
3.3.4 Trends in the Levels of Trust  
In his seminal research on the subject of trust, Putnam (2003) showed that trust in other people 
has been slowly eroding in the USA in recent decades. Evidence gathered by other researchers 
show that this trend is a worldwide phenomenon affecting both developed and developing 
countries (Fattore et al., 2003, p. 167). Uslaner (2006, p. 7) cites evidence from the World 
Values Survey conducted across 24 countries and regions that showed that generalised trust is 
declining. In 1981, 38.5% of people thought that most people could be trusted. This declined 
to 26.9% in 2001.  
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Some of the literature examined in this study (see below) show recurring themes of declining 
political trust at all levels of development. Several reasons have been advanced to explain the 
decline in political trust including poor government performance, institutional fatalism and 
high public expectations.  
Kim (2005, p. 5) reports that political trust has been in decline in South Korea. He cites data 
from the Korea Democracy Barometer Survey (1996–2004) that shows a decline in trust in 
virtually every public institution in South Korea. He also points out that such distrust is 
widespread among all socioeconomic groups and is particularly prevalent in relation to core 
state institutions. Bélanger and Nadeau (2005, p. 122) also show declines in political trust in 
Canada during the period 1984 to 1993 and indicate that this had an effect on political 
participation, particularly voting behaviour.  
However, in their studies on Europe, Allum et al. (2007, p. 24) find that levels of political trust 
and generalised trust in European counties are quite stable. This poses an interesting question 
for further research (beyond the scope of the present study)—do European societies have a 
better way of fostering and maintaining trust or is there something in Putnam’s methodology 
that does not translate well to other countries? 
3.3.5 Heterogeneity and Trust  
Community heterogeneity and its relationship to trust is a subject of much debate in the 
literature where heterogeneity is primarily (although not exclusively) identified in terms of 
income inequality or ethnic diversity, as discussed below.  
The subject is treated in some depth by Rothstein and Stolle (2001) and Rothstein and Uslaner 
(2004, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2006, p. 1057) who find that income inequality is negatively 
correlated with generalised trust. That is, high levels of income inequality are generally 
associated with lower levels of generalised trust. This is supported by Hooghe (2007, p. 1056) 
who notes that citizens from different socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to share the 
same set of values and norms. His theoretical explanation for this is that income inequality 
makes those who have access to scarce resources afraid to lose them, and fosters envy among 
those who lack access to these resources. Feelings of injustice in more economically unequal 
societies further impact on the generation of generalised trust. For Rothstein and Uslaner (2004, 
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cited in Hooghe, 2007, p. 1056), the distribution of resources plays a key role in establishing 
perceptions about people sharing the same values, norms and destiny.  
More recently, there has been a proliferation in the literature dealing with trust and diversity 
(Coffé & Geys, 2006; Rothstein & Stolle, 2001). The discussion and debate has centred largely 
on the issue of how diversity impacts on trust. Delhey and Newton, 2005 (cited in Hooghe, 
2007, p. 710) observe that “generalized trust is strongest where we have something in common 
with others, especially when we are from the same ethnic background.” People have a greater 
level of generalised trust when they commonly interact with people who are similar to them in 
terms of culture, income, ethnicity, history and status. This is possibly why levels of 
generalised trust are higher in the relatively more homogeneous Scandinavian countries 
(Paldam, 2007, p. 7). As indicated earlier, many empirical studies seem to confirm that 
generalised trust decreases as diversity increases. The issue of diversity and trust is particularly 
relevant for countries that have large or emerging immigrant populations. Studies on trust and 
diversity have proliferated in Europe in the recent past (Gerritsen & Lubbers, 2010; Hooghe, 
Reeskens, Stolle & Trappers, 2009; and Kresler, Christel & Bloemraad, 2010) as demographic 
and labour market conditions change in response to the increase in the number of immigrants. 
With the advent of political democracy this becomes particularly relevant to South Africa. 
Several urban centres and towns in the Western Cape have seen dramatic changes in their 
demographic profiles as large numbers of the African/Black population group migrate into 
these areas in search of employment opportunities. As the studies in Europe demonstrate, this 
has serious implications for social cohesion. Putnam (2007, cited in Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle 
& Trappers, 2009, p. 199) concedes that diversity impacts negatively on trust and social 
cohesion in the short run.   
In their empirical work on diversity and trust, Hooghe et al. (2009, pp. 204–209) use multi-
level models to test whether diversity indicators influence individual levels of generalised trust 
in a variety of European countries. They find that at the individual level, men, older people, 
lowly educated respondents and the unemployed are less trusting of diversity. Their analysis, 
however, shows that diversity does not exert the consistent and strong negative effects often 
ascribed to it by researchers (Hooghe et al., 2009, pp. 211–213).  
Knack and Keefer (1997, p. 1257), in a cross-country study of 29 countries in the World Values 
Survey, found a negative relationship between trust and heterogeneity. This, however, is 
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contested by others including Uslaner (2006, p. 14), who finds no cross-country evidence to 
suggest that diversity per se leads to less trust. He explores the relationship between religious 
diversity and trust and finds there is only a weak relationship, even though religious conflict is 
at the heart of many inter-state and intra-state wars—and hence the expectation that religious 
diversity would be more strongly (negatively) related to generalised trust. Diversity, in his 
view, seems to be uncorrelated with trust. 
There is growing evidence in the literature that suggests increasing diversity is not generally 
associated with a breakdown of social order, despite other findings to the contrary. Rather than 
see diversity as having negative consequences for trust some analysts call for different forms 
of social cohesion, where more attention is being paid to diversity and recognition of 
differences (Gutmann, 1994; Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005).  
3.3.6 Trust and Outcomes  
In the process of examining the relationship of trust to diversity, analysts of social capital also 
began to enquire about the outcomes that result from both generalised and political trust. This 
section reviews the literature on this aspect of social capital.  
In the literature, low trust societies are often correlated with crime and low socioeconomic 
status. Rothstein and Eek (2006, p. 3) present an overview of trust to outcomes analysis and 
contend that we should be interested in generalised or social trust. The reason is that generalised 
trust is correlated with favourable social, economic and political conditions—that is, countries 
where generalised trust is high are characterised as richer, with more economic growth and 
better performing government institutions7. Income inequality is also said to be lower. The 
degree of causality in some of these studies, however, is often difficult to establish. In some 
instances, generalised trust acts as a catalyst influencing socioeconomic outcomes. In other 
instances high levels of generalised trust emerge as a response to these factors. Differently put, 
socioeconomic factors (i.e. low levels of income inequality, homogeneous population groups) 
sometimes facilitate the emergence of generalised trust. For example, some theorists find 
                                                 
7 The study does not indicate if causality has been established. 
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generalised trust to be associated with higher levels of GDP per capita and a higher ratio of 
GDP to investment (Knack & Keefer, 1997 cited in Pollitt, 2001, p. 7).   
La Porta et al. (1997, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, pp. 311–317) find that the effects 
of trust on economic performance are both statistically significant and quantitatively large. 
Among their findings is that trust enhances economic performance across countries, and that it 
has a relatively small but significant effect on infrastructure quality and adequacy, a significant 
effect on infant mortality and a large effect on educational achievement. At a macro-economic 
level, La Porta et al. (1997, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000) found trust to be associated 
with lower rates of inflation and weakly associated with higher per capita GNP growth.  
The review of various theorists on the concept of trust has prompted the use of the term political 
trust instead of generalised trust. Putnam’s theory can therefore be developed further to 
incorporate the concept of political trust as seen in Chapter Four. 
3.4 CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
In articulating Putnam’s framework, networks and associations are seen as engendering trust 
which, in turn, has an impact on civic participation. According to the transmission mechanism 
articulated in the Putnam framework, civic participation impacts on both government 
effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes, but with the former having an independent causal 
effect on the latter. Reflecting on the entire institutional context, it is networks and associations 
(the core of social capital) that ultimately affect social outcomes. Following the causal link in 
Putnam’s thesis, this section explores the relationship between social capital and civic (and 
political) participation.  
Theorists who turned their attention to this subject have arrived at divergent but interesting 
views. Uphoff (2000, p. 216) makes the observation that social capital is more amorphous 
(vague, shapeless) than participation. Putnam’s theory emphasises the role of social capital as 
a catalytic variable influencing social, economic and political outcomes (1993, 1995, and 
2001). In political science, Lowndes and Wilson (2001, p. 629) confirm that Putnam’s theory 
has had a major impact on the discipline particularly in the areas of political theory (i.e. the 
role of civil society in a democratic polity), political economy (i.e. the link between civic 
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communities and economic success) and comparative and historical analysis of democratic 
practices in countries.  
3.4.1 Defining Civic and Political Participation  
There has been much debate on the concept of “participation” in the literature on social capital. 
In general, there is consensus that it is a form of active citizenship that enables people to 
develop responses to social and economic problems and communicate them in different areas 
of public life and in a multiplicity of ways. There are numerous debates on the definition of 
civic participation. Some authors, whose contributions are discussed below, view it as 
analogous to political participation while others see the two as distinct concepts. 
For Best and Dustan (2006, p. 6) “civic participation can be categorised as ‘civic engagement,’ 
‘political participation,’ and ‘political engagement’ among other labels.” They go on to say that 
definitions of civic participation are often subjective and comprised of different ways of 
categorizing activity  
from individual voluntarism to organizational involvement to electoral participation. It can include 
efforts to directly address an issue, work with others in a community to solve a problem or interact with 
the institutions of representative democracy (Carpini, 2005, as cited by Best & Dustan, 2006, p. 6).  
In their view, civic participation includes political participation and engagement—it is not only 
limited to the political sphere but includes non-political activities as well. It is in the political 
sphere, however, where civic participation has its most profound and direct effects.   
As a distinct concept political participation is defined as taking part in the processes of 
formulation, passage and implementation of public policies (Parry et al., 1992, cited in 
Lowndes, 2006, p. 542). Verba and Nie (1987, p. 2) define political participation as “activities 
by private citizens that are aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or 
the actions they take . . . in acts that influence government decisions.”  
To borrow from Klesner’s (2007, p. 3) simple definition, political participation is basically our 
relations with political institutions. Through political participation citizens can hold 
governments accountable and influence the types of policies that are adopted. Jenkins, 
Andolina, Keeter, and Zukin (2003, p. 4) view political engagement as positively tied to the 
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functioning and representativeness of the political system because ultimately the system affects 
“who gets what.” Elaborating on this they point out that when large numbers of people are 
absent from being politically represented, extreme viewpoints may be over-represented to the 
detriment of the middle. For Donovan, Bowler, Hanneman, and Karp (2004, p. 410) political 
engagement  
is a sort of spill over effect of social group membership, and refers to something larger than standard 
conceptions of political participation such as voting. While voting may be an element of political 
engagement, political engagement is assumed to be part of a larger attachment to civic life and interest 
in public affairs.  
Narayan (1999 notes that communities can have high levels of public engagement because they 
are ignored by public institutions or if they enjoy highly complementary relations with the state. 
However, it is the “absence or weakness of the state that is often compensated for by the 
creation of informal organizations” (Narayan, 1999, p. 15).  
Political engagement can manifest itself in three types of political behaviour, that is, “electoral 
activity, civic activity, and political voice” (Jenkins et al., 2003, pp. 1–2).  
Electoral behaviour is understood to be that which is involved with voting and political office. . . .  
political voice is those activities that allow for political expression which may include communicating 
with those in power or decision-making positions, participating in boycotts, petitions and other 
demonstrations. These types of political action are also sometimes known as ‘unconventional’ (Jenkins 
et al., 2003, pp. 1–2). 
Having examined the definitions of political participation the review proceeds with a 
breakdown of the factors that affect political participation.   
3.4.2 Factors that Affect Political Participation 
It is interesting to note that the same factors affecting participation also affect trust, indicating 
that trust and participation are inextricably linked. Klesner (2006, p. 9) identifies a few factors 
that shape political participation. The more important ones include socioeconomic and 
demographic factors, social capital, leadership, institutional opportunities and constraints and 
other contextual factors.  
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The following section identifies the factors that affect participation and groups these factors 
according to (i) demographic factors, (ii) associational activity (iii) leadership and (iv) 
institutional opportunities and constraints.   
3.4.2.1 Economic and Demographic Factors 
According to Klesner (2006), Jenkins et al. (2003), Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) and 
Verba and Nie (1987), socioeconomic and demographic factors have a definite impact on 
political participation. Verba and Nie (1987, pp. 129–133) observe that socioeconomic status 
(what they term SES factors) has a key impact on participation. In a seminal paper by Nie, 
Powell, and Prewitt (1969, p. 808) the authors posit that as an economy of a country becomes 
more developed because of economic growth, the social structure of a nation is altered which 
leads to changes in attitudes and cognitions which in turn impacts on political participation.  
Demographic factors, especially age, have been extensively studied in the literature as key 
factors impacting on participation. According to Klesner (2006, p. 10), older citizens are more 
likely to participate in political activity because they are more experienced and have a greater 
stake in society that they need to defend. Jenkins et al. (2003, cited in Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 
2005, p. 238), report that younger people find civic participation more appealing than political 
participation, and the percentage of young people who are involved in political engagement is 
significantly lower at 11% than the percentage of people aged 38 and older (18%). Older people 
are equally active in both political and civic participation. Young people who are involved in 
civic participation may not be involved in political participation, particularly those who hold 
the view that democratic processes are messy, inefficient, unprincipled and filled with conflict 
(Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005, p.237). Klesner (2007, p.10) also finds political participation 
to be higher among educated and wealthier people. The views of these authors are discussed 
below.  
There is no clear-cut evidence that membership in heterogeneous groups has a greater impact 
on political participation. Among White communities in America group homogeneity impacts 
positively on political participation (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005, p. 238). This also seems 
to be the case with Japan where Ikeda (2002, p. 17) found that homogeneous social networks 
have a greater effect as facilitators of political participation.  
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3.4.2.2 Associational Activity as a Factor  
The second factor that has an impact on participation is social capital—or as Klesner (2006, p. 
3) puts it, “one’s relationship with others.” The social capital factor often refers to social 
networks and associations and even trust. Since this is central to the thesis the research will 
review what the literature has to say about communities with higher levels of associational 
activity and levels of participation. In Klesner’s (2006, p. 30) work on Latin America, he found 
that people who participated in non-political associations were more likely to participate in 
politics. 
Donovan et al. (2004, p. 407) used New Zealand as a case study to test the same hypothesis 
and found that membership in voluntary associations impacted on democratic virtues. Because 
of the high rate of participation in sports groups in that country, they see New Zealand as an 
interesting case study to test whether membership in non-political associations such as sports 
clubs and other voluntary organisations promotes political engagement. They find that not all 
types of groups/associations are alike in terms of their effects on political engagement. The 
effects on political engagement for membership in a community or cultural group were higher 
but were the highest for sports groups. Sports groups were “also associated with higher 
dimensions of engagement that included voting and discussing politics” (Donovan et al., 2004, 
p. 415). In summary, the authors find that there is  
individual-level evidence that membership in private, non-political associations corresponds with 
greater political engagement in New Zealand. Although correlation does not establish causation, we 
have controlled for various alternative explanations so as to suggest that membership in these groups 
generates higher levels of political activity. However, of those social groups that are expected by neo-
Tocquevillians to be breeding-grounds for democratic virtues, membership in church groups may be 
less consequential than membership in sports groups, cultural groups and community organizations 
(Donovan et al., 2004, p. 409).  
As we see later, the study by Donovan et al. sheds light on the two study areas of this research 
because of a similar phenomenon in Cederberg, that is, the community’s very high incidence 
of membership in sports groups.  
Membership in church groups has also been associated with higher levels of participation 
(Verba, 1995). Djupe and Grant (2001, p. 303) refer to previous research on religious 
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institutions and political participation which found that churches can increase participation 
among their members through the development of civic skills and the distinct political histories 
of religious traditions. 
Booth and Richard (1998, p. 782), in a study involving six Central American states, breaks up 
associational activity into formal associational activity and communal activity where the 
former represents membership in institutions like professional bodies and unions and the latter 
includes membership in schools, church organisations and other self-help projects. By breaking 
up associational activity into formal associational activity and communal activity they were 
able to see how these types of associational activity impacted on political engagement. They 
found that communal activity was statistically related to “contacting public officials.” This led 
the authors to conclude that communal activity enables citizens to convey their demands to 
government. Formal associational activity as a mechanism of political engagement was 
statistically related to “contacting public officials” and “campaigning.” Even though both types 
of activities were “participatory in nature”, in the Central American case, formal groups have 
a greater effect on democracy than informal communal groups. Unfortunately, there was no 
investigation of who belonged to the formal and communal groups. The authors assumed, 
however, that wealthier individuals are more likely to belong to formal associations than the 
poor and are therefore better able to influence (through their campaigning) policies that are 
more in favour of their interests than members of communal groups. The authors also believe 
that in the case of Central America communal groups have a very narrow mechanism for 
exchange with the political regime in power. They may8 be co-opted by repressive regimes 
rather than becoming more democratic, leading the authors to suggest that “contrary to the 
expectations of the developmentalists who promote communal organisations and the theorists 
who laud them as fronts for democracy. . . communal groups may not generate the anticipated 
systemic democratisation because it helps regimes buy off local activists” (Booth & Richard, 
1998, p. 797).  
                                                 
8 This has not been empirically tested as yet.  
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Booth and Richard (1998, p. 797) also point to a reciprocal or iterative rather than linear 
relationship between associational activity and political participation.  
3.4.2.3 Leadership as a Factor 
The literature has highlighted leadership as a key activator of collective action and political 
participation in communities (McCallum & O’Connell, 2009; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 
2011; Bankoff, 2015). For example, Bodin and Crona (2008, p. 2771) recognise the important 
role that associational activity plays in collective action but argue that it is leadership which is 
necessary to activate collective action and to potentially produce a flow of benefits to 
communities. According to Purdue (2001, p. 2221) community leaders act as key points of 
contact between the state and local communities, putting them at the interface between internal 
“communal” and external “collaborative” social capital. Leadership provides communities 
with the know-how of how to manoeuvre bureaucracy (Bodin & Crona, 2008, p. 2775). 
Leadership is therefore a critical component necessary to unlock the benefits manifested in 
networks. According to Oh, Labianca, and Chung (2006, p. 574), leaders have the ability to 
connect various sub-groups, determining the relative efficacy of the group. According to these 
authors, the greater the number of sub-group connections, the greater the leaders’ access to a 
diversity of information and social support from which the leaders can draw. They state that 
“groups that communicate more frequently with other groups have greater access and more 
potential resources to draw from” (2006, p. 575).  
The downside of centralised leadership (mostly found in hierarchical structures) is dependency 
and vulnerability. According to Bodin and Crona (2008, p. 2777), depending solely on 
leadership for collective action leads to vulnerability and dependency because the community 
is dependent on a single person’s prioritisation and decision making. According to the authors 
this dependency on leadership reduces a community’s resilience.  
Effectiveness of Leaders 
According to Balkundi and Kilduff (2006, p. 420), the network approach to leadership does not 
locate leadership in the attributes of individuals but rather in the relationships connecting 
individuals. According to the authors, the network approach locates leadership in relational, 
contextual and systemic understandings. Writing in the context of organisations, the authors 
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state that leaders are vital in perceiving and managing network relations which are the key to 
leadership. If they cannot do this they will lack authority, allowing informal leaders to frustrate 
organisational functioning and hence their ability to mobilise collective action (Balkundi & 
Kilduff, 2006, pp. 419–420).  
According to Balkundi and Kilduff (2006, p. 428) the extent to which leaders are effective in 
terms of accessing important resources and mobilising collective action depends on the social 
structural positions they occupy in the key networks within and between organisations. The 
authors believe that individuals who have “social connections connected to each other have 
dense social circles whereas individuals whose social contacts have few connections have 
sparse social circles” (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006, p. 48). It is their contention that members of 
a dense network share similar attitudes and values towards the leaders of the organisation. 
According to the authors 
whether members of a dense network tend to enhance or neutralise the leaders’ effectiveness is likely 
to depend on whether the shared attitudes are negative or positive since a dense network of people 
favourably disposed towards the leader represents a pool of social capital available to the leader. 
Messages transmitted to this group are likely to be favourably received and expeditiously transmitted. 
In their view dense networks can enhance or distort leadership initiatives. (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006, p. 
428) 
Leadership initiatives can also be enhanced through structuring of interpersonal networks to 
reach diverse constituencies, using relatively few ties to expand the range of resources and 
information accessed (Burt, 1992, as cited in Balkundi & Kilduff 2006, p. 429). In the context 
of communities, leaders can build links with key communities and different constituencies 
through delegation to trusted lieutenants.  
Women and Leadership 
According to Warren, Thomson, and Saegert (2001, p. 20) there is a big difference between the 
leadership styles of men and women. According to the authors, men are more concerned with 
developing contacts and power positions with mainstream institutions such as government 
departments whereas women are more enabling, “nurturing broad based ties in the community 
and investing in human development at all levels of development.” The authors highlight that 
women tend to have a comprehensive approach to community development which is based on 
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human and needs-centred programmes and an open style of leadership. The authors state that 
women develop strategies that are diverse but that emphasise the integration of public and 
private spheres—“with a key focus on strengthening family and friends.” They state that 
organisations that lack significant numbers of women in leadership positions tend to focus 
solely on jobs, economic development and housing construction. 
According to Warren, et.al (2001, p. 20) female leadership is vital for building, promoting and 
using social capital in poor communities. The authors state that it is women who primarily 
bring together neighbours and relatives to support issues of daily life which are not met through 
the economic and political system. They conclude by saying that the leadership approach of 
women tempers the clash of interests that dominates in the political realm (Warren, et.al, 2001, 
p. 21). 
Leadership as a feature of the transmission mechanism from social capital to socioeconomic 
outcomes is largely ignored in the Putnam framework, thereby necessitating an augmentation 
of the framework in the context of this thesis.  
3.4.2.4 Institutional Opportunities and Constraints  
In their work on social capital and urban governance, particularly political participation, 
Maloney, Smith, and Stoker (2000, p. 803) criticise Putnam’s treatment of the exogenous state 
because he fails to take into account the role played by political structures and institutions in 
influencing social capital. The authors offer a more state-centred approach to the treatment of 
participation and note that institutions play a key role in promoting and sustaining participation. 
They believe that more attention needs to be given to the interpenetration of state and civil 
society in the development and promotion of participation. It might be that state/civil society 
interactions are primarily between civil society and officials rather than councillors who impact 
on policy making. They are also critical of Putnam’s assertion that knowledge of associations 
and their density is the key to participation, stating that this does not tell us anything about the 
quality of governance in the area and that it is primarily the quality of governance that impacts 
on participation (Maloney et al., 2000, p. 803). The authors find that strong civic vibrancy has 
been maintained in Birmingham as a result of government policies that have been pursued to 
encourage and sustain participation (2000, p. 804).  
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In an article on factors driving local participation, Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker (2006, p. 
540) highlight the role that rules play in promoting participation. According to the authors, 
rules shape participation and influence results. Their focus is on formal rules and informal 
rules, customs and conventions that structure participation (2006, p. 542). They consider how 
resources, socioeconomic factors, relationships (networks and associations) and rules in use 
interact to produce distinctive local contexts for participation. In their article on participation 
they were primarily interested in the actions taken by citizens in seeking to influence decisions 
made by public officials and elected representatives.  
For Lowndes et al. (2006, p. 546) “rules provide a structure of incentives and disincentives to 
political actors and they also express norms on what is appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviour.” Public authorities, in their view, can have a huge impact on participation if they 
provide people with the right incentives. They show that actors can shape and bend institutional 
forces in a new direction (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 559). 
Putnam (1993, 1995) is also criticised for his “society-centred approach” which undervalues 
state agency and associated political factors (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001, p. 629). The authors 
are of the opinion that state agency has an important role to play in harnessing participation 
and that the underlying institutional framework must be examined to determine the factors that 
impact on the promotion of participation. The authors quote numerous studies that examine the 
extent to which social capital can be developed by the state. Their underlying argument is that 
the institutional framework/design is an important variable that is not considered in Putnam’s 
study. They point out that there are a few interacting dimensions of institutional design within 
government that shape the creation and mobilisation of participation (Lowndes & Wilson, 
2001, p. 633). The first of these include factors such as the institutional relationships that local 
authorities in particular have with the voluntary sector which supports and recognises these 
organisations. Secondly, local governments can provide opportunities and prospects for the 
formation of new groups. The third factor that impacts on the formation of participation is the 
responsiveness of decision making by local authorities. A fourth factor is that of democratic 
leadership and social inclusion.    
The role of state agency in the development of social capital has gained currency in the last 
few years. The state according to Wallis, Killerby, and Dollery (2004, p. 250) can play an active 
role in the development of social capital by forging dynamic alliances and partnerships between 
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and within state institutions and civil society. There is sufficient opportunity for the 
establishment of complementary relationships between government and civil society, so that 
the synergies between state and citizen action ameliorates resource access problems and creates 
a virtuous circle of social, institutional and economic improvement.  
Wallis et al. (2004, pp. 250–252) note that the level of voluntary activity may be boosted by 
local government through a host of initiatives such as grants and partnerships. New associations 
and stocks of social capital may be influenced by the degree to which local bodies engage in 
participatory governance. In their unpacking of the state’s role in the development of social 
capital they infer that particular attention must be paid to the institutions of local governance 
since this affects not only the overall level of public participation in policy making but also the 
distribution of opportunities to participate in different social groups.  
Variables affecting political participation have been the subject of much debate and analysis 
since the 1960s. Demographic factors, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, geographic location, 
educational attainment, gender and religious affiliation have all been part of the political 
analyst’s vault of possible explanatory tools to understand why and how citizens participate in 
the political process. The review sheds light on social capital’s contribution to the analysis with 
its focus on types of associational activity (religious institutions, sport organisations, formal 
and communal bodies) and the interaction of state/civil structures. Both are seen as influencing 
and being influenced by political participation, sometimes to the detriment of democracy but 
more often enhancing it. In the empirical research participation is given particular attention—
the role of the state in the promotion of social capital, particularly the institutions of local 
governance and the effects they have on public participation. The augmented analytical 
framework developed in Chapter Four incorporates institutional and policy design in the 
creation and mobilisation of political participation.  
3.5 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS  
An area that has also entered the discourse on social capital is government effectiveness, since 
political engagement and participation impacts on the functioning of governments. One of the 
propositions by Putnam is that the effectiveness and efficiency of government activity is 
dependent on the prevalent social capital in that region or locality. Government effectiveness 
is then related to better developmental outcomes, that is, in the form of better socioeconomic 
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outcomes and even higher economic growth. In the case of the latter, Serageldin and Grootaert 
(2000, p. 45) see this as a macro-level effect and show how institutions, legal frameworks and 
the government’s role in the organisation of production affect market performance.   
Several studies have been undertaken to determine the relationship between social capital and 
government effectiveness. Knack (2000, pp. 2–3), in his paper on social capital and the quality 
of government, shows that large-scale collective action generated in part by pervasive social 
capital can improve government functioning. The author lists three mechanisms through which 
this happens: firstly, that it stimulates government accountability; secondly, it facilitates 
compromise and agreement where polarised political preferences exist; and thirdly, it makes 
governments more responsive to communities, in part, through innovative policy making. The 
study is extensive and provides a detailed analysis of social capital variables and various 
aspects of government performance for 50 American states. The measures used to determine 
government efficiency were compiled and analysed in a previous study undertaken by Barrett 
and Greene (1999, cited in Knack, 2000, p. 6), and were concentrated across five areas of 
government performance, including financial and capital management, human resources, 
information technology and what Knack (2000, p. 22) refers to as “managing for results.” 
Under the five performance areas, a total of thirty-five criteria were used to determine 
government efficiency. These included adequacy of financial auditing, effective procurement 
management and involvement of stakeholders in developing strategic plans. After controlling 
for higher income, better education and the “potential for polarised preferences” such as racial 
heterogeneity and inequality, the results showed that social capital was positively related to 
more effective governance (Knack, 2000, p. 13). The study found that the quality of governance 
is also more pronounced where social capital is more prevalent (Knack, 2000, p. 16).  
Unlike social capital, education and income were not significant determinants of government 
performance (Knack, 2000, p. 16). The evidence showed that if the quality of government 
performance is high, it reinforces a virtuous cycle where communities run smoothly with 
reduced criminality and social strife, generating more trust and reinforcing more civic 
cooperation (Knack, 2000, p. 19). Like Putnam, Knack‘s study implies that people with more 
horizontal networks had better governments.  
According to Evans (1997, p. 66) the extent to which a state is “developmental” or “predatory” 
is crucially dependent on the capacity of its public institutions and the nature of state–society 
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relations. In the case of a developmental state, government is more likely to play an 
interventionist role, especially in sectors of the economy where the prospects for creating 
employment and alleviating poverty are relatively high. Without strong participation of civil 
society, however, the state runs the risk of bureaucratising development, with the decision-
making process resting solely in the hands of state officials. The absence of accountability 
provisions can often give rise to a culture of impunity which endangers democracy and 
development. Government effectiveness is therefore dependent on the degree to which the 
public can engage officials and politicians. Put another way, to the extent that the effectiveness 
of government is strongly influenced by the level of social capital in a given society, social and 
economic outcomes are likely to reflect growth and distributional achievements.  
Many studies have tested Putnam’s hypothesis at a regional, state and country level. Few, 
however, have focused their attention on the level of local government. As local government 
is the tier in a political system that is responsible for the direct delivery of basic services, testing 
Putnam’s hypothesis at the level of local government provides a more rigorous test of his social 
capital hypothesis.    
Cusack (1999, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 486) and Rice (2001, cited in Coffé & Geys, 
2005, p. 486) show that high levels of social capital are correlated with higher subjective 
approvals of local government performance. Coffé and Geys (2005, p. 486), in their analysis 
of social capital in Flemish municipalities, tested the effect that social capital has on local 
government performance. They used financial management as an objective indicator of 
government performance.  
They found that social capital affects government performance in three ways. First, it improves 
performance as it makes “citizens sophisticated consumers of politics” (Boix & Posner, 1998, 
cited in Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 487). This means that social capital makes it easier for people 
to monitor how effective socioeconomic outcomes are under political parties and to use their 
voting powers to vote less effective governments out of office. In societies where there are 
higher levels of social capital it increases people’s monitoring of government performance. 
Citizens in high social capital communities demand that governments, particularly at the lower 
level, become more effective and efficient at meeting their constitutional obligations. 
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Second, they found that it creates an atmosphere of cooperation and compromise or, in 
Putnam’s words; social capital contributes to a society in which “habits of cooperation, 
solidarity and public spiritedness” between people are facilitated (Putnam, 1993, pp. 89–90). 
Third,  it creates an environment that encourages compliance with the necessary regulations, 
reducing the costs associated with enforcing compliance and freeing up resources which can 
then be more productively used. It therefore garners  
greater ease of cooperation among politicians and bureaucrats and reduces the possibility of gridlock 
in decision-making which makes it therefore more likely to lead to a higher quality of governance (Boix 
& Posner, 1998; Knack, 2002, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 487).  
Social capital might also change the nature of people’s preferences from particularistic (or 
selfish) towards more community-oriented concerns (Boix & Posner, 1998, cited in Coffé & 
Geys, 2005, p. 487). 
Thus in a political economy sense, social capital infers that there is a relationship between civil 
society and the state that impacts on the effectiveness of democracy (Booth & Richard, 1998, 
pp. 795–796).  
According to Mani (2001, p. 4), social capital ensures better governance since “well-organized 
communities demand better services from public agencies as well as government staff that 
interact closely with these communities.” 
The study by Coffé & Geys (2005, p. 489) used data for the 2000 fiscal year and was based on 
a cross-section analysis of 305 (out of a potential 308) Flemish municipalities. The authors 
found that where social capital was high, government performance was more efficient and 
effective, confirming Putnam’s social capital hypothesis at the local level. However, it may be 
the case that participation gets reduced because the ruling party is not seen as being efficient – 
so government inefficiency creates disillusionment and decreases political participation. This 
perspective will also be added to the analytical framework discussed in Chapter Four.  
The literature reviewed examined the effect of social capital on government effectiveness. 
Other than Putnam, the studies examined did not look at the other intermediate variables as 
expressed in the analytical framework, that is, trust and political participation. The studies also 
examined a host of criteria used to determine government efficiency but did not focus on other 
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“subjective” factors of government efficiency, that is, the extent to which governments’ actions 
impact on the social welfare function of the communities that they serve. The review also 
showed that there were no studies that examined the effects that social capital has on 
government effectiveness in so far as local governments that experience considerable capacity 
constraints are concerned. This absence constitutes a compelling reason to undertake a study 
of this nature.   
3.6 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES  
In Putnam’s thesis the ultimate effect of social capital is to be assessed according to the social 
and economic outcomes. The process, as illustrated in the Figure 3–1, sees social and economic 
outcomes as being influenced by civic participation and government effectiveness. In the 
preceding section, the relationship between participation in the political process and 
government efficiency was explored. This section deals with that part of Putnam’s theory 
regarding how social capital impacts on social and economic outcomes.        
Social capital has been linked to a wide range of social, economic and development outcomes 
(Helliwell & Huang, 2014; Kwon & Adler, 2014). The literature reviewed in this section cites 
empirical evidence to show that social capital makes societies healthier and wealthier, gives 
them better government and improves overall socioeconomic wellbeing.  
The several ways in which social capital can lead to better developmental outcomes have been 
extensively treated by a number of analysts. The literature has generally concentrated on the 
following themes: economic growth and development, poverty alleviation and livelihood 
support, and access to basic services. 
Support for the link between social capital and development comes from Dasgupta and 
Serageldin (2000, pp. ix–xii) who point to growing evidence that social capital has an important 
impact on development outcomes, including growth, equity and poverty alleviation. Maluccio, 
Haddad, and May (2000) examines the relationship between social capital and household 
welfare in South Africa's largest province and found that social capital had a positive and 
significant effect on welfare in one of the two years considered (1998). 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
For Jooste (2005, p. 2) the main argument underlying these theories is that social capital spurs 
a host of behavioural and attitudinal mannerisms which contribute toward the strengthening of 
democracy, the development of cooperative culture and the establishment of harmonious social 
interaction. Among others, she concludes that social capital may help address the rational 
choice dilemma of collective action.  
Social capital is a key determinant of whether communities collaborate to generate, manage 
and maintain local resources. In poor countries, especially in the rural areas, collective action 
is important for the generation and management of local resources. In this regard, high levels 
of community social capital improve the management of such resources. Several studies have 
also pointed to this in the literature (Ostrom, 2000, p. 178).  
Since social capital improves the potential for cooperative action it can be leveraged as a 
resource. This is especially so in the context of developing countries, where governments are 
unable to cope with the demand for basic services because of a lack of capacity and resources. 
Private contractors sometimes fill the gap in the absence of government provision, but when 
the private sector is reluctant, community-based efforts can help fill the gap (Latt et al., 2002). 
The aforementioned authors document their findings with respect to community participation 
in the provision of basic services with actual case studies. 
Reid and Salmen (2002, p. 101), in their qualitative analysis of the effects of social capital on 
agricultural extension services in Mali, found that the degree of social cohesion in the form of 
residents’ propensity to attend association meetings was the most important determinant of 
whether a community would be successful in implementing external development interventions 
such as the agricultural extension services that they studied. What this means is that social 
capital impacts on social and economic outcomes by coordinating behaviour and thereby 
facilitating the interventions of external development agencies.  
A study by Pantoja (2002, p. 143), found that bonding capital can be high (in the form of 
bonding between members of the same group) but can also lead to exclusion for those not part 
of the “in group”. In this sense it can be “fractured” on the basis of race or class. He finds that 
even though social capital can be used by certain groups to secure a greater share of resources, 
the lack of social capital can present a major challenge to the successful implementation of 
community-driven development. Pantoja cites a case study in India where community 
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development strategies are dependent on community-level social capital but as “one of a 
variety of assets available in different degrees to individuals and groups in a community” 
(Pantoja, 2002, p. 143). 
One study that integrates qualitative and quantitative data is that by Narayan and Pritchett 
(1997, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 269). They show that social capital can have 
an important role to play in determining positive developmental outcomes at the 
local/village/community level. In their survey on social capital and household income in rural 
Tanzania they show that social capital had an impact on village-level developmental outcomes.  
Their survey instrument incorporated questions on village life as well as on various dimensions 
of social capital including membership in groups, membership characteristics of groups and 
their attitudes on issues like trust and social cohesion. Analysis of their data found that the level 
of social capital of the households interviewed (an index of the social capital measures) had an 
impact on incomes. According to the authors, the estimates suggest that a one standard 
deviation increase in the village social capital index increases the income of all households in 
the village by approximately 20% (Narayan & Pritchett, 1997 as cited in Dasgupta & 
Serageldin, 2000, p. 274). Narayan and Pritchett further explain that if half of the village are 
members of one group, this village would have a social capital index that is higher by one 
standard deviation than a village in which group membership is zero. If average membership 
were to increase, the estimates suggest that this would increase expected income by an 
impressively large amount—more than what it would increase if they were to add three years 
of schooling per adult. The implication of this is that social capital is an important instrument 
in the fight against poverty (Narayan & Pritchett, 1997, as cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 
2000, p. 290).  
Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 80) showed through developed country urban studies literature 
and developing world documents, that the nature and extent of social networks are key 
components of the risk management strategies of the poor. The authors examined the case of 
Mexicans in San Diego and Haitians in Miami and showed that despite their population size, 
they are denied the benefits of considerable economic resources and social opportunities 
because of their low levels of social capital and internal cohesiveness.  
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Unlike the above example, other groups, like the Koreans in Los Angeles or the Chinese in San 
Francisco, are able to “call upon and develop both cohesive internal ties and more extensive 
ties into the mainstream economy, because a range of indigenous social institutions exist for 
meeting basic credit and security requirements” (Rao & Woolcock, 2001, p. 2).  
The analysis of social capital theorists whose works were reviewed here appears to endorse 
Putnam’s thesis that social capital has a positive impact on social and economic outcomes. 
These findings have important implications for the formulation of policy and the development 
of strategies for poverty alleviation, especially at the local level. In the interpretation of the 
research findings for this thesis, which are discussed in Chapter Seven, it will be argued that 
even small differences between local areas with respect to social capital can deliver significant 
differences in outcomes. 
3.7 CONCLUSION  
The analysis of the constructs, causal linkages and analytical prescripts in the Putnam thesis 
led to an elaboration on the concepts of networks and associations, trust, civic participation, 
government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. In terms of networks and associational 
activity, the review shows that the effectiveness of such organisations and groups is dependent 
on a host of variables and is often influenced by the environment in which they operate. 
Network characteristics were shown to be vertical or horizontal, with active or passive 
membership, were homogeneous and heterogeneous, and differed in the activities they 
undertook. A new approach for network effectiveness needs to take account of the extent to 
which networks and associations are imbued with combinations of the characteristics 
mentioned above. This idea is further developed in Chapter Four.   
When analysing the second concept of trust in the Putnam framework, the notion of generalised 
trust was critically examined and found to be fraught with empirical and conceptual problems. 
Given the difficulty with the term, the literature focused on the concept of “political” trust.   
Civic participation was found to include political participation and engagement. Factors that 
affect participation were identified and included demographic, associational activity and 
institutional opportunities and constraints. The role of institutional design was critically 
examined along with state agency in the promotion of civic participation. A point of note was 
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the lack of attention paid to the concept of leadership in the promotion of both social capital 
and political participation and engagement. This is considered an important factor in the 
research findings on Cederberg and Matzikama.  
On government effectiveness, the extent to which a state is “developmental” or “predatory” 
was found to be crucially dependent on the capacity of its public institutions and the nature of 
state-society relations. Measurements of government effectiveness, however, relied primarily 
on objective indicators collected from government departments or agencies. Government 
effectiveness in the literature was not found to be dependent on the extent to which local 
governments’ impact on the welfare function of communities, particularly poor communities. 
This was found to be a caveat and is incorporated into the augmented analytical framework 
developed in Chapter Four.    
The review on socioeconomic outcomes gave an account of how social capital has been linked 
to positive social and economic outcomes in the development literature. It traced developments 
in both the developed and developing world and discussed the studies documenting socio-
economic outcomes. The chapter has demonstrated that the Putnam thesis can be augmented 
with insights from the literature so as to reflect a comprehensive transmission mechanism from 
networks to socioeconomic outcomes capable of providing answers to the research question.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: AUGMENTING PUTNAM’S 
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
One of the key aims and objectives of the thesis is to rework Putnam’s theory of social capital 
so as to provide an analytical framework capable of describing the transmission mechanism 
necessary for social capital to impact on socioeconomic outcomes in the South African small 
town and rural context. I intend to develop the analytical framework in this chapter based 
largely on the insights gleaned from Chapter Three. The analytical framework will be used to 
analyse the findings in the two study areas in Chapter Six. 
Using the Putnam framework as a point of departure, I begin this chapter with a discussion on 
networks and associations. The salient points of networks/associations as elaborated in the 
literature review are incorporated into the analytical framework. The various characteristics of 
networks/associations are discussed and diagrammatically represented. The relationship 
between networks/associations and trust and participation is then sketched. This is followed by 
a discussion on trust and its attributes and how this affects and is affected by participation. In 
the discussion on participation, the factors affecting participation are incorporated into the 
analytical framework and linked to government effectiveness. The administrative and technical 
aspects of government effectiveness are then worked into the analytical framework which is 
further extended to apply a welfare approach to the Putnam construct. Socioeconomic 
outcomes are incorporated into the analytical framework as the final outcome of the process.  
4.2 NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS  
From the literature review, social networks or associations were seen as a structure for sharing 
information, coordinating activities and making collective decisions. According to mainstream 
proponents, the system works because of common values and norms as well as sanctions of 
undesirable conduct. Social networks are a medium within and through which information 
flows and decisions are made. This medium is dynamic and helps to interpret and assess the 
information that flows through it. The type of network or association also influences the 
information that gets disseminated through it and the actions that emanates from it. For 
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example, membership in a church organisation might be given a moral or ethical dimension as 
a result of the medium through which it is disseminated, and the actions that stem from it might 
be mediated by this moral dimension. The different types of networks and their varying aspects 
have a bearing on the other concepts discussed in the analytical framework.  
A brief summation of the findings from the literature review in Chapter Three will help to 
distinguish the following characteristics of networks:  
4.2.1 Horizontal Versus Hierarchical 
Networks are described as being either horizontal or vertical. A horizontal network is also 
described by Putnam (1993, p. 116) as a social network. A horizontal network is one in which 
the structure of the network has mutuality and equality of participation. According to Putnam 
(1993, pp. 107–108) these horizontal associations are more equitably and densely populated 
than hierarchical ones. As people begin to interact with one another (in the context of these 
networks) generalised reciprocity as well as social trust is engendered and enhanced. Greater 
trust impacts on relationship building by increasing communication and cooperation which in 
turn impacts positively on civic engagement.  
In contrast to horizontal networks, hierarchical ones are characterised by dependence (Boix & 
Posner, 1996, p. 3) rather than mutuality, which limits their ability to generate reciprocity and 
trust. For Ikeda and Richey (2005, p. 241), hierarchical relationships are characterised by 
coercion and compliance. This could create mistrust, which makes relationship building harder 
and, as a consequence, more difficult to arrive at common goals. The sharing of opinions is 
also more of a challenge which, in turn, negatively impacts on civic mindedness. Ikeda and 
Richey (2005, p. 256) show that in Japan, by contrast, vertical or hierarchical 
networks/associations impacted positively on political participation because of the culture of 
the society. A probable explanation is that this is because of the culture and belief in 
Confucianism which enforces the notion that superiors in the social structure have more 
knowledge than those who occupy lower positions (Ikeda & Richey, 2005 p. 242). This is 
however not the norm in Western urban societies that are governed by liberal values where 
hierarchical networks usually have negative consequences. 
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4.2.2 Active Versus Passive Membership  
The degree of activism in an association/network also impacts on trust, participation and 
socioeconomic outcomes. This is the finding of Savage et al. (2004, p. 35) and Kankainen 
(2009, p. 11). The latter found that active membership in hobbies and cultural associations 
correlates positively with trust.  
However, passive membership is not necessarily negative since the longer individuals remain 
in their passive roles the more influence these associations have on their attitudes (Wollebæk 
& Selle, 2002, p. 37). Passive membership therefore impacts positively on the belief system. 
In a study in Finland by Kankainen (2009, p. 11) though, a correlation was established between 
lower levels of trust and passive membership in certain associations.  
From the research conducted then, there appears to be general consensus that passive 
membership has a lesser impact on trust and participation than active membership. In the 
analysis of the differences between networks in Cederberg and Matzikama, I assess the degree 
of activism in the existing networks, look at how network activism differs between the two 
municipalities and, if they do, what the possible explanations for these differences are. I also 
investigate which types of membership lead to action and political participation. 
4.2.3 Homogeneous Versus Heterogeneous Membership  
From the work by Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005, p. 235) we learn that people are more 
likely to join groups that are homogeneous in their membership. This is because people find it 
easier to mix with “their own kind.” Even though Putnam (1993) and others argue that 
heterogeneous membership is more likely to generate public trust (because people get to 
socialise with others from outside their established circle), Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005, 
p. 235) show that the empirical evidence on the matter is inconclusive. In the investigation of 
Cederberg and Matzikama I examine the extent to which membership is heterogeneous or 
homogeneous. In the context of South Africa, it should be noted that the extent to which social 
group membership is heterogeneous in both racial and income terms is important since it will 
help identify the extent to which groups have managed to develop relationships beyond their 
particular race and income categories. This could have important implications for the country 
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in terms of our understanding of trust between racial groups and the factors that promote or 
inhibit participation and engagement across class lines.  
The analytical framework also identifies homogeneity and heterogeneity in the type of social 
groups that are available in the African/Black communities of Cederberg and Matzikama. The 
greater the heterogeneity (in terms of the diversity of activities that they undertake) the more 
likely they are to impact on trust and participation. The more heterogeneous social groups are 
in a given community, the more likely it is that such a community will link up with other 
institutions and race groups. It is believed that this increases the opportunity for bridging and 
linking social capital which connects groups and individuals to others as well as with those 
who occupy different social positions (e.g. the more powerful or socially advantaged). 
4.2.4 Public Versus Private Good-Provision 
Boix and Posner (1996) found that the effects on trust and participation are different depending 
on whether networks are based on the generation/production of private or public-type goods. 
They explain (1996, p. 6) that 
the existence of a private goods-producing group depends on convergent interests rather than 
trustworthiness whereas the  existence of an association set up to supply a universally consumable 
product like better schools or safer streets, on the other hand, would appear to be a better indicator of 
the presence of social capital in the community because its very existence depends on the ability of its 
members to trust one another and overcome the organization's built-in incentives for free-riding.  
It is thus safe to assume then that social networks engaged in the provision of public goods are 
more likely to be an indicator of civic mindedness than private good-producing groups. Under 
certain conditions, however, certain “private” goods can also be provided by social groups if 
such goods confer a public benefit. For example, in the Black community of Cederberg, 
community associations have taken the initiative to play a role in the formation of soccer clubs 
for the youth in their areas.  
The analytical framework should enable us to examine the extent to which public and private 
good-producing groups have an impact on social cohesion and collective action in the two 
study areas. While both groups have to deal with the free rider issue, the focus in the analytical 
framework specifically identifies this for public good-producing groups since the emphasis in 
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the analytical framework is on the greater impact of trust, political participation and 
developmental outcomes. 
4.2.5 Political Versus Non-Political Associational Activity  
Some of the studies referred to in the literature review have shown that the scope and type of 
associational activity have important implications for trust and participation. In Wollebæk and 
Selle (2002, p. 38) and Putnam (1993), non-political associations had different impacts on trust 
and participation and hence socioeconomic outcomes when compared to political associations. 
This was confirmed by Stolle and Rochon (2001, pp. 154–155), who showed that political 
organisations have the least levels of public and political trust and efficacy.  
Non-political associations like stokvels, choirs and sport groups would appear to not only 
enable people to bond and stand together but also offer an opportunity for them to engage with 
other racial groups (in the context of South Africa) and thereby build trust and cohesion 
between them. This clearly facilitates the flow of information and enhances communication 
between and within these groups. This is said to facilitate engagement with the political 
authorities. For example, in New Zealand it was found that membership in non-political 
associations like sports clubs promote political engagement (see Donovan et al., 2004, p. 415). 
Verba (1995) echoes this with his work on church groups, showing that they are associated 
with higher levels of participation.  
4.2.6 Typology of Networks  
Having discussed the various types of characteristics of networks, the following table illustrates 
their relationship with trust and participation.  
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Table 4-1: Typology of Networks 
TYPE CHARACTERISTICS 
OF NETWORKS 
DESCRIPTION IMPACT 
TRUST PARTICIPATION 
Horizontal 
versus 
Hierarchical  
Horizontal 
 
• Mutuality and equality of 
participation 
• Densely populated 
• Enhances communication and 
cooperation 
• Facilitates generalized reciprocity 
• Equal division of power 
√ √ 
Hierarchical • Dependence rather than mutuality  
• Characterized with coercion and 
compliance 
• Unequal division of power 
× √ 
Active versus 
Passive 
Active • characterized by active 
engagement and involvement 
√ √ 
Passive  
 
• Passive participation in a network 
involves not participating actively, 
and usually letting others make 
decisions 
× √ 
Homogeneous 
versus 
Heterogeneous 
Homogeneous  
 
• Networks/associations that have 
the same kind of constituents – 
• Generally racially and culturally 
based networks 
• Can also be defined in terms of the 
homogeneity of  social groups     
× × 
Heterogeneous 
 
• Networks/associations that have 
unrelated constituents 
• E.g. Racially and culturally diverse   
• Can also be defined in terms of the 
heterogeneity  of social groups 
(diverse social groups) 
√ √ 
Public-good 
versus private-
good 
producing 
Public-good producing 
 
• Public-good producing 
networks/associations are set up to  
supply a universally consumable 
product like better schools  
• Public-good producing 
networks/associations existence 
depends on the ability of its 
members to overcome built-in 
incentives for free-riding 
√ √ 
Private-good 
producing  
• Private goods-producing 
networks/associations depends on 
convergent interests  
× √ 
Non-political 
versus 
political  
Non-political  
 
• Examples of non-political 
networks/associations include 
sports groups, cultural groups etc.  
√ √ 
Political  • Unions, government agencies × √ 
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Having outlined the attributes of various networks we now look at how they can be integrated 
into the analytical framework. This is illustrated in Figure 4-1.  
The aim in this section is to understand how the types of networks illustrated in Figure 4-1 have 
an impact on trust and participation. Two observations that can be made about networks are 
that their characteristics are not mutually exclusive and that each network can have a host of 
different attributes. Figure 4-1 shows that networks/associations that are horizontal, active and 
heterogeneous in their membership, public good-producing and non-political in their scope 
have the strongest impact on trust and participation. These positive attributes are demarcated 
by the red dotted line. 
Although Figure 4-1 illustrates the effect that networks and associations (social group 
membership) has on trust and participation, it is important to bear in mind the potential 
endogeneity between trust and networks since high levels of trust may also facilitate social 
group membership. However, it is unknown at this stage if political trust leads to the 
proliferation of social groups which is an area of further future research. 
4.3 TRUST  
The second component in the analytical framework deals with the concept of trust. The 
literature speaks of generalised or social trust. Trust is considered to be thick or thin. Thick 
trust refers to trust among family and friends while thin trust resonates with generalised trust 
which implies weak social ties (James & Sykuta, 2004, p. 7). 
The concept of trust is a critical element of social capital. Generalised trust is an outcome of 
belonging to multiple cross-cutting associations. We noted that Muhlberger (2003, p. 7) defined 
generalised trust as “an expectation that other people in a society will generally abide by 
commonly held social norms, roles and ethical dictates.”  
Prakash and Selle (2001, p. 2) and Fatorre et al. (2003, pp. 172–173) identified problems with 
the concept of generalised trust in so far as assumptions are made and conclusions drawn from 
the data concerning a broad range of stakeholders, including civil society and political office 
bearers. In their analysis they combine impersonal trust (in government and public sector 
organisations) and personal trust (family and friends) into one measure.  
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This is underscored by others such as Brehm and Rahn (1997, as cited in Muhlberger, 2003, p. 
22) who find that people interpret questions about generalised trust as political trust. In the 
course of their research the link between trust and civic engagement was explored. It appears 
that the responses to their questions depended on generalised trust being interpreted in a 
political way.  
The definition of political trust as given by Muhlberger (2003, p. 10) refers to “people in a 
community who are willing to work together on common problems . . . willing to talk to each 
other and [who] care about community problems.” For Muhlberger, political trust is better than 
the concept of generalised trust in explaining civic engagement involving political action 
(2003, p. 22).  
The concept of trust that has been used is based on the following rationale: trust is comprised 
of thick (personal) or thin (impersonal) trust. Thin trust resonates with generalised or social 
trust. However, because of the interpretation of generalised or social trust, and the interest I 
have in the relationship between trust and civic engagement or participation, I opted for the 
more banal notion of political trust which is essentially trust in political actors and institutions.  
To illustrate the nature of the relationship between trust and participation in the analytical 
framework, I examine the following three points from the literature review:  
(i) Brehm and Rahn (1997, p. 1003) investigated the relationship between trust and 
engagement and found that it is not one dimensional—that is, it does not necessarily 
follow that trust leads to participation because it may also be the other way around. 
In their work they find that a stronger relationship exists from engagement to trust 
than from trust to engagement. This has definite implications for the analytical 
framework since the relationship can be illustrated as moving in both directions, 
that is, from trust to participation and from participation to trust. Using the 
analytical framework as a reference, the qualitative part of this study investigates 
the relationship between political trust and participation for Cederberg and 
Matzikama and explores the direction of causality between the two concepts. The 
statistical significance of the correlation is examined as well as the sign of the 
coefficient to see the directionality of the relationship.  
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(ii) Bélanger and Nadeau (2005, p. 137) found that politically distrustful voters were 
more likely to abstain from participation. This implies a positive relationship 
between trust and participation, for example, if trust is low (high mistrust) then 
participation is low.  
For Muhlberger (2003, p. 4), when trust is high, it may become an inhibitor of collective action 
and hence, of participation, because people believe that the community, the political leaders, 
or both, will act in their best interest, thereby decreasing their propensity to participate. This 
implies a negative relationship between trust and participation—high trust, low participation.  
This point speaks to the nature of the relationship between trust and participation, that is, 
whether the relationship is positive or negative. This is very different from the issue of 
directionality referred previously above. There are several reasons why any one of the above 
might hold that can be attributable to a number of social phenomena. It is important here then 
to interrogate other factors or characteristics of a particular community—is there an entrenched 
culture of apathy, or has the history of exclusion indelibly left its mark on what the community 
feels about the political system, or are there other social dynamics at play such as high rates of 
alcoholism, intimidation by gangs and high levels of violence which erode trust and 
subsequently militate against participation? Figure 4-1 below incorporates the discussion on 
trust into the analytical framework.  
4.4 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION  
The third strand in the analytical framework centres on the concept of civic engagement and 
(political) participation. The definition of civic participation adopted here is taken from Best 
and Dustan (2006, p. 6), namely that civic participation is seen as “civic engagement, political 
participation and political engagement.”  
Some of the same factors that shape participation also influence political trust. These factors 
include:  
• Economic and demographic factors: This refers to socioeconomic status, social 
structure of population and diversity (marginal effects). These factors arguably cut 
across all the concepts discussed in the analytical framework.  
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Other factors which are not necessarily cross-cutting and which can have a direct bearing on 
participation include the following: 
• Relationship with the state: Communities can have high levels of 
engagement/participation either because they are ignored or because they have high 
complementary relations with the state (Narayan, 1999, p15). However, a 
complementary relationship with the state does not necessarily produce the type of 
participation which is required for accountable and efficient governance. For 
example, Booth and Richards showed that in the case of Central America, 
communal social groups may be co-opted by repressive regimes, leading the authors 
to suggest that “communal associations ….. help regimes buy off local activists” 
(1998, pp. 796–797). Informal communal social groups are at risk of either being 
co-opted into accepting outcomes which do not maximise their social welfare or of 
having their leadership bought off in the process. The analytical framework 
therefore needs to include “the relationship with the state” as one of the factors 
affecting participation. In South Africa this point may deserve more attention 
because of the way the new state (post-1994) has structured its relationships with a 
range of interest groups, including civil society organisations. As in several other 
countries, some groups enjoy preferential access to power and resources while 
others feel marginalised. How this affects participation would appear to depend 
largely on who occupies positions of power and the connections they have to their 
communities or some other reference group. Race, ethnicity and socioeconomic 
status are the likely variables influencing the relationship that communities have 
with the state. In the case of marginalised groups participation might follow from 
an adversarial stance, with groups making demands on the state to alleviate their 
harsh circumstances.  
• Political structures and institutions: complementarity of relations with the state is 
dependent on the political structures and institutions which bind the state and 
citizens in such a manner that the expectations and obligations of both are mediated. 
Political structures and institutions differ in the extent to which they are effective in 
facilitating meaningful participation. Related to this is the issue of how the state and 
civil society interpret their roles and how this is given effect in the policies of the 
state.  
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In the South African context, ward committees were created in the new democratic 
dispensation to facilitate meaningful participation by the community in local government 
decisions. It is thus an important aspect to incorporate into the analytical framework. Since the 
democratic elections, a spate of legislation has been passed to promote local economic 
development. Ward committees were given a crucial role in the governance model developed 
for this process. The results of what these new structures have achieved need to be assessed for 
their effectiveness in Cederberg and Matzikama. In particular, ward committees need to be 
examined to see if their levels of interaction with local authorities are greater or lesser than 
other community-based organisations and whether this has any bearing on development 
outcomes, or even if they have added to the dysfunctionality of municipalities.  
• The aspect of rules (related to the previous factor): formal and informal rules, 
customs and conventions affect participation (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 540). Here 
Lowndes echoes the work of North which emphasises “rules of the game” and 
correct incentives which structure participation. This includes institutional and 
policy design as a factor (that influences participation), including responsiveness of 
decision making by local authorities.  
• State agency: state agency refers to the capacity of the state to forge dynamic 
alliances and partnerships between and within state institutions and civil society. 
However, agency is not confined to the state alone. Agency also manifests itself in 
communities where strong community leadership is responsible for improved 
participation. The issue of state agency and particularly community leadership is 
largely unexplored in the literature and will be incorporated as a key variable 
impacting on participation.  
• Leadership: leaders are crucial activators of social capital and community members 
are dependent on leadership for collective action. Leaders are therefore crucial for 
linking social capital.  
Each of the factors listed above have been referenced in the analytical framework. Civic 
engagement/participation is an outcome of the compendium of factors discussed and is 
illustrated in Figure 4:1 below.  
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4.5 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS   
The nature of state-society interactions determines whether a state is predatory or 
developmental (Evans, 1997). Stated more simply, effective participation by civil society 
impacts on the performance of government. This is the next step of the framework that is 
discussed below.  
Consider the case of an interventionist state that gets involved in sectors of the economy where 
the prospects for creating employment and alleviating poverty are relatively high. Without 
strong participation of civil society, the state runs the risk of “bureaucratising” development, 
with the decision-making process resting solely in the hands of state officials. The absence of 
regulations which enforce accountability and good governance can give rise to a culture of 
impunity endangering both democracy and development. Hence government effectiveness is 
therefore dependent on the degree to which the public can engage officials and/or politicians 
and hold these office bearers accountable if they transgress or do not deliver. Put another way, 
all other things being equal, to the extent that the effectiveness of government is strongly 
influenced by the level of associational activism in a given society, social and economic 
outcomes are likely to reflect growth and distributional achievements.  
Studies that have sought to examine the relationship between social capital and government 
effectiveness have used financial, human resources (HR), management and other technical 
indicators as measurement tools. In addition to incorporating these technical criteria into the 
analytical framework, a “welfarist” approach is also factored into the analytical framework. In 
a welfarist approach, which augments the more technical aspects of effectiveness, the 
framework incorporates the extent to which government maximises the social welfare function 
of the poor. Financial, HR and other management indicators of government performance, 
which other studies such as the one by Coffé and Geys (2005) rely on to determine government 
effectiveness , tell us about the administrative and technical efficiency of government’s 
performance but say little about municipalities that have capacity constraints such as Cederberg 
and Matzikama. This study looks at more subjective measures of performance—particularly 
from the perspective of the poor. It asks whether there is an improvement in the social and 
economic conditions of the lives of the poor. The treatment of government effectiveness in the 
analytical framework thus covers both a technical and welfarist perspective.  
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4.6 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES  
The literature has generally focused on the following themes: economic growth and 
development, poverty alleviation, livelihood support, educational attainment and access to 
basic services. In Putnam’s thesis, however, the ultimate effect of social capital is to be assessed 
according to social and economic outcomes. 
Social and economic outcomes can be maximised in different ways, with or without 
government intervention. In developing countries that are characterised by poor service 
delivery, poor communities can collaborate, manage and maintain local resources (as they often 
do) to compensate for the lack of government provision of services. This type of collective 
action improves the management of local resources (Ostrom, 2000, p. 178). Rao and Woolcock 
(2001, p. 80) show that social networks, in particular, are a key component of the risk strategies 
of the poor.  
In the analytical framework, social and economic outcomes reflect this specifically—an 
outcome that is the result of belonging to an association/network, as illustrated in the preceding 
discussion. Given the limited capacity of community associations and networks to provide 
services, especially bulk infrastructure, they are likely to concentrate on activities that relate to 
reducing their vulnerability to shocks or minimising the effects of poverty, or improving their 
safety and security. It is in their engagement with state institutions that their role is expanded 
to facilitate the provision of housing, job creation and provision of basic services. Here the 
impact of associations and networks on socioeconomic outcomes is likely to be most evident 
and it is where Putnam’s thesis can be seen to validate its claim of the positive contribution of 
social capital. 
4.7 COMPARISON OF FRAMEWORKS  
The framework illustrated in Chapter Three is a static interpretation of Putnam’s thesis. The 
necessity of developing an augmented framework was informed by the literature review in 
Chapter Three. The enhanced framework showing the insights and ideas obtained from the 
literature review and the more nuanced and dynamic interpretation of the relationship between 
networks/associations and socioeconomic outcomes is illustrated in Figure 4-1.  
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When comparing the two diagrams the following differences are highlighted:  
• The Putnam thesis does not distinguish between all the different types of characteristics of 
networks which are vital for an understanding of the extent to which networks impact on 
trust, participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. This is 
incorporated in the augmented analytical framework. 
• In the Putnam thesis, generalised trust is a direct outcome of membership in networks and 
associations. In the analytical framework trust is not defined as “generalised” but rather as 
“political” trust. 
In contrast the enhanced framework depicts the drivers behind networks, trust, participation, 
government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. The framework also highlights the 
original contribution that the thesis makes to the analysis of the transmission mechanism that 
exists between networks and socioeconomic outcomes.   
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Figure 4-1: Augmented Analytical Framework 
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The framework postulates two paths from networks and associations to political 
engagement and ultimately socioeconomic outcomes.  
i. The one path is through political trust. When members of networks and associations 
deal with a political party/regime that they do not trust they might be tempted to 
exert direct pressure on the regime. Conversely, if they trust the political 
regime/party then they might explore ways to effectively negotiate their demands 
and express their concerns, or as noted earlier, might be co-opted into accepting 
outcomes that do not maximise their welfare.  
ii. The other path shows that trust might not be relevant. The line from networks and 
associations to political engagement is instructive here. Members in networks and 
associations can directly engage politicians and officials whether they trust them or 
not. This is a form of effective democracy. If the correct factors are in place at the 
level of the local authority (like the ones illustrated under civic engagement and 
participation in the diagram above), then this enhances/facilitates engagement.  
Apart from being influenced by political trust, participation is influenced by a host of other 
factors which were not originally postulated in the Putnam hypothesis. For example, where 
there are strong political institutions and structures at the level of local government, formal 
and informal rules that enhance participation, leadership, strong state agency, and so on, 
then even in a climate where the citizens are distrustful of officials and politicians, there 
are mechanisms through which they can interface with the local authority which reduce the 
probability of violent forms of protest.  
The analytical framework also implicitly shows that the types of characteristics of networks 
and associations do influence the development of effective leadership and a sense of 
collective identity which facilitates collective action/ political engagement.  
In the analytical framework government effectiveness is more broadly defined than in the 
Putnam framework. In areas where governments are ineffective in terms of technical 
criteria, it is important to establish whether the pressure exerted on the local authority by 
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poor communities, organised in networks and associations, actually impacts on their 
wellbeing. Given the developing country context of our case studies, the augmented 
framework differs from the original framework in that it allows for both technical 
efficiency criteria as well as social and economic welfare criteria. The augmented 
analytical framework implicitly argues that in (poor, marginalised) communities where 
there are numerous networks and associations of the kind that engender positive outcomes, 
the welfare function of such communities is by and large formulated and established 
through the ebb and flow of information in such structures. The social welfare function of 
communities then is determined by what communities need/prefer. Thus social networks 
influence the formation and constitution of the social welfare function of poor 
communities. This can then be communicated to the local municipality through political 
engagement.  
4.8 CONCLUSION  
This chapter described the development of the analytical framework which will be used to 
discuss the research findings in Chapter Six. The analytical framework developed departs 
from the Putnam framework (illustrated in Chapter Three, i.e. Figure 3–1). The analytical 
framework is based on the literature review in Chapter Three and the research question 
posed in Chapter One.  
Figure 4-1 describes the relationship between networks/associations and socioeconomic 
outcomes. It also provides a framework through which the findings of the two study areas 
can be interpreted. The analytical framework is intended to provide insight into the 
transmission mechanism from networks to outcomes. While the study areas are located in 
rural parts of the Western Cape, the framework is generic enough to test in both urban and 
rural contexts. 
The analytical framework demonstrates that the relationship between social networks and 
socioeconomic outcomes is complex and contingent upon several factors that are 
themselves the product of multifaceted social and institutional conditions. For social 
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networks and associations to impact on socioeconomic outcomes requires a great deal of 
confluence between a number of other variables as the analytical framework illustrates. It 
also shows that not all networks and associations are the same and that it is the 
characteristics of networks that influence the extent to which better socioeconomic 
outcomes are realised.  
The analytical framework also makes reference to the type of trust that is generated through 
membership in an association and how this political trust impacts on the way in which 
communities interface with political authorities.  
Community participation—both the way it occurs and its extent—is also determined in 
large measure by the community’s sense of collective identity and agency which, in turn, 
is influenced by the types of associations of which they are members. However, other 
influences such as the institutional make-up of the municipality concerned, as well as 
factors relating to those illustrated in the analytical framework (such as state agency) also 
have a bearing.  
The combination of all these factors appears to have a determining effect on government 
effectiveness. The pressure exerted on government through a community’s collective 
action is bound to influence the maximisation of welfare functions of that community. 
Furthermore, the incorporation of an ethos of community service into the broader 
legislative instruments allows for potential enhancement of the welfare functions, just as 
government administrative competencies are indispensable for developmental outcomes.  
It is with this in mind that I proceed to examine the methodology of the research, which 
follows in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the methodological framework for the study. It deals with research 
design, methods, tools and instruments that were used throughout the research project life 
cycle of data collection, analysis and interpretation. The chapter aims to demonstrate how 
the approach and methodology used were relevant and appropriate given the research 
question and how, in addition to standard analysis, innovative instruments were used to 
test the research question.  
 
This chapter describes the methodology used to measure the effect that social capital has 
on socioeconomic outcomes (as illustrated in the augmented analytical framework). The 
methodology was developed to measure how social capital manifests itself in communities 
that are marginalised, rural and poor, including the transmission mechanism to 
socioeconomic outcomes. Accordingly, the intention is to establish the link between the 
theoretical framework developed in the thesis and the empirical methods used to assess the 
impact of social capital on socioeconomic outcomes. This necessitates the development of 
a framework for empirically investigating the existing level/s of social capital and a review 
of the methods used to measure it in light of this framework “by drawing upon examples 
of both secondary and primary social capital research conducted to date” (Stone, 2001, p. 
2).  
The chapter is structured as follows. It starts out with the operationalisation of the concepts 
identified in the theoretical framework and identifies some of the indicators that can be 
used to measure the constructs. This is followed by a description of the research design and 
a discussion of the research methods employed which included a quantitative as well as 
qualitative approach. In the quantitative component, municipality-wide surveys were 
conducted in both Cederberg and Matzikama to capture the relevant data. In the qualitative 
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component the case study method was employed using key informant interviews to capture 
data. I also discuss how single-method bias was reduced through the use of triangulation.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion on the quantitative analysis of data where 
descriptive and inferential statistics are used to provide baseline data on the concepts in the 
analytical framework. Path analysis will also be used to capture the “interactional” 
relationships that exist in the analytical framework. The qualitative analysis of the data will 
be briefly described before concluding the chapter.  
5.2 DATA NEEDS AND OPERATIONALISATION 
Several ad hoc methods have been employed to measure social capital. Unfortunately the 
multiplicity of methods is primarily related to the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding 
the topic. As indicated in the literature review, social capital is a multidisciplinary concept 
that has been defined in different but related ways across disciplines. Hence Bjørnskov and 
Svendson (2003, p. 8) are of the opinion that because economists, sociologists and political 
scientists differ in their definitions of social capital they also differ in their approaches to 
the measurement of the concept. For example, Bjørnskov and Svendson (2003, p. 8) 
observed that there were at least ten different approaches to measuring social capital in the 
literature. The authors (2003, p. 6) state that social capital has been measured in a host of 
countries and that an equal number of proxies have been used to measure social capital 
across the literature.  
5.2.1 Operationalisation of Concepts and Identification of Indicators   
According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 159) operationalisation is intended to “specify 
concrete empirical procedures that will result in the measurement of variables. It is the final 
specification of how one would recognise the different attributes of a given variable in the 
real world.”  
In this section I examine the operationalisation of the concepts dealt with in the framework 
developed in Chapter Four. Here I review how the different concepts have been dealt with 
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at an operational level and touch on the types of indicators that have been used to measure 
the concepts to date as well as the indicators used in this study. The review is by no means 
exhaustive and was selected primarily on the basis of its relevance to the research question.  
The augmented analytical framework identified several concepts that needed to be 
operationalised so that they could be empirically observed in Cederberg and Matzikama. 
These included networks and associations, political trust, civic engagement and 
participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes.  
As noted in the literature review, networks and generalised trust are two of the key 
indicators used to measure social capital in the literature (see Inglehart, 1997, and Putnam, 
2000). In the literature review the deficiencies of the concept of generalised trust were 
noted and hence this study does not consider its application here as a measure of social 
capital. I do, however, accept the conceptualisation of social capital in terms “of voluntary 
participation in associational activity, which entails interaction with others in the formal 
context of a club, organisation or association of some sort” (Jooste, 2005, p. 2). This is 
endorsed by Krishna, 2002 (as cited in Gomulia, 2006, p. 38), who argued that networks 
are the only important variable to be operationalised when measuring social capital. 
As far as associational activism is concerned, the operationalisation of social capital must 
enable the identification of the existence of such networks, the types that exist as well as 
the characteristics with which they are imbued. Putnam (1998, p. vi) as cited in Stone 
(2001, p. 8)  differentiated between formal and informal networks, where informal 
networks examine family, kin, friends and neighbours while formal networks include 
membership to voluntary associations such as sports groups, church and cultural groups. 
According to Stone (2001, p. 14) measuring the extent to which people are “attracted to 
formally constitute social groups of one kind or another is a method frequently employed 
for the measure of group-based relations in social capital research.” Therefore in this study 
social capital is operationalised as membership in formal networks and associations. When 
operationalised in this manner, it also enables the measurement of network density in a 
particular locale.  
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Operationalising social capital as formal social groups also allows for the identification of 
the types of social groups to which people are likely to belong. For example, sports groups, 
cultural groups and volunteer groups. The conceptual framework also identified particular 
characteristics with which groups are imbued, that is, whether they encouraged active or 
passive membership, are horizontal or vertical, homogeneous or heterogeneous, political 
or non-political, and whether they are public or private good-producing, as this may 
influence the nature and extent of social capital. Passive/active membership is 
characterised by the frequency with which meetings are held and the turnout at such 
meetings. 
Horizontal or vertical social groups are operationalised according to how decisions are 
made and the extent of discussion/debate allowed by the broad membership when meetings 
are held. Political and non-political associations are operationalised as networks and 
associations that have been initiated or funded by political or government entities. 
Operationalising public and private good-producing networks are characterised by the 
goods and services that they produce, such as the provision of basic goods and services 
(e.g. water and sanitation services). 
The framework identified political trust as another key concept in the transmission 
mechanism from networks and associations to socioeconomic outcomes. As indicated in 
Chapter Two, Kim (2004, p. 3) sees it as the trust that citizens put in their political 
institutions and actors. Here the political actors and institutions are central to the notion of 
political trust. Stokes (1962, cited in Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005, p. 122) and Miller (1974, 
cited in Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005, p. 122) conceive of political trust  
as a general evaluative orientation towards the government based upon citizens’ normative 
expectations of government operation and effectiveness or it can be viewed as individuals 
assessment of how well the government is performing compared with how well they think it should 
be performing.  
When operationalising the term political trust, it refers to trust in both government and 
political entities and the indicators used to measure it are trust in political leaders, local 
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government and central government. The multiple indicators were then transformed into 
one composite indicator that measured political trust.  
Conceptually the definition of civic participation adopted here is taken from Best and 
Dustan (2006, p. 6), namely, that civic participation is seen as “civic engagement, political 
participation and political engagement.” When operationalising the term, it is identified as 
a form of active citizenship that engages with and in the local government and political 
arena. The aim here is to measure political participation in such a way that it is capable of 
capturing the active role that citizens play in their engagement with the state, including 
officials and institutions. In this study, the indicators used to do this included signing a 
petition, participating in an election campaign, attending a council meeting and voting in 
local elections. When comparing the list of indicators in the thesis with that of Putnam 
(1993, pp. 92–96 and 149) and Putnam (1993, cited in Gomulia, 2006, p. 37) under the 
banner of civic engagement, there is a distinction between his indicators and those used in 
this thesis, because his list encompasses both civic vibrancy and political action which 
include the following:  
• Membership in mutual aid societies 
• Membership in cooperatives 
• Strength of the mass parties  
• Turnout and voting in elections 
• Longevity of associations  
• Newspaper readership 
• Density and vibrancy of clubs and associations in each region 
The thesis makes a clear distinction between associational activity and civic participation 
and the indicators used to measure the concepts reflect this.  
Studies that have examined the effects of social capital on government effectiveness have 
used several administrative and technical indicators to measure government 
performance/effectiveness. For example, the study by Knack (2000, p. 22) measured 
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government performance across five areas, including financial and capital management, 
human resources, information technology and what he refers to as “managing for results.” 
Under the five performance areas a total of thirty-five criteria were used to determine 
government effectiveness. The parameters that were set for the operationalisation of 
government effectiveness are based on the assessment criteria obtained from the Provincial 
Department of Local Government and Housing and the Provincial Treasury of the Western 
Cape. The lexicon of these measurement criteria includes municipal transformation and 
organisational development, basic service delivery, good governance, financial viability 
and local economic development performance. The operationalisation of these terms are 
given in the table below. The indicators (presented and discussed in Chapter Six) for each 
of the performance areas were also provided by the state bodies mentioned above. 
With respect to the assessment of government’s welfarist performance, it is necessary that 
the research captures people’s perceptions of what they think their government is doing for 
them (service delivery or related issues) and the responsiveness of local government to the 
immediate and urgent service delivery problems they face. The operationalisation of this 
function, it follows, involves determining such responsiveness to problems relating to basic 
service delivery.       
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Table 5-1: Assessment Criteria used by Provincial Government 
ASSESSMENT DEFINITION 
Municipal 
Transformation & 
Organisational 
Development 
Included in this was the staffing situation, transformation (how representative 
the municipality is in terms of its demographics), HR policies and whether HR 
policies and systems are in place.  
Basic Service 
Delivery 
Included in this was an assessment of households without access to basic 
services, municipal backlogs in the provision of basic services, spending of the 
capital budget and provision of free basic services.  
Good Governance This was divided into development planning and performance management. 
Under development planning the indicators included goal alignment with 
provincial and national goals; Integrated Development Planning (IDP) processes 
(the extent to which the IDP is included in all sectoral plans, whether the IDP is 
approved and submitted on time); Service Delivery Budget Implementation 
Plans (SDBIPs)—a plan that municipalities need to submit to the Provincial 
Treasury which links the priorities and projects identified in the IDP with the 
budget and service delivery targets of the municipalities). Under the second 
indicator of good governance, namely, performance management, the indicators 
included performance management system (PMS) implementation and whether 
this was implemented on all levels, PMS linked to IDP targets, the PM policy 
and framework. It also included performance on delegations of authority, 
whether regular council and mayoral committee meetings are held, the quorum 
at meetings, the changes in political leadership, and anti-corruption policy 
implementation.  
Financial Viability Included in this measure was management of debtors and income, liquidity, audit 
reports, credit control and indigent policy, supply chain management processes, 
valuations, asset management, tariffs and accounting policies.  
Existence and attendance of Public Participation and Intergovernmental Forums. 
This included a public participation strategy, a communication strategy, whether 
ward committees were established, the functioning of these ward committees 
and attendance to intergovernmental relations where different tiers of 
government interact to discuss intergovernmental matters.  
Local Economic 
Development (LED) 
Including LED and poverty alleviation strategies, jobs created through LED 
projects, and temporary positions filled.  
 
The socioeconomic outcomes variable is operationalised as people’s perceptions of 
government’s impact on their socioeconomic conditions. This is captured in an indicator 
that measures those perceptions. 
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5.3 RESEARCH METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 74) the research design of a study differs from 
the research method, in that it is the blueprint of how one intends to conduct one’s research. 
The research design posed in this thesis is an empirical one and therefore requires an 
appropriate set of methods.  
5.3.1 Making the Case for a Mixed Method Approach  
The research design is an empirical one which requires the collection of primary, 
secondary, numeric and textual data. The research methodology therefore employs a mixed 
method approach that is, comprising both quantitative as well as qualitative approaches to 
collecting and analysing data.   
This is not unique to this thesis as a number of authors have endorsed the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods in the measurement of social capital because they are 
deemed complementary (see Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002, and Dudwick, Kuehnast, 
Nyhan Jones, & Woolcock, 2006).  
According to Kawachi, Kim, Coutts, and Subramanian (2004, p. 688) a mixed method 
approach introduces greater methodological sophistication and yields more comprehensive 
and complex results. Hughes and Stone (2002, p. 3) state that  
social capital measurement remains an emerging field, in which it is important to test and validate 
numerous approaches to measurement, the refinement of which will happen over time, through 
retesting, re-use and ongoing development of both conceptual and empirical understandings of 
social capital.  
In light of the emerging status of social capital it is useful to use a well-thought-out 
combination of methods, since this increases the analytical richness of a study and provides 
an investigational basis for making policy and project recommendations (Dudwick et al., 
2006, p. 1).  
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Dudwick et al. (2006, pp. 2–3) point out that the weakness of quantitative research is the 
strength of qualitative research and vice versa. For example, quantitative research is a few 
steps removed from the individuals/households from whom data is collected. The authors 
state that by collecting and subsequently analysing data in this way, quantitative methods 
uphold empirically rigorous, impartial and objective research standards. According to 
Dudwick et al. (2006, p. 3) quantitative analysis can be replicated at a later stage by some 
other researcher. The drawback of quantitative research however, is that it often misses out 
on the broader important contextual issues.  
Quantitative surveys are also expensive to administer and require good planning and pre-
testing and cannot describe the complex deliberations of local politicians in an area or how 
certain events have occurred.  
In contrast, Babbie and Mouton (2001), Dudwick et al. (2006) and Jankowicz (2000) all 
emphasise the value of qualitative research. Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 270) state that 
qualitative research emphasises the actor’s perspective and allows us to understand social 
action in specific contexts rather than attempting to generalise to some theoretical 
population. In this way, qualitative methods help us understand process, context and 
causality issues or, as Dudwick, et al. put it, “context specific depth” (2006, p. 4). From the 
perspective of the case studies selected, the qualitative approach allows the researcher to 
explore some of the historical and catalytic issues in the community that can account for 
the variations in social capital in Cederberg and Matzikama.  
Qualitative approaches allow for nuanced perspectives to come through from the different 
groups being interviewed. According to Dudwick et al. (2006, p. 4) “various groups within 
a community may have overlapping or very different experiences of social norms and 
networks. Qualitative methods that allow researchers to explore the views of homogeneous 
as well as diverse groups of people help unpack these differing perspectives within a 
community.”  
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Several authors, such as Dudwick et al. (2006, p. iv), Oliver-Hoyo and Allen (2006, p. 47) 
and Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 75), concur that the integration of quantitative and 
qualitative methods can yield better results by minimising single-method biases and by 
triangulating findings. Triangulation is the use of multiple methods of data collection in 
order to develop a full picture of the situation and to determine corroboration (Oliver-Hoyo 
& Allen, 2006, p. 47). According to Brinberg and Kidder (1982), as cited in Oliver-Hoyo 
and Allen (2006, p. 43)  
each method would measure the same construct while having a different error type inherent in 
that method. The deficiency of each method would then average out, leaving a true estimate of a 
single result. Therefore triangulation yields a more accurate and valid estimate of a result when 
each method of measurement converges on the same answer. 
The process of triangulating methods and findings creates a system of checks and balances 
to ensure greater validity of results. It allows us to determine the validity and reliability of 
data collected. For example, it can be used to check whether data collected in one form 
corresponds/validates/confirms data collected in another form. Combining the different 
methods allows for a more complete perspective of how social capital influences social and 
economic outcomes in the municipalities under consideration.  
The research methodology combines both quantitative and qualitative measures and 
triangulates findings so as to minimise the negative effects of any one approach. The rest 
of the section on research methods will be devoted to discussing both the tools and 
instruments used to collect the data. 
5.4   QUANTITATIVE METHOD 
Quantitative studies include the use of surveys and statistical analyses (Babbie & Mouton, 
2001, p. 49). According to Jankowicz (2000, p. 222) “the survey method is useful when 
you want to contact a relatively large number of people to obtain data on the same issue or 
issues, often by posing the same question to all.” This is especially relevant in this case 
where data is required on all the key concepts in the augmented analytical framework. 
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The usefulness of using a survey to collect primary data is reiterated by Sabatini (2005, pp.   
6–7) and Durlauf (2002, p. 476), who states that there are limits to what can be learned 
about social capital from conventional data sources. This is because these data sources 
often use proxy indicators of social capital which are not always credible. According to 
Durlauf (2002, p. 474), where research has been undertaken on social capital from 
conventional sources, he has found a number of difficulties in these studies.   
Given the problem with proxy indicators and the lack of available data on social capital 
variables, a number of studies and institutions like the World Bank have conducted surveys 
that capture data on social capital in communities, regions and countries. For example, one 
of the most widely cited studies is that of Narayan and Pritchett (1997) who examined 
social capital in the context of rural Tanzania. The study was primarily done at the micro 
and meso-levels with interviews of 1,376 households. The survey instrument quizzed 
respondents about their membership in groups, the characteristics of these groups and 
attitudes and values particularly related to social cohesion and trust (1997, p. 8). The 
authors also obtained data on a number of socioeconomic variables.  
In the Western Cape, the Cape Area Study collected data in 2003 on social capital variables, 
including civic commitment and political participation. The study included 400 interviews 
from the various racial groups. Putnam (1993) also carried out six surveys for his 
comparative study of northern and southern Italy.  
These discussions recognise the need for greater use of surveys for data collection, which 
was an important requirement for the theoretical framework developed for this thesis. At 
the time a municipality-wide survey was about to be undertaken in both Cederberg and 
Matzikama municipalities by the respective municipalities and, through a cooperative 
arrangement, the two efforts were combined. The survey provided a baseline understanding 
of the social and economic status of the community as well as baseline indicators of the 
social capital variables under consideration, including networks, trust, participation and 
social and economic variables. The researcher worked closely with a demographer to 
ensure that the correct protocols and procedures were followed during the survey. The 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
demographer assisted with the selection of the sample (to ensure that it was representative 
of the municipality), the training of enumerators and with ensuring that all procedures for 
collecting the data were quality controlled.    
5.4.1 Survey Methodology  
The survey was based on a random sample of residents to whom a structured questionnaire 
was administered to obtain data which was essential to the concepts in the analytical 
framework. The questionnaire was designed to capture information on demographic, 
socioeconomic and social capital variables at the level of the household (see Annexure D). 
The questionnaire drew from the Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) questionnaire 
which was developed by specialists at the World Bank. However, the questionnaire 
differed from SOCAT in that all questions were structured and close-ended, which allowed 
for uniformity of responses. In the case of SOCAT the questions were open-ended and 
semi-structured “which often requires the researcher to interpret the meaning of responses, 
opening the possibility of misunderstanding and researcher bias” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, 
p. 233).  
 On the social capital side I incorporated questions on the following variables:  
• Groups and networks 
• Political trust  
• Collective action and cooperation 
• Information and communication 
• Social cohesion and inclusion 
• Political participation and engagement 
• Government effectiveness  
• Perceptions of government performance. 
There questionnaire was divided into different content sub-sections. The sub-sections are 
described in the table below and illustrated in Annexure D. 
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Table 5-2: Content Sub-Sections of the Questionnaire 
 CONTENT SUB-SECTIONS 
1 Demographic data and social group membership  
2 Events in the household 
3 Housing  
4 Access to basic services  
5 Appliances  
6 Household income   
7 Household expenditure  
8 Financial assets  
9 Community visits 
10 Access to services like schools, public transport, medical professionals, etc 
11 Migration  
12 Health 
13 Employment  
14 Trust 
15 Access to help 
16 Access to information  
17 Social cohesion  
18 Safety and security  
19 Political action  
20 Perception of honesty of public officials  
21 Household economic activity  
 
The questionnaire attached in Annexure D was designed to demonstrate the linkages 
between the different concepts used. Data was collected from a representative sample of 
households in Cederberg and Matzikama and reviewed by a statistician who specialises in 
survey methods. Given the nature of the research question, the survey collected information 
on a broad range of social, demographic and economic variables including questions on 
associational activity, trust, social cohesion, institutions and political parties. The result 
was a rich database on socioeconomic variables which allowed for comparisons with 
traditional social capital measures. It was also possible to correlate socioeconomic 
variables with social capital ones and thereby reveal findings that were not purely academic 
but are of interest to policy makers as well. The household survey also provided a general 
framework in which the results of the survey on social capital could be better understood 
from an economic development perspective.     
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5.4.2 Sample  
Random sampling was used in this study. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 164) 
and Jancowicz (2000, p. 196) random sampling is a precise, scientific procedure which 
provides useful descriptions of the total population, since the sample of individuals drawn 
from the population must contain similar variations to those that exist in the population.  
Sample Size 
In estimating the sample size for both Cederberg and Matzikama, the degree of precision 
was between 7.5% with a 90% confidence interval.  
In Cederberg the sample was selected to be representative of approximately 800 
households/ 2,900 persons. The municipality was divided firstly into wards and further 
broken down into towns (district areas), and then into survey areas. The entire municipality 
was covered in the survey. In total, the sample frame comprised:  
• 6 wards 
• 9 towns (district areas) 
• 15 survey areas. 
The 15 survey areas covered the entire population distribution of the municipality, where 
a one level stratified sample was implemented, using a simple random sampling without 
replacement9. In each survey area, every second street was selected, and alternatively the 
enumerator surveyed odd number buildings in the first selected street and even number 
buildings in the second selected street and so on. In each household, the head of household 
(defined as the decision maker) was identified and qualified to be the main respondent. The 
first part of the questionnaire collected data on the entire household and on each member 
                                                 
9 Without replacement means that once an individual is sampled, that person is not placed back in the 
population for re-sampling. 
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as well as the events in the household for the preceding 12 months. The rest of the 
questionnaire was dedicated to the head of household itself. Details on the response rate 
are listed below: 
Table 5-3: Response Rate to Questionnaire by Place 
ENUME
RATOR 
PLACE NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLD
S 
ENUMERATE
D 
NUMBER OF 
ABSENT 
HOUSEHOLDS 
NUMBER OF 
REFUSING 
HOUSEHOLDS 
TOTAL 
HOUSES 
VISITED 
1 Clanwilliam 77 3 17 97 
2 Clanwilliam 61 10 15 86 
3 Clanwilliam 56 26 3 85 
4 Clanwilliam 10 42 10 62 
Wupperthal 6 0 0 6 
5 Citrusdal 93 2 3 98 
6 Citrusdal 93 17 11 121 
7 Lamberts Bay 90 0 0 90 
8 Lamberts Bay 86 0 5 91 
9 Lamberts Bay 72 31 31 134 
10 Elands Bay 73 3 10 86 
Leipoldtville 5 1 1 7 
11 Graafwater 61 0 5 66 
12 Graafwater 41 0 0 41 
Elandskloof 10 0 0 10 
Paleisheuwel 5 0 0 5 
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS 839 135 111 1085 
 
Household Survey 
Response Rate 
% 
Absent Rate % Refusal Rate % Total % 
77 12 10 100 
 
The same questionnaire was used in the entire municipality and was available in English 
and Afrikaans. When necessary, the questionnaire was translated by the enumerators into 
other languages of choice which, in this case, was isiXhosa. Using maps of the 
municipality, towns were divided into survey areas and clearly demarcated for enumerators 
to avoid any risk of overlapping or missing households. Each enumerator was provided 
with a map that showed the boundaries of the survey area and the starting point for the 
streets selected. 
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In Matzikama, the sample was designed to be a representative sample of approximately 
667 households in the municipality, for a total of 2,200 persons. Here too, the entire 
municipality was covered and was divided into wards, each of which was further sub-
divided into towns (district areas), and then into survey areas. In total the sample frame 
comprised:  
• 6 wards 
• 8 towns (district areas) 
• 10 survey areas. 
As was the case in Cederberg, the 10 survey areas covered the entire population distribution 
of the municipality, where a one level stratified sample was implemented, using a single 
random sampling. In each survey area, every second street was selected, and alternatively 
the enumerator surveyed odd number buildings in the first selected street and even number 
buildings in the second selected street and so on. 
In each household, the head of household (defined as the decision maker) was identified 
and qualified to be the main respondent. The first part of the questionnaire collected data 
on the entire household and on each member as well as the events in the household for the 
preceding 12 months. 
The rest of the questionnaire was dedicated to the head of household itself. The confidence 
interval was calculated on the fertility rate, using a probability of true value of 90%. Details 
on the response rate are listed below: 
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Table 5-4: Response Rate to Questionnaire by Place 
ENUMERATOR PLACE NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS 
ENUMERATED 
NUMBER OF 
ABSENT 
HOUSEHOLDS 
NUMBER OF 
REFUSING 
HOUSEHOLDS 
TOTAL 
HOUSES 
VISITED 
1 Vanrhynsdorp 80 14 3 97 
2 Klawer 36 47 13 96 
3 Klawer 79 49 7 135 
4 Lutzville 68 0 0 68 
5 Doringbaai 6 0 0 6 
Viswater 6 0 0 6 
Olifantsdrif 10 0 0 10 
Nuwestasie 3 0 0 3 
6 Vredendal 1 69 0 0 69 
7 Vredendal 2 67 0 0 67 
8 Vredendal 3 98 0 0 98 
9 Vredendal 4 84 0 3 87 
10 Vredendal 5 61 0 0 61 
Total Households  667 110 26 803 
 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
RESPONSE 
RATE % 
ABSENT RATE 
% 
REFUSAL 
RATE % 
TOTAL 
IN % 
83 14 3 100 
 
The sample size permitted a reliable analysis at the municipal level. The population 
considered in the study was made up of the entire population of households for the social 
capital study.  
It is important to note that training of the enumerators took place in both Cederberg and 
Matzikama and was conducted by the demographer (see Quantitative Method section 
above). The training comprised both theory and practical exercises. Three supervisors were 
trained one week earlier in order to pre-test the questionnaire in the area of Bellville during 
a pilot survey. 
For these two surveys, as for most of the large-scale surveys, given the tools, time and 
resources available, the stratified sampling method adhered to the following criteria: 
scientific reliability, representativeness of the sample, efficiency of estimators, the 
improvement of data quality and administrative convenience (Steigler, 2006). 
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Sample Scheme 
The simple random sampling without replacement (SRSWOR) method was used to select 
responding households. This method is used as all units distinct and is much more efficient 
than the sampling with replacement method. 
According to the demographer, the procedure of selection of a sample of a size n from a 
population P = {p1, …., pi, …., pn}  is as follows. On the first draw, one unit is selected 
from the population P of N units at random, that is, the probability of selection of any unit 
in the first draw is 1/N. On the second draw, one unit is selected again from the remaining 
(N-1) units which were not selected in the first draw. On the third draw, one unit is selected 
again from the remaining (N-2) units that were not selected in the first and the second draw. 
The procedure of selection of units is repeated until n units are selected (Steigler, 2006).  
Estimates of Sampling Errors 
The non-responses and refusal rate were recorded in a field work report to ensure that this 
information was available when the targets for each sample were achieved. The degree of 
non-responses during the interviews, as small as possible, was designed in a way that at 
least 80% of the questions were answered. All non-answered questions were noted in a 
separate report, and the degree of refusal calculated for each question. 
Data Collection Exercise 
In the case of Cederberg, the data collection took place from 27 November 2006 to 3 
December 2006. In the case of Matzikama the data collection took place in the first quarter 
of 2007. Each enumerator was sent to a specific survey area, and had a specific supervisor 
to refer to and from whom to get assistance. The enumerators were provided with a detailed 
enumerator manual and a list of codes. The process went smoothly in all areas and no major 
problems were reported. 
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Supervision and Data Quality 
In Cederberg and Matzikama data was checked by supervisors on a daily basis. Supervisors 
assisted with interviews. In Cederberg four interviews had to be re-conducted because of 
missing data. In Matzikama, seven interviews had to be re-conducted because of missing 
data. The demographer then checked all data. 
Data Entry and Data Analysis 
In the case of Cederberg, data entry commenced after all data was collected and checked 
for quality. Work on data entry started on 10 December 2006 and continued to 24 
December. Two trained data entry clerks were employed after the demographer designed 
the data base. Data was entered in MS Excel, and later transposed to the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program. A final quality check was conducted after data 
collection and entry were completed.  
In the case of Matzikama, data entry was carried out between 5 March 2007 and 25 March 
2007. Trained data entry clerks were employed after the demographer designed the data 
base. Data was entered in Excel and subsequently analysed in SPSS and Excel. 
The demographic analysis was done with the assistance of the demographer using cross 
tabulation tables, selecting the critical variables (age, gender, marital status, population 
groups, etc.).   
5.5 QUALITATIVE METHOD 
According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 270) and Jakowicz (2000, p. 127), qualitative 
research studies attitudes and behaviour within their natural setting—and is concerned with 
the nature and content of what is being said as opposed to the frequency with which it is 
said or the artificial setting in the surveys. This means that qualitative research is better 
suited to studying social processes over time. The qualitative researcher has a preference 
for understanding events, actions and processes in their contexts. 
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Different qualitative methods exist in the literature. These include case studies, historical 
reviews, biographical analysis and ethnographic studies (see Jakowicz, 2000, pp. 214–225, 
and Mouton & Babbie, 2001, pp. 278–288).  
The decision to use the case study method was undertaken as this yields scientifically valid 
information on the settings in which they occur and where many variables are measured. 
Contextual knowledge is already rich and impressions and intelligent presumptions can be 
made about a particular group (see Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 281). Babbie and Mouton 
(2001, p. 281) also state that case studies take multiple perspectives into account and 
attempt to understand the influences of multilevel social systems on subject perspectives 
and behaviour. In their view, the defining characteristic of a case study is its emphasis on 
an individual unit where the unit can be anything from an individual to a community or 
country. In the case of the community, community case studies can be defined as a focus 
on a description and analysis of patterns of, and relations between, the main aspects of 
community life.   
There are a number of ways in which data can be collected when using the qualitative 
approach. The types of approaches that have been used include informant interviews, focus 
group interviews and other participatory approaches. According to Dudwick et al. (2006, 
p. 11) participatory approaches rely on groups and their participants include representatives 
from all the major sub-groups in the community. The methodology is that if a group arrives 
at an agreement on a particular issue, then the consensus will be representative of the 
community. Dudwick et al. (2006, p. 11) states that for this method to be successful, good 
moderation of the process is necessary.   
At the outset of the field research it was decided to use both focus groups and informant 
interviews. The poor response rate to focus group interviews, however, proved to be a 
constraint and informant interviews were then held with people holding eminent positions 
in the community and government, including community leaders and municipal managers 
as their opinions were relevant to the study.  
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In total there were ten key informant interviews conducted in each of the two municipalities 
used as case studies. Details of the key informants are given in the table below.  
Table 5-5: Key Informants by Municipality, Gender and Race  
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
KEY INFORMANTS GENDER RACE GENDER RACE 
Municipal Manager Male Coloured Male  Coloured 
Community Development Workers Male Coloured Female Coloured 
Senior Community Representatives x 2 Male  African/Black Male African/Black 
Senior Community Representatives x 2  Female  African/Black Female African/Black 
Representative from the Youth x 2 Male  African/Black Male African/Black 
Representative from the Youth x 2 Female  African/Black Female African/Black 
 
For the informant approach, a semi-structured questionnaire was administered. In both 
Cederberg and Matzikama participants were given the opportunity to respond at length. In 
both instances respondents were encouraged to speak freely and to provide answers from 
their perspectives. The questions were designed thematically and focused on community 
history, history of associational activity, current associational activity, perceptions of 
political trust, political participation and socioeconomic outcomes. It must be noted that 
the themes corresponded with the analytical framework articulated in Chapter Four.    
The use of case studies and interviews has been endorsed by a number of social capital 
practitioners. For example, Putnam (1993, p. 13) conducted more than 700 interviews with 
councillors between 1970 and 1989. He also interviewed a number of community leaders. 
Krishna and Shrader (1999, p. 7) point out that qualitative measures are able to capture 
empirically complex experiences which are not picked up if only quantitative measures are 
relied on. This is endorsed by Woolcock (2001) who states that the qualitative techniques 
are useful in unpacking the mechanisms behind the workings of social capital.  
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5.6 ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of the Western Cape’s Higher Degrees 
Committee. The ethical approval covered issues relating to confidentiality, anonymity and 
participant’s right of refusal to participate in the surveys and interviews.  
Details of the survey were communicated via the local radio station in both municipalities 
and was also facilitated through the participation of certain ward councillors. The 
participation of ward councillors was directly related to the permission granted for the 
survey by the relevant administrative authorities, particularly the Municipal Managers of 
the local authorities concerned.  
Fieldworkers at all times carried their identification and wore a survey vest especially 
designed for the data collection phase. These fieldworkers were required to always identify 
themselves to the respondents and to provide them with the necessary documentation, 
including letters of support from the municipalities concerned. All questionnaires and 
documentation were available in English, Afrikaans and isiXhosa.    
5.7 DATA ANALYSIS  
Data had to be analysed to illuminate understanding of the factors that affect the way in 
which social capital impacts on socioeconomic outcomes in the municipalities under 
consideration. This section provides an overview of how the quantitative and qualitative 
data were analysed and triangulated to provide a picture of social capital in the 
municipalities studied.     
5.7.1 Quantitative Data Analysis  
Data collected from the survey was analysed using both descriptive and inferential 
statistics. Descriptive statistics articulates data in manageable forms while inferential 
statistics assists in drawing conclusions from observations, typically from a sample about 
the characteristics of a population (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 458). For description 
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purposes, the data was presented in a cross-tabulation layout. The tables provided the count 
and/or the percentage.  
For inferential purposes, the Chi-square test of association was used to examine any 
significant association between the two categorical variables that are given in the cross-
tabulation (the variable in the row and the variable in the column).  
The Chi-square test of significance tells us about the yardstick against which to estimate the 
significance of associations between variables which helps to rule out associations that may not 
represent genuine relationships in the population under study (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 484).  
In reviewing the methods of data analysis, a number of approaches were found to have 
been used to estimate the relationship between social capital and outcomes. One study, 
which focused on the effectiveness of social capital on institutional performance, 
particularly at the local government level, was undertaken by Coffé and Geys (2006, p. 
1058), who explored the relationship between social capital and institutional performance 
among 305 Flemish municipalities. The authors employed two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
or Instrumental Variables (IV) regression techniques to overcome the endogeneity bias in 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. They state that a similar process was followed by 
authors such “as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Knack and 
Keefer (1997), Brehm and Rahn (1997), Knack (2002) and Bjørnskov (2003)” (Coffé & 
Geys, 2006, p. 1058). The study is a purely econometric study with no survey component. 
It relies on existing municipal data sources. Coffé and Geys (2006, p. 1063) point to the 
following limitations with their analysis. They state that there were problems of ‘reverse 
causality’. For example, social capital leads to better local government performance, but it 
can be argued that better performance also increases confidence in the government and 
subsequently social capital in general. The direction in which the chain of causality flows 
in interpreting the (positive) association between social capital and local government 
performance is therefore ambiguous. 
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Narayan and Pritchett (1997) used instrumental variable estimation to examine what would 
happen to income if there was an exogenous shift in social capital measured by the village 
level social capital index:   
Instrumental variables estimation uses the correlation between social capital and another 
variable--the instrument--which is not determined by, and does not directly determine, income to 
estimate the impact of exogenous shifts in social capital on income. This eliminates the difficulty 
created by the potentially simultaneous determination of income and social capital. The drawback 
is that one must have valid instruments, and worse, the validity of an instrument depends entirely 
on theoretical arguments about the structure of the model since at least some set of the “just 
identifying” assumptions cannot be directly tested (Narayan & Pritchett, 1997, p. 18).   
One of the most comprehensive research papers on the effects of social capital and 
democracy in South Africa as measured by tolerance of diversity, civic commitment and 
political participation, was undertaken by Jooste in 2005, based on data from the 2003 Cape 
Area Study. After a descriptive analysis of key aspects of the extent of civic engagement, 
local councillor engagement, political participation, collective action and tolerance of 
diversity, Jooste (2005, pp. 29–30) further explored the relationship between social capital 
and these variables. Using a correlation matrix approach (Kendall Tau-B Correlations) she 
shows that civic engagement is positively associated with associational activity. 
Why Path Analysis 
None of the approaches mentioned above were capable of estimating the “interconnected” 
relationship between social capital, political trust, participation, government effectiveness 
and socioeconomic outcomes, as illustrated in the analytical framework. Path analysis, 
however, seemed feasible for the following reasons: 
• According to Webb (Garson, 2008, p. 1) path analysis, which was developed by Sewall 
Wright in the 1930s, represents an attempt to deal with “connecting” relationships. Path 
analysis is a straightforward extension of multiple regression which aims to provide 
estimates of the magnitude and significance of hypothesised causal connections 
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between sets of variables which, in this case, is social capital and the other variables in 
the framework.  
• According to Suhr (2008, p. 2) path analysis places few limitations on the types of 
relations which can be specified since it is a “multivariate technique specifying 
relationships between observed (measured) variables in which multiple, related 
equations are solved simultaneously to determine parameter estimates.”  
• According to Wright (1960, p. 190) the method deals with a system of interrelated 
variables and the “construction of a qualitative diagram in which every included 
variable, measured or hypothesized is represented either as completely determined by 
certain others or as an ultimate factor.”  
• Finally, Suhr (2008, p. 2) states that path analysis offers a “graphical language” which 
is a convenient and powerful way to present complex relationships. Suhr (2008, p. 2) 
states that “a diagram, which is a pictorial representation of a model, is transformed 
into a set of equations which are solved simultaneously to test model fit and estimate 
parameters”.  
Mechanics of Path Analysis  
According to Wuensch (2008, p. 2), path analysis can be presented as “a hierarchical 
(sequential) multiple regression analysis.” Path analysis is an extension of general 
regression analysis which aims to provide estimates of the scale and importance of 
presumed contributory relationships between sets of variables. According to Wuensch 
(2008, p. 2) “a regression is done for each variable in the model as a dependent on others 
which the model indicates are causes.” 
In path analysis we distinguish between exogenous and endogenous variables. According 
to Garson (2008, p. 2), “exogenous variables in a path model are those with no explicit 
causes (no arrows going to them, other than the measurement error term). Endogenous 
variables . . . are those which do have incoming arrows. Endogenous variables include 
intervening causal variables and dependents.”  
The correlation between two variables may be decomposed into four components:  
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• The direct effect of 1 on 4,  
• The indirect effect of 1 (through an intervening variable or variables) on 4,  
• An unanalysed component due to the direction of causation for a path being unknown, 
and  
• A spurious component due to 1 and 4 each being caused by some third variable or set 
of variables in the model.  
According to Meehl and Waller (2002, p. 283) paths drawn to endogenous variables are 
directional. Path analysis tests both direct and indirect effects on some outcome(s). In 
particular, path analysis determines if the relationships are positive, negative or not 
supported by the data.  
According to Wuench (2008, p. 2), the beta weights from these multiple regressions are 
the path coefficients shown in the typical figures that are used to display the results of a 
path analysis, like in Figure 5-1. For example, the path coefficient from (1) Social Group 
Membership to (2) Public Trust is 0.09. 
According to Garson (2008, p. 2) a path diagram is drawn beforehand to help plan the 
analysis and represents the “causal” connections that are predicted by the hypothesis. 
According to Garson (2008, p. 2) a path model has both path coefficients and an error term 
which is represented by e, see Figure 5-1 below. The statistical significance of the path 
coefficients is estimated to determine if the correlation between the different 
concepts/constructs in the hypothesis are statistically significant.  
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Figure 5-1: Path Model Representing Analytical Framework Under Discussion10 
 
In Figure 5-1 the arrows indicate the links between the various constructs in the analytical 
framework tested in this research. Social group membership is the exogenous variable, 
whilst the other variables are endogenous. There are path coefficients from social group 
membership to political trust, from political trust to political participation, and so on. The 
arrows indicate association rather than causation. They capture the influence that social 
group membership has on political trust (and so on). The path diagram was estimated for 
Matzikama and Cederberg. In some instances the data fitted the analytical framework well 
while in other cases it did not.  
Limitations of the use of Path Analysis and Mitigating Measures 
Path analysis deals with the degree of correlation between variables, and requires the 
formulation of hypotheses beforehand. In this case it hypothesises causal connections 
between sets of variables which, in this case is social capital and the other variables in the 
                                                 
10 Public Trust/Political Trust is used interchangeably 
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framework. The difficulty with establishing causal links between the various constructs is 
that correlations are observable phenomena whereas causality is inferred. It is important to 
note that the correlations observed in the data may be signs of causality but are never 
sufficient to infer causality (Schield, 1995, p. 1). Freedman states that “path models do not 
infer causation from association” but “estimate causal effects from observational data” 
(2005, p. 11). Despite the advent of statistical tools, it does not preclude the strong 
assumptions required to infer causation from association by modelling (Freedman, 2005, 
p. 1).  
According to Garson (2008:15) one of the major shortcomings of path analysis is the under-
identification or under-determination of the model. He states that “for under-identified 
models there are too few structural equations to solve for the unknowns whilst over-
identification provides researchers with better estimates of the underlying true values than 
does just identification”. Whilst we know that path analysis is sensitive to specification, 
we erred on the side of caution by over-specifying the model than underestimating it since 
“leaving out variables would mean that the path coefficients will reflect the shared 
covariance with such unmeasured variables and will not be accurately interpretable in 
terms of direct and indirect effects” (Garson 2008:15).  
This is precisely why path analysis is less suited for alternative specifications of variables 
not supported by the hypothesis and why the researcher was constrained in terms of the 
way in which the variables were specified.  
Apart from the problems identified above, there is the added complication of how to use 
dichotomous variables in standardised regression models, as is the requirement in the 
thesis. As noted by Hellevik (2007), in using survey data it is not unusual for the dependent 
variable to be a dichotomy, as is the case here. He states that when “the research problem 
requires a multivariate solution, regression analysis is very convenient for handling large 
numbers of independent variables” (2007, p. 59). Hellevik also shows that contrary to 
popular belief, ordinary linear regression methods can be used with a binary dependent 
variable—dichotomy coded 0-1 (Hellevik, 2007, pp. 59–60). Hellevik therefore refutes the 
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“argument that the statistical tests for linear analyses are inappropriate with a binary 
dependent variable” since he finds that “the significance probabilities from linear and 
logistic regression analysis turn out to be nearly identical” (Hellevik, 2007, p. 60). 
What is of consequence for the methodology used in this research is that the purpose of the 
analysis is not “prediction but rather causal decomposition of bivariate associations [as in 
path analysis]—hence the problem of “impossible predictions” (which is the main reason 
against the use of linear regression with binary dependent variables) is no longer relevant” 
(Hellevik, 2007, p. 61).   
To illustrate that the results of linear tests do not differ from logistic tests, Hellevik (2007, 
p. 61) compares a series of parallel linear and logistic regression analyses involving two 
independent variables (the binary variable gender and the continuous variable age) and a 
series of binary dependent variables. He states that 
there was no systematic tendency for one of the two sets of p values to be larger than the other . 
. . and that the differences between the two sets of P values were extremely modest. The 
correlation between the two sets of P values was as high as 0.9998, which means an explained 
variance of 99.96% when one P value was regressed on the other (Hellevik, 2007, p. 61). 
He states that the high agreement in test results may come as a surprise to all who firmly 
believe that the linear regression cannot be used with a binary dependent variable due to 
inadequacy of the significance test (Hellevik, 2007, p. 64). He states that the outcome is in 
line with the statement we find in some textbooks on regression analysis that the linear 
tests will give misleading results for significance tests only with small samples (Hellevik, 
2007, p. 64).  
Concluding, Hellevik states that the results for linear and logistic significance probabilities 
turn out to be nearly identical, even with small samples and skewed distributions on the 
dependent variable. Fortunately in the case of this analysis there was a compelling 
argument for preferring the linear approach, since the linear measures could be used to 
investigate the links illustrated in the analytical framework articulated in Chapter Four.   
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5.7.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Data analyses were used to answer the research question. Data was interpreted and 
analysed by “breaking up” into “manageable themes, patterns, trends and relationships” 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 108). The aim of the analysis was to understand the diverse 
aspects of data collected through an investigation of the relationships between concepts 
and constructs so as to determine whether there were any patterns that can be identified or 
isolated.   
The first stage of the analysis entailed the transformation of data into a format conducive 
to interpretation. The main technique associated with interviews is called content analysis. 
The purpose of content analysis was to describe the content of the respondent’s utterances 
systematically, and to classify the various meanings expressed in the material recorded. 
This took the form of identifying the main themes expressed (Jankowicz, 2000).  Responses 
were coded according to the themes identified but no software was employed in the further 
analyses of the qualitative interviews. 
The results of the semi-structured interview were presented in a thematic way 
corresponding to the analytical framework. A blending of the information obtained 
empirically was then integrated with my own interpretive comments.     
The interviews were conducted with the informed consent of the interviewees, and their 
anonymity was guaranteed.  
5.8 CONCLUSION  
Measuring social capital in this study depended on the analytical framework that was 
developed in Chapter Four. In describing the methodological framework for the thesis, I 
elaborated on the research design, methods, tools and instruments that were used 
throughout the research project life cycle of data collection, analysis and interpretation, to 
demonstrate their appropriateness.     
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The methodology also demonstrates the necessity of using both quantitative as well as 
qualitative methods to measure social capital. While Putnam’s methodological approaches 
were different, his and other perspectives were useful in testing the research question in the 
context of the communities in the Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities.   
Employing the mixed methods approach also allowed for the triangulation of findings so 
as to determine the nature of the relationship between the different constructs in the 
analytical framework discussed. Determining whether the hypothesised links are causal or 
not was an important part of the mixed methods approach as it helped to provide a 
comprehensive perception of social capital in the Cederberg and Matzikama 
municipalities.  
The survey provided baseline information on useful indicators of the social capital 
variables including networks, trust and participation.  
Descriptive inferential statistics and path analysis brought into relief the investigation of 
the relationship between the different constructs in the analytical framework. Path analysis 
was used to (i) explore whether there is a statistically significant association between the 
different concepts in the analytical model, (ii) explore whether the model is relevant for 
Cederberg and Matzikama, and lastly (iii) to predict the scale and importance of the 
relationships explored. 
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CHAPTER SIX: SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILES OF 
CEDERBERG AND MATZIKAMA  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities are both located in the same region of the 
Western Cape province of South Africa, namely the West Coast, which stretches 400km 
along the Atlantic Ocean. The West Coast District Municipality consists of five local 
municipalities: Swartland, Bergrivier, Cederberg, Matzikama, Saldanha, and one District 
Management Area (DMA) named Bitterfontein.  
Cederberg and Matzikama share similar geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. 
They have high unemployment rates and undiversified economies which puts a limit on 
their ability to increase revenues. Both municipalities are “Project Consolidate” 
municipalities which is a reference to their weak institutions and considerable capacity 
constraints in the areas of management and implementation.  
Figure 6-1: Map of West Coast District Municipality  
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6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AREAS  
According to Jacobs and Andrews (2009, p. 6) the South African rural landscape is highly 
unequal and deeply divided between black subsistence and white commercial agricultural 
farmers existing side by side, with White commercial farmers (less than 20%) owning 
approximately 80% of all landholdings compared to the majority of African/Blacks. The 
authors see the current system of landownership as actively supported and developed on 
the back of the historical dispossession of the African/Black majority under colonialism 
and later Apartheid. According to Jacobs and Andrews (2009, p. 5) the Apartheid state  
operated as financial broker for white minority interests beyond its role as social, institutional, 
political, legal, and repressive central apparatus. It organized tax incentives and large subsidies for 
foreign and local companies through state corporations, facilitating links between different 
industrial sectors in order to lower their costs, subsidising the white farmers over decades and 
keeping many out of bankruptcy.  
Jacobs and Andrews (2009, p. 7) further state that  
like other sectors of the economy, commercial agriculture is highly centralised. A small number of 
large conglomerates, either central cooperatives or agribusinesses dominate production and are 
involved in services, manufacturing and marketing of products as well. The lifestyle and standard 
of living of white farm owners stand in stark contrast to the poverty of blacks working for them in 
commercial agriculture as labour tenants or farm workers. Despite more than 20 years of post-
Apartheid rule, landownership patterns and the face of the South African agrarian landscape have 
not changed much.  
This scenario is mirrored in both Cederberg and Matzikama. According to Jacobs and 
Andrews (2009, p. 19) a survey carried out in Cederberg, Matzikama and Bergrivier among 
600 households connected to the agricultural sector revealed that the majority of 
households described agriculture as the basis of their livelihoods. The survey found that 
farm workers depended on wage income, with the majority of the main decision makers in 
this rural category reportedly in permanent employment and nearly 20% in non-permanent 
jobs. They were also more likely to work on large commercial farms rather than for small 
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farmers who participated in this study. Resource-poor farmers, on the other hand, relied on 
their own labour rather than hiring non-family wage workers. According to the authors 
(2009, p. 19) land reform has evidently done little to visibly improve the livelihood 
strategies of rural households tied to agriculture in this region.  
6.2.1 Locating Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities 
Cederberg Municipality borders the Boland District in the south, Bergrivier Local 
Municipality to the west and the Northern Cape to the east. It includes the communities of 
Clanwilliam, Citrusdal, Lamberts Bay, Graafwater, Leipoldville, Elandskloof, Elandsbaai 
and Wupperthal.  
Most of the towns in Cederberg originated from small farming communities. The 
African/Black migrants of Cederberg primarily relocated to the towns because of work 
opportunities on the large commercial farms and the rooibos tea factory that opened in the 
last two decades or so. In addition, more farm workers arrived from surrounding farms 
after farm fires forced them to move or they were evicted by farmers. These displaced farm 
workers settled in various towns in the municipality. The move was largely to the formal 
town of Clanwilliam or the informal settlement of Khayelitsha.  
Matzikama is situated to the north of the West Coast district municipality, with the Atlantic 
Ocean to the west, and the Northern Cape to the east. The Olifants River runs through the 
municipality supporting an agricultural sector that is primarily built on viticulture. 
Vredendal is the largest town in the area, is centrally located and also serves as the 
administrative centre for the municipal area. Vanrhynsdorp, Klawer and Lutzville are 
secondary towns with established business districts. Smaller villages include Ebenhaeser, 
Koekenaap and Papendorp. The coastal towns are Doringbaai (largely dependent on 
fishing/lobster) and Strandfontein (a holiday destination).   
The major historical milestones in the development of the area included the building of the 
canal in the late 1920s and early 1930s.The second major development was the Group 
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Areas Act which negatively affected a large part of the Coloured population who were 
moved to designated second-class areas of the municipalities.  
Most of the African/Black people in the area arrived after 1994. At an individual level, 
most African/Blacks were not born in Matzikama but came there looking for work, 
particularly on the commercial farms.  
6.3 SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE  
Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities are located in the Western Cape which is 
relatively well resourced when compared to the rest of the country. Data from StatSA 
(2014) show that individual poverty rates in 2006 in the Province were considerably lower, 
i.e. 37% compared to 57% for South Africa and 81% for rural areas as a whole.  
During the same period, the Western Cape had one of the highest rates of basic service 
provision (StatsSA: 2014). For example, access to basic services like water, electricity, 
sanitation and refuse removal were all higher, averaging 80%, compared to rural areas 
outside of the Western Cape like the Eastern Cape and Limpopo Province where coverage 
was considerably lower averaging 60% (StatsSA:2014).  
This section provides a socioeconomic profile of Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities 
based on the 1996 and 200111 Census data. The Census data was used because it is 
representative at the municipal level and because it can be compared across the two 
different census periods (1996 and 2001) allowing us to compare these two municipalities 
over a period of time.  
As noted earlier Cederberg and Matzikama share similar geographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, namely they are predominantly agriculturally based economies with their 
populations distributed in rural areas and small towns, a large proportion of which are poor. 
                                                 
11 The 2010 Census data was not used because it falls outside of the period of the study. 
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They have high unemployment rates and undiversified economies which limit their abilities 
to increase revenues. Both municipalities are institutional weak with considerable capacity 
constraints.  
6.3.1 Demographic Profile 
6.3.1.1 Population Group and Size 
A comparative profile of the distribution of the population by race in Cederberg and 
Matzikama municipalities, show that Coloureds were the majority in both municipalities 
between 1996 and 2001 and that African/Blacks made up a relatively small percentage of 
the population, i.e. less than 10 percent in the 1996–2001 period. 
Table 6-1: Population Group and Size, 1996–2001 (%) 
POPULATION GROUP CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
 1996 2001 1996 2001 
African/Black 4 8 2 5 
Coloured 78 78 77 77 
White 17 14 20 18 
Undeclared 1 0 0 0 
All population groups 100 100 100 100 
The population structure and profile for Cederberg changed slightly between 1996 and 
2001. In 1996 African/Blacks accounted for 4% of the population; in 2001 the figure 
doubled to 8%. Population growth in Matzikama has been highest for African/Blacks when 
compared to other population groups. In 1996 African/Blacks accounted for 2% of the 
population; in 2001 the population had increased to 5%. The increase in the number of 
African/Blacks in the municipality can be attributed to migration from other parts of the 
country, particularly the Eastern Cape (and other parts of the Western Cape). Studies 
(Bekker, 2002) show that migration to the Western Cape has been a major policy question.  
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6.3.1.2 Birthplace of Residents  
The table below shows the birthplaces of residents by population group for both 
municipalities for the 2001 period12. In the case of African/Blacks, a significant number 
(50% in Cederberg and 40% in Matzikama respectively) were born in the Eastern Cape. 
This is quite distinct from the White and Coloured population groups. When compared to 
the other race groups in both municipalities, African/Blacks are more likely to come from 
the Eastern Cape.  
Table 6-2: Birthplace of Residents, 2001 (%) 
  CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/
BLACK  
COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/
BLACK 
COLOURED WHITE 
Eastern Cape 50 0 3 40 1 2 
Free State 3 0 2 3 0 2 
Gauteng 1 0 5 3 0 5 
KwaZulu-
Natal 
1 0 1 1 0 1 
Limpopo 1 0 1 2 0 1 
Mpumalanga 1 0 1 2 0 1 
Northern 
Cape 
7 2 6 8 11 12 
North West 2 0 0 1 0 1 
Western 
Cape 
33 97 77 38 87 73 
Not 
applicable 
2 0 4 2 0 3 
Grand Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
6.3.1.3 Age Profile  
The following table presents the age structure of the population for Cederberg and 
Matzikama in 1996. The table shows that African/Blacks in both municipalities were more 
                                                 
12 The data is not available for 1996  
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likely to be concentrated in the 20-39 age group (50% in Cederberg and 46% in Matzikama) 
reflecting the influx of working age youth into the two municipalities. 
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Table 6-3: Population Profile by Age, 1996 (%) 
CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
 AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE TOTAL AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE TOTAL 
0-4 7 11 6 10 12 12 6 11 
5-9 7 11 7 10 10 11 7 11 
10-14 5 11 9 11 4 11 9 11 
15-19 6 9 8 9 6 9 8 9 
20-24 14 10 5 9 13 9 6 8 
25-29 16 10 7 10 12 9 6 8 
30-34 11 9 6 8 11 8 7 8 
35-39 9 7 7 7 10 7 8 7 
40-44 7 5 7 6 6 6 8 6 
45-49 5 4 6 5 4 4 7 5 
50-54 3 3 6 4 3 4 6 4 
55-59 4 3 6 3 3 3 5 3 
60-64 3 2 5 3 3 2 5 3 
65-69 1 2 4 2 1 1 4 2 
70-74 1 1 4 2 1 1 3 1 
75-79 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 
80-84 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 
85-120 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
This trend is also reflected in the 2001 data for Cederberg and Matzikama where a distinct bulge in the 20-39 age group can clearly be 
seen for the African/Black population group. 
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Figure 6-2: Age Structure by Race, Cederberg 2001 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Age Structure by Race, Matzikama 2001 
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6.3.1.4 Gender Profile  
The gender profile of the Coloured and White population groups in Cederberg and 
Matzikama are closely balanced with a sex ratio of 1 and 0.96 respectively. This is however 
not the case for African/Blacks in Cederberg and Matzikama where males make up a 
significantly greater proportion of the population than females (i.e. greater than 60%). This 
is largely attributed to the large number of male migrant workers flocking to the area in 
search of work opportunities.  
Table 6-4: Gender Profile by Population Group, 1996 (%) 
 
CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
African/Black 64 36 100 62 37 100 
Coloured 50 50 100 50 50 100 
White 49 51 100 49 51 100 
 
Table 6-5 shows a marginal decline in the sex ratio for African/Blacks in 2001, but still 
reflecting a high concentration of males, largely reflective of the migrant status of most 
African/Blacks.  
Table 6-5: Gender Profile by Population Group, 2001 (%) 
  
  
CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
African/Black 60 40 100 62 38 100 
Coloured 49 51 100 49 51 100 
White 49 51 100 49 51 100 
 
6.3.1.5 Language Profile  
The following table shows the languages spoken by the various population groups in 
Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities for 1996. Ninety-nine percent of Coloureds and 
Whites spoke Afrikaans compared to only 23% and 31% of African/Black residents in 
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Cederberg and Matzikama respectively. The large percentage of native isiXhosa speakers 
in the African/Black population in both municipalities is testament to the fact that these 
groups are recent migrants to the areas. 
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Table 6-6: Language Profile by Population Group, 1996 (%) 
  
CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
Afrikaans 23 99 95 31 99 96 
English 0 0 4 1 0 3 
IsiNdebele 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IsiXhosa 64 0 0 61 0 0 
IsiZulu 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Sepedi 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sesotho 2 0 0 2 0 0 
Setswana 7 0 0 2 0 0 
Siswati 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tshivenda 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xitsonga 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other and 
Unspecified  0 1 0 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The two figures below show that African/Blacks in Cederberg and Matzikama are almost identical in their language profile in both the 
1996 and 2001 Census periods, speaking primarily isiXhosa. 
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Figure 6-4: Language Profile by African/Black Population Group for Cederberg and Matzikama, 
1996 (%) 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Language Profile by African/Black Population Group for Cederberg and Matzikama, 
2001 (%) 
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6.3.2 Education Profile  
The literature on development shows strong linkages between education, skills and 
socioeconomic wellbeing.   
Table 6-7: Educational Profile by Population Group, 1996 (%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/ 
BLACK 
COLOUR
ED 
WHITE AFRICAN/ 
BLACK 
COLOU
RED 
WHITE 
1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 
No schooling 22.26 16.41 4.00 22.95 16.54 4.00 
Some primary 31.25 32.72 10.24 27.10 30.61 9.90 
Complete 
primary 
12.24 11.14 25.60 8.85 10.37 2.55 
Some 
secondary 
21.83 20.18 30.34 22.4 23.51 26.89 
Grade 12/Std 
10 
1.89 3.25 22.57 3.50 3.58 25.72 
Higher 0.6 0.92 18.42 1.20 1.35 18.18 
Unspecified  3.42 4.75 5.69 2.11 2.12 3.71 
Not Applicable  6.51 10.64 6.15 11.80 11.92 6.05 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In general the educational profiles of both municipalities are poor with relatively low levels 
of educational attainment for Coloured and African/Black residents. Whites in general have 
higher levels of educational attainment. There are similarities in educational attainment 
across the municipalities concerned. A comparison of the two periods shows improvements 
in education attainment between 1996 and 2001.  
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Table 6-8: Educational Profile by Population Group, 2001 (%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/ 
BLACK 
COLOUR
ED 
WHITE AFRICAN/ 
BLACK 
COLOU
RED 
WHITE 
2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 
No schooling 13.08 12.56 3.91 14.30 12.39 3.25 
Some primary 30.00 32.64 10.78 30.32 33.87 12.02 
Complete primary 10.66 11.37 2.19 9.04 10.55 2.15 
Some secondary 29.85 25.57 25.37 28.81 26.17 28.57 
Grade 12/Std 10 6.62 5.83 33.49 6.34 5.59 33.89 
Higher 1.08 1.18 18.24 0.70 1.44 14.39 
Unspecified 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not Applicable 8.72 10.85 6.00 10.48 10.29 5.72 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
6.3.3 Household Income 
The income distribution for both municipalities is illustrated in the table and figure below13. 
 
                                                 
13 The data for 1996 was not comparable with 2001.  
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Table 6-9: Household Income Distribution in Cederberg and Matzikama, 2001 (%) 
 CEDERBERG  MATZIKAMA  
  
AFRICAN/B
LACK COLOURED WHITE TOTAL 
AFRICAN/B
LACK COLOURED WHITE TOTAL 
R0 - R800  58 31 14 30 49 34 13 30 
R801 - R1 600  24 30 10 26 26 30 10 25 
R1 601 - R3 200  14 26 17 24 19 21 17 20 
R3 201 - R6 400  3 10 24 12 4 9 22 12 
R6 401 - R12 800  2 2 21 6 1 4 21 7 
R12 801 - R25 600  0 0 9 2 1 1 11 3 
R25 601 - R51 200  0 0 2 0 0 0 3 1 
R51 201 - R102 400  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
R102 401 - R204 800  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
R204 801 or more  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
The 2001 Census data shows that in general African/Black households are more likely to earn low incomes. In Cederberg 82% and in 
Matzikama 75% earned less than R1 600. 
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Figure 6-6: Household Income in Cederberg and Matzikama, 2001 (%) 
 
6.3.4 Employment 
An abundant literature in sociology and urban economics suggests that the spatial 
organisation of towns can exacerbate unemployment and deteriorate the income of 
disadvantaged communities. In this perspective, labour-market outcomes do not only 
depend on individual characteristics like age, education and ethnicity but also on location 
within the town. In their work on the city structure and unemployment, Rospabe and Selod 
(2003) state that under Apartheid, only Whites were authorised to live close to the town 
centre. The non-white labour force (i.e. Asians/Indians, Coloureds and Blacks) were forced 
to live on the periphery of cities, sometimes very far away from the city centre. Even though 
a certain amount of residential desegregation started to occur at the end of the 1980s, these 
spatial patterns of segregation still prevail in the 2010s. When one compares residential 
and job locations, it is clear that there exists a major disconnection between places of work 
and places of residence. Their results show that there are important spatial issues that 
exacerbate unemployment: distance to jobs, rural origin (especially for women), and the 
length of time spent in the present dwelling. 
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A comparison of Tables 6-10 and 6-11 show low levels of unemployment in 1996. Unemployment however increased considerably 
since 1996 to 13% in Cederberg and 30% in Matzikama for the African/Black population. This is mostly related to the influx of 
African/Blacks in search of work opportunities.  
Table 6-10: Employment in Cederberg and Matzikama, 1996 (%) 
  
  
CEDERBERG  MATZIKAMA  
AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED  WHITE  TOTAL  AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED  WHITE  TOTAL  
Employed  94 91 97 92 86 86 97 88 
Unemployed  6 9 3 8 14 14 3 12 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 6-11: Employment in Cederberg and Matzikama, 2001 (%) 
CEDERBERG  MATZIKAMA  
  AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED  WHITE  TOTAL  AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED  WHITE  TOTAL  
Employed  87 89 98 90 70 82 96 83 
Unemployed  13 11 2 10 30 18 4 17 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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6.4  ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES 
The provision of basic services is a critical component in the development and health of 
communities since the quality of health can primarily be linked to conditions at the level of the 
household and the immediate living environment. Households that have access to basic services 
such as electricity, water, sanitation and refuse removal spend less of their time collecting water 
and firewood. Apart from the negative impact that firewood collection has on the environment, 
these services are particularly beneficial to women who would otherwise spend a large percentage 
of their time engaged in such activities. It frees up their time, enabling them to engage in other 
productive activities. The following section gives an overview of the provision of various basic 
services in Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities. The data compares the situation in 1996 with 
2001. 
6.4.1 Access to Electricity 
The following tables examine access to energy for lighting, cooking and heating purposes. Table 
6-12 indicates low levels of access to electricity for African/Blacks, intermediate levels of access 
for Coloureds and high levels of access for Whites in Cederberg in 1996, reflecting the preference 
given to White households during Apartheid. In 1996 in Matzikama there were intermediate levels 
of access for African/Blacks and Coloureds and high levels of access for Whites. In Cederberg in 
1996 only 34.45% of people had access to electricity for lighting purposes which doubled to 
65.84% in 2001. The progress from 1996 to 2001 for Matzikama residents was not as dramatic as 
that of Cederberg since only a marginal improvement was made in the provision of electricity for 
lighting purposes, i.e. increasing from 61.12% to 65.33%. The Coloured population group 
experienced similar marginal increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Table 6-12: Access to Energy for Lighting, 1996-2001(%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Electricity 34.45 65.84 71.57 97.87 97.31 97.87 61.12 65.33 68.12 77.04 98.44 96.10 
Gas 0.95 - 0.22 0.15 0.55 0.15 0.23 0.92 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.26 
Paraffin 1.67 4.01 0.70 0.40 0.44 0.40 9.60 15.02 1.22 0.65 0.38 0.11 
Candles 61.48 29.72 26.95 1.21 1.26 1.21 29.04 18.72 29.89 21.39 0.51 1.11 
Solar 0 - 0 0.15 0 0.15 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.14 
Other 0 0.54 0 0.2 0 0.20 0 0 0 0.55 0 2.25 
Unspecified  1.44 0 0.57 0 0.49 0 0 0 0.56 0 0.37 0 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
We witness a similar trend when it comes to the provision of energy for cooking purposes. In 1996, 25.84% of African/Black residents 
had access to electricity for cooking purposes which increased to 49.13% in 2001. African/Black residents in Matzikama only increased 
their access to electricity for cooking marginally from 51.76% to 56.07%.  
Table 6-13: Access to Energy for Cooking 1996-2001(%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Electricity 25.84 49.13 57.10 69.51 91.70 91.65 51.76 56.07 55.19 65.92 91.26 92.10 
Gas 13.46 5.75 14 7.08 5.99 6.04 25.76 12.76 22.72 15.14 8.23 6.68 
Paraffin 44.54 32.97 1.41 1.29 0.05 0.05 9.60 19.03 2.06 1.78 0.03 0.4 
Wood 15.83 11.50 26.2 21.25 1.59 1.51 12.65 10.49 19.32 16.28 0.2 0.56 
Other - 0.65 2.2 0.88 0.66 0.75  1.75 0.72 0.85 0.26 0.39 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Once again a similar trend in Cederberg when it comes to the provision of energy for heating purposes. In 1996, 21.05% of African/Black 
residents had access to electricity for heating purposes which increased to 37.74% in 2001. African/Black residents in Matzikama saw 
a marginal decline in their access to electricity for heating purposes from 48.48% in 1996 to 46.81% in 2001.  
Table 6-14: Access to Energy for Heating, 1996-2001 (%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Electricity 21.05 37.74 48.36 56.08 93.57 84.70 48.48 46.81 48.11 57.97 91.60 93.00 
Gas 1.68 1.19 2.23 1.20 2.25 3.07 4.92 1.74 2.82 1.657 5.32 2.27 
Paraffin 5.02 17.03 0.95 0.41 0.05 0.25 2.81 12.34 11.63 0.68 0.30 0.23 
Wood 60.29 28.74 37.90 35.30 2.25 4.63 40.28 23.67 39.24 30.95 1.28 1.73 
Other  11.71 30.58 10.66 17.73 1.86 9.16 3.27 15.43 8.67 8.74 1.49 2.72 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
6.4.2 Access to Water and Sanitation Services  
In 1996, 26.79% of African/Black residents had access to water inside their dwelling in Cederberg, increasing to 38.61% in 2001. In Matzikama 
municipality 32.08% of African/Black residents had access to water inside their dwelling in 1996 which increased top 37.96% in 2001. Most residents 
in both municipalities had access to water either inside their dwelling, inside the yard or outside the yard. No-access is very low.   
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Table 6-15: Access to Piped Water, 1996-2001 (%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLAC
K 
COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Inside the dwelling 26.79 38.61 65.27 66.75 95.99 92.60 32.08 37.96 44.45 54.70 96.58 95.02 
Inside the yard 32.30 40.02 25.9 26.46 0.93 4.53 35.36 32.61 40.81 27.93 0.71 2.19 
Outside the yard 36.36 20.17 3.05 4.99 0.11 2.01 29.27 24.90 9.41 12.80 0.07 1.73 
No access 4.07 1.19 5.77 1.80 2.87 0.86 3.29 4.62 4.89 4.58 2.44 1.02 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
In 1996, 32.30% of African/Black residents had access to flush or chemical toilets in Cederberg which increased to 65.51% in 2001. In Matzikama 
municipality 54.33% of African/Black residents had access to flush or chemical toilets in 1996 which increased to 64.20%. There were still high 
levels of non-provision at roughly 30% in both municipalities in 2001. 
Table 6-16: Access to Sanitation Services, 1996-2001 (%) 
 CEDERBERG  MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Flush or chemical 
toilet 
32.30 65.51 65.27 79.69 98.41 98.94 54.33 64.20 54.01 69.19 99.22 98.27 
Pit latrine  4.78 2.82 7.33 2.93 0.60 0.20 13.34 4.73 18.47 7.53 0.20 0.20 
Bucket latrine 21.29 1.30 11.63 4.39 0.11 0.45 3.27 1.23 15.85 7.30 0.30 0.28 
None of the above 40.90 30.48 15.49 13.00 0.55 0.45 28.57 29.94 11.30 15.99 0.07 1.22 
Unspecified  0.76  0.27  0.38  0.23  0.37  0.17  
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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6.4.3 Access to Refuse Removal 
Refuse removal remains a key problem in both municipalities. Table 6-17 compares the two municipalities and highlights the 
improvements made in Cederberg.  
Table 6-17: Access to Refuse Removal, 1996-2001 (%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Removed by local 
authority at least once a 
week  
21.53 48.26 43.83 49.19 65.44 62.46 50.82 66.97 45.13 56.26 66.78 64.15 
Removed by local 
authority less often 
3.11 1.19 0.62 0.96 0.16 0.40 1.17 0.31 0.74 0.51 0.68 0.23 
Communal refuse dump 9.33 7.05 15.04 9.07 3.90 4.33 23.65 1.23 18.27 3.02 6.16 1.45 
Own refuse dump 39.23 43.06 17.21 39.90 26.92 32.51 22.72 30.25 31.91 39.17 22.35 33.44 
No rubbish disposal 24.16 0.43 1.89 0.91 0.99 0.35 0.70 1.33 0.63 1.05 1.66 0.77 
Other 0.72 0 18.31 0 0.05 0 0 0 0.13 0 33.86 0 
Unspecified  1.67 0 3.10 0 2.52 0 0.70 0 3.30 0 2.33 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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6.4.4 Access to Housing 
The lack of adequate housing for low-income households has been found to reinforce the vicious 
cycle of disease, poverty and unemployment. Agnus Walker (2000) observes that in areas with high 
socioeconomic disadvantage there are higher rates of mortality than areas with lower levels of 
socioeconomic disadvantage. 
The access to formal housing by race between 1996 and 2001 is shown below. There has 
been an increase in access to formal housing for all race groups. The low level of formal 
housing in the African/Black community is directly related to the fact that these residents 
are migrants, therefore they are new to the area compared to the other groups. 
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Table 6-18: Access to Formal Housing, 1996-2001(%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Formal 49 77 93 94 98 98 68 58 90 90 99 98 
Traditional 2 4 2 2 0 2 1 9 3 5 0 1 
Informal 45 19 4 3 0 0 30 31 5 4 0 0 
Other  0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 6-19: Dwelling Ownership, 2001 (%) 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
AFRICAN/BLAC
K 
COLOURED WHITE AFRICAN/BLACK COLOURED WHITE 
2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 
Owned and fully 
paid off 
33.73 37.77 48.77 23.05 32.95 48.14 
Owned but not yet 
paid off   
3.36 8.32 14.75 3.50 9.80 13.96 
Rented  15.29 12.25 23.45 25.1 15.86 28.15 
Occupied rent -
free 
47.61 41.67 13.03 48.35 41.40 9.75 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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The data on dwelling ownership shows that 33.73% of African/Blacks in Cederberg and 
23.05% of African/Black residents in Matzikama reside in homes they own, as opposed to 
48.0% of Whites residents. The vast majority (45.9%) occupy rent-free dwelling types. More 
than 45.0% of African/Black residents in both municipalities currently occupy their homes 
rent-free.  
6.5   ECONOMIC PROFILE  
The municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama are both largely agrarian ones. During the 
period under study Agriculture comprised 28% of Cederberg municipality’s (Gross Domestic 
Product (Regional)) GDPR. Between 1995 and 2005 Cederberg’s average economic growth 
rate was 3.2. Despite being a relatively small municipality within the district, Cederberg’s 
growth rate could be attributed to an increased demand for agricultural goods and the 
development of the secondary sector during this period. Wholesale & Retail Trade; Catering 
and Accommodation was the second biggest sector at 22% followed by Manufacturing at 14%. 
The key drivers of economic growth during this period was Manufacturing which registered a 
growth rate of 10% followed by Construction with 8% and Wholesale & Retail Trade; Catering 
and Accommodation with roughly 7%.  
Figure 6-7: Trends in Economic Growth: Cederberg, District and Western Cape, 1996-2005 
 
SOURCE: WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL TREASURY CALCULATIONS, BASED ON QUANTEC RESEARCH DATA, 2007 
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 Figure 6-8: Trends in Economic Growth: Matzikama District and Western Cape, 1996-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL TREASURY CALCULATIONS, BASED ON QUANTEC RESEARCH DATA, 2007 
Like Cederberg, Agriculture is the dominant sector in the Matzikama Municipality with a 
contribution of 20% to GDPR. This was followed by the Wholesale & Retail Trade; Catering 
and Accommodation sector at 17% and Manufacturing at 14.4 percent. The key drivers of 
economic growth were Manufacturing, which registered a growth rate of 12.6 percent, followed 
by Construction with 10.7 percent and Community, Social and other Personal services at nine 
percent.  
The two local economies are highly dependent on Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry but 
economic activity has increased in sectors such as General Government services, 
Manufacturing, Transport & Communication, and Social Services. In the mid-2000s 
international, national and local demand for products was strong presenting a pull for more 
unskilled migrant labour from other parts of the country. However, the supply of goods and 
services was more uncertain. This could be attributed to climate change, water scarcity, lack of 
available land and low levels of labour productivity. Even with strong growth, the traditional 
sectors were not likely to reduce unemployment or poverty. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONTRASTING SOCIAL 
CAPITAL IN TWO SIMILAR COMMUNITIES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter reports on the quantitative and qualitative findings of the research undertaken in 
the Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities. Using the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter Four, this chapter begins with an assessment of formal social group membership in 
Cederberg and Matzikama and assesses how group membership has influenced political trust 
in the municipalities concerned. This is followed by a discussion of the relationship between 
political trust and civic engagement/political participation to determine what influence, if any, 
it has had on the effectiveness of local government and ultimately the socioeconomic outcomes 
of the African/Black population in these two resource-constrained municipalities.  
The period in which research was carried out for this study was between 2006 and 2007. The 
importance of this for social capital in Cederberg and Matzikama is that until then, supporters 
of the government among African/Blacks believed that their impoverished situation would be 
ameliorated, and gave their African National Congress (ANC) representatives a high degree of 
consent. The perception of communities (in South Africa in general) with regard to their local 
government has, however, changed dramatically in the past decade (Alexander, 2010, pp. 26–
30). Whether this is true for the two locations since 2007 has not been established since the 
research does not account for this period. 
7.2 NETWORK AND ASSOCIATIONAL ACTIVITY  
This section sketches the differences in formal social group membership (as a measure of 
network and associational activity) in the African/Black communities of Cederberg and 
Matzikama using the survey data and data collected from the qualitative interviews with key 
informants from the municipalities concerned.  
During the household survey respondents were questioned about their membership in formal 
social groups to which they themselves or members of their household belonged (including 
children over the age of 12 years). Table 7-1 below shows their responses by specifying the 
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distribution of formal social group membership by type of membership in Cederberg and 
Matzikama14 in percentage terms.  
Table 7-1: Type of Social Group Membership in Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities  
 
Table 7-1 shows that membership of Associations (like ratepayers’ associations) is relatively 
similar at 3.19% and 3.92% for Cederberg and Matzikama respectively. The p-value is 0.168 
which suggests that the results are insignificant, confirming no difference in the percentage of 
Associations in the two municipalities. 
Membership in Volunteer Social Groups in percentage terms is twice as large in Cederberg 
(1.89%) compared to Matzikama (0.92%). The p-value is less than 0.05 which suggests that 
the results are significant.  
Membership in Sports Groups in percentage terms is twice as large in Cederberg (9.85%) 
compared to Matzikama (4.45%). Once again, the p-value is less than 0.05 which suggests that 
the results are significant—meaning that there is a significant difference in the percentage of 
Sports Groups in the two municipalities. 
                                                 
14 Representative of the entire population of the two municipalities concerned. 
15 If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid. 
16 If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid. 
TYPE OF SOCIAL 
GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP 
MUNICIPALITY  
CHI-SQUARE TEST CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
Association 3.19% 3.92% χ2 – value = 1.903 
p value = 0.168 
Volunteer Social Group 1.89% 0.92% χ2 – value = 8.128 
p value = 0.004 
Sports Group 9.85% 4.45% χ2 – value = 52.460 
p value = 0.000 
Cultural Group 1.85% 0.52% χ2 – value = 17.627 
p value = 0.000 
Other 0.77% 0.00% χ2 test invalid15 
None 80.60% 90.10% χ2 – value = 86.470 
p value = 0.000 
Refuse to answer 1.85% 0.09% χ2 test invalid16 
Total 100.00% 
n=2 598 
100.00% 
n= 2 293 
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Membership in Cultural Groups in percentage terms is three times as large in Cederberg 
(1.85%) compared to Matzikama (0.52%). Here again the p-value is less than 0.05 which 
suggests that the results are significant—meaning that there is a significant difference in the 
percentage of Cultural Groups in the two municipalities. 
The population of Matzikama is more likely not to belong to any formal social group (90.10%) 
compared to Cederberg (80.60%). The p-value is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results 
are significant. This means that there is a significant difference in the percentage of Social 
Group membership in the two municipalities concerned, with Matzikama recording a lower 
level of formal social group membership compared to Cederberg. 
The findings show that there are higher levels of Social Group membership (Volunteer Social 
Group, Sports Group and Cultural Group) in Cederberg compared to Matzikama. A point worth 
noting is that membership in Sports Groups reflects the most recorded Formal Social Group 
activity in both Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities.  
However, the percentages of “None” Social Group membership in both Cederberg (80.60%) 
and Matzikama (90.10%) show low levels of network activity which supports Jooste’s 
conclusion (2005, p. 24) that membership in formal social groups in the Western Cape is 
generally low.  
An estimated 504 individuals indicated membership in formal social groups out of a total of 
839 households surveyed in Cederberg. This means that every second household surveyed in 
Cederberg had approximately 1 individual belonging to a formal social group.   
An estimated 227 individuals indicated membership in formal social groups out of a total of 
667 households surveyed in Matzikama. This means that every third household surveyed in 
Matzikama had approximately 1 individual in a formal social group.   
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In Table 7-2 race and Social Group membership in Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities 
are compared. For the purposes of this study, racial categories correspond to the nomenclature 
adopted during the Apartheid system namely, African/Blacks, Coloureds and Whites.17   
                                                 
17 There were too few Asian/Indian residents in the municipalities concerned for any meaningful analysis of 
social capital. 
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Table: 7–2: Social Group Membership by Race Group in Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities 
TYPE OF 
SOCIAL 
GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP 
CEDERBERG                                                  MATZIKAMA  
AFRICAN/ 
BLACKS 
COLOURED
S 
WHITES CHI-
SQUARE         
TEST 
AFRICAN/ 
BLACKS 
COLOURED
S 
WHITES CHI-SQUARE 
TEST 
Association 2.82% 2.62% 5.30% χ2 – value = 
6.653 
p value = 0.036 
1.67% 4.65% 2.08% χ2 – value = 
8.565 
p value = 0.014 
Volunteer Social 
Group 
1.88% 1.40% 3.43% χ2 - value = 
6.425 
p value = 0.040 
0% 0.66% 2.67% χ2 – value = 
15.329 
p value = 0.000 
Sports Group 33.33% 3.29% 11.84% χ2 – value = 
347.322 
p value = 0.000 
7.11% 3.64% 6.53% χ2 – value = 
10.018 
p value = 0.007 
Cultural Group 10.09% 0.06% 0.31% χ2 – value = 
189.187 
p value = 0.000 
1.26% 0.42% 0.59% χ2 – value = 
2.796 
p value = 0.247 
Other 4.46% 0.06% 0% χ2 test invalid18 0% 0% 0% χ2 test invalid19 
None  47.42% 92.57% 66.04% χ2 – value = 
500.727 
p value = 0.000 
89.96% 90.51% 88.13% χ2 – value = 
1.7911 
p value = 0.408 
Refuse To 
Answer  
0% 0% 13.08% χ2 test invalid20 0% 0.12% 0% χ2 test invalid21 
Total  100.00% 
n = 426 
100.00% 
n=1 642 
100% 
n=321 
 100.00% 
n=239 
100.00% 
n=1 676 
100.00% 
n=337 
 
                                                 
18 If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid. 
 
19 If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid. 
 
20 If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid. 
 
21 If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid. 
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Membership in Associations is twice as high amongst Whites in Cederberg (5.30%) compared 
to African/Blacks (2.82%). For Volunteer Social Groups it is roughly twice as large for Whites 
in Cederberg (3.43%) compared to African/Blacks (1.88%).   
A more interesting picture emerges for membership in Sport Groups: in Cederberg it is highest 
for the African/Black community (33.3%), with Whites at 11.84% and Coloureds a low of 
3.29%.  
Cultural Groups membership in percentage terms is three times as large in the African/Black 
communities in Cederberg (10.09%) compared to the White and Coloured communities 
(<1.00%). The p-value in all cases is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results are 
significant.  
The p-values given in Table 7-2 show that African/Blacks in Cederberg are more likely to be 
members of formal social groups such as sport and cultural organisations when compared to 
Coloureds and Whites in the municipality.  
We find some strikingly different levels when social group membership is compared in 
Cederberg. The African/Black population record 52.58%, Whites 33.96% and Coloureds 
7.43%. A natural conclusion here is that race appears to be strongly correlated with social group 
membership. 
Table 7-2 shows that the most popular forms of formal social group membership for the 
African/Black community in Cederberg are sport groups followed by cultural groups. A further 
breakdown of social group membership by households suggests that (i) both Whites and 
African/Blacks are more engaged in Cederberg, while Coloureds are less engaged in both and 
(ii) that each African/Black household in Cederberg has at least one member who belongs to a 
formal social group. This is not the case for any other race group in Cederberg.   
Membership in Associations (like Rate Payers Associations) vary with each of the racial groups 
in Matzikama. Coloureds are more likely to belong to Associations (4.65%) compared to 
Whites (2.08%) and African/Blacks (1.67%).  
Whites are more like to be involved in Volunteer Social Groups (2.67%) in Matzikama 
compared to African/Blacks (0.00%) and Coloureds (0.66%).   
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In Sports Group membership the findings showed markedly different levels for the three racial 
groups in Matzikama. African/Blacks are more likely to belong to Sports Groups (7.11%) 
compared to 6.53% for Whites and 3.64% for Coloureds.  
The p-value for each of the three findings above is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results 
are significant.  
The results show no difference in Cultural Group membership and “other” forms of 
membership among the different race groups in Matzikama.  
For all three race groups non-membership in a formal social group is relatively the same in 
Matzikama that is, African/Black (89.96%), Coloureds (90.51%) and Whites (88.13%). Table 
7-2 also shows that 10% of African/Black people in Matzikama belong to a formal social group 
compared to roughly 9.5% of Coloureds and 11.8% of Whites. From this it would appear that 
race is not strongly correlated with social group membership in Matzikama.  
There are, however, significant differences in the types of Social Group membership by race 
group for Associations, Volunteer Social Groups and Sports Groups. The p-values show that 
Coloureds are more likely to belong to Associations, whereas African/Blacks and Whites are 
more likely to be involved in Sports Groups. Membership in Volunteer Social Groups seems 
to be more established among Whites.   
Table 7-3 compares formal Social Group membership among the African/Black populations of 
Cederberg and Matzikama.  
Table 7–3: Social Group Membership for African/Blacks in Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities 
 
TYPE OF SOCIAL 
GROUP MEMBERSHIP CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
Association 2.82% 1.67% 
Volunteer Social Group 1.88% 0.00% 
Sports Group 33.33% 7.11% 
Cultural Group 10.09% 1.26% 
Other 4.46% 0.00% 
Total  52.58% 10.04% 
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When comparing the African/Black communities of Cederberg and Matzikama, two immediate 
observations can be made:  
• The African/Black population in Cederberg (52.58%) has a higher level of formal 
Social Group membership compared to its counterpart in Matzikama (10.04%). 
• The African/Black population in Cederberg displays social behaviour that is quite 
different from its counterpart in Matzikama with regard to formal social group 
membership. Membership in all types of formal Social Groups (Associations, 
Volunteer Social Groups, Sports Groups, Cultural Groups and Other) is higher among 
African/Blacks in Cederberg when compared to their counterparts in Matzikama.  
These findings presented in Table 7-1, Table 7-2 and Table 7-3 are provocative since there are 
no other differences to account for what is a remarkable difference in percentage terms and 
warrants further investigation, particularly qualitative insights into why this is the case. 
This is particularly so if one bears in mind the following:   
• The African/Black population arrived in the two municipalities around the same time 
(i.e. they are relatively new to both areas), yet the African/Black population in 
Cederberg managed to construct vibrant social group activities which are not found in 
Matzikama. 
• On average, African/Blacks have been in Cederberg for 18 years compared to an 
average of more than 30 years for the Coloured and White groups, which differs from 
Putnam’s view that social capital takes years to build up in one place and is generally 
found in more established communities.   
• The African/Black population in Cederberg is more impoverished than the other race 
groups, yet there is a proliferation of social group membership in the area.   
Evidence collected from this study indicates that despite the relatively impoverished nature of 
African/Black communities in Cederberg, membership of formal social groups is significantly 
higher than in other, wealthier race groups. Here it would seem that we encounter a different 
perspective of social capital compared to that of Jooste (2005), who held the view that 
membership in formal social groups among poor households is low because it is measured 
against the opportunity costs (time and effort) that they associate with such membership. The 
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Cederberg experience, however, contests this view and instead finds common ground with the 
work of Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p 229), who offer a communitarian view of social 
capital in which social group membership (and social ties) decreases the vulnerability among 
the poor. Time may certainly be a scarce commodity for poor communities whose limited 
resources are stretched beyond capacity and hardship leaves them physically and 
psychologically exhausted. On the other hand, they may have an abundance of time if they are 
unemployed, and reducing their vulnerability through various forms of mutual aid may be one 
of the few survival strategies available to them.  
The differences in network and associational activity among the African/Black community in 
Cederberg compared to the African/Black community in Matzikama are striking. In the 
sections that follow I investigate the factors which drive the rich and vibrant culture of civic 
organisation in Cederberg but are visibly absent in Matzikama despite their similar 
socioeconomic characteristics—that is, they are economic migrants, have low incomes, are 
marginalised and culturally displaced.  
The augmented analytical framework, repeated below, discussed the different types of 
characteristics of networks. It distinguished between horizontal and vertical features, active 
versus passive, heterogeneous versus homogeneous, public good versus private good-
producing, and political versus non-political characteristics. Using primarily qualitative data, I 
examine how the networks and associations differ between Cederberg and Matzikama in terms 
of the type of characteristics with which they are imbued and how this impacts on the vibrancy 
of public life and ultimately on development outcomes in the two municipalities concerned. 
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Figure 7-1: Analytical Framework Incorporating a Typology of Networks/Associations 
 
7.2.1 Horizontal Versus Hierarchical Networks  
Table 7-3 showed a proliferation of formal social groups in the African/Black community of 
Cederberg, the most prominent form being that of Sports Groups. According to the Sports 
Coordinator interviewed in Cederberg 
Khayelitsha has many sport groups. One of them Khayelitsha Sport was introduced in 1999. Here the 
youth was organised into soccer clubs like the Young Pirates, Yizo Yizo, Blue Line United, 
Boesmanskloof, Brazilian chiefs, Oceans Swallows (Lamberts Baai) Bob Rangers Elands Baai, Citrusdal 
United. There are a total of nine soccer teams.22   
Sports clubs appear to be spread throughout the Cederberg Municipality including 
Boesmanskloof, Lamberts Bay, Elands Baai and Citrusdal, indicating that they are not confined 
to one area in the municipality. Observation confirmed that a large number of African/Black 
                                                 
22 Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black 
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youth are involved in these groups. It is likely that such sports groups provide a good 
opportunity for the youth to develop civic competences including leadership capabilities. 
According to one community development worker in Cederberg  
The sports clubs provide the youth with opportunities for skills development and leadership. The 
leaders of the sports clubs have petitioned the municipality to train its members in various aspects of 
management and administration like financial management and the writing of reports. 23 
Apart from facilitating the formation and development of leadership skills, a community with 
a diverse social network structure also facilitates the flow of information on socioeconomic 
and developmental issues facing them. In small communities with dense horizontal social 
networks, such as that found in the African/Black community in Cederberg, the flow of 
information about community needs is much more diffuse. As a result, communities can be 
informed relatively quickly about events that affect them. With good leadership, they are in a 
position to respond to these events more effectively. As we shall see later in the chapter, their 
response to events can be further improved if the relationship between social groups and state 
organs (municipal departments) is carried over to the institutional structures that are mandated 
principally to deal with service delivery.     
The dissemination of information by effective leaders about community needs in sports groups 
can reinforce a sense of collective identity and generate social and political mobilisation. This 
is the view of Donovan et al. (2004, p. 407) who used New Zealand as a case study and found 
that membership in sport clubs promotes political engagement. According to Donovan et al., 
sport groups were “also associated with higher dimensions of engagement that included voting 
and discussing politics” (Donovan et al., 2004, p. 415). Similarly, Stevens and Adams (2013, 
p. 661) argued that sports groups impact on collective action and community change.  
In contrast, those informants interviewed in the African/Black community of Matzikama 
identified a few social groups to which locals are affiliated such as the soup kitchen, the soccer 
club, the African National Congress (ANC) branch, the ANC Women’s League and the 
                                                 
23 Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured  
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Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The informants also disclosed that most of 
the organisations were political or were funded and operated by government or political 
organisations. This may explain the hierarchical nature of networks and associations in 
Matzikama because they function according to modes of centralised authority. According to 
the municipal manager of Matzikama, the social group structures are funded by the local office 
of Social Services which he said was highly politicised. As such, he said, these structures were 
badly managed and had difficulty working together.  
From this short profile it would appear that Putnam’s (1993, p. 116) so-called “dense social 
networks” are more prevalent in Cederberg’s African/Black community than among its 
counterpart in Matzikama. 
The interviews held with the African/Black community in Matzikama revealed that hierarchical 
organisations reflect the classical features of dependence (rather than mutuality) that are 
characteristic of such vertically structured entities and as such, are limited in their ability to 
generate norms of reciprocity, social trust or a sense of responsibility for collective endeavours 
(see Boix & Posner, 1996, p. 3). It is useful to recall here Boix and Posner’s description in the 
literature review of vertical associations as  
contain(ing) built-in hierarchies which facilitate decision-making and eliminate the collective action 
dilemmas which confront members of horizontally structured groups. Since the experience of arriving 
at mutually acceptable decisions and overcoming dilemmas of mutual cooperation is at the heart of 
what makes participation in civic associations so beneficial for facilitating wider social cooperation, this 
feature of vertically structured organizations robs them of much of their social capital-building power 
(Boix & Posner, 1996, p. 4).  
The social network structure in the African/Black community in Cederberg is more horizontal, 
numerous and diverse than that found in the African/Black community in Matzikama, and as 
such lends itself to the flow of information within the community and the development of civic 
competencies and leadership capabilities. The practical manifestations of these networks in 
Cederberg bear a resemblance to Putnam’s description of social networks in Northern Italy. 
We recall that he characterised them as “social networks” because they are not hierarchical. In 
his opinion, communities with social networks often value social solidarity, civic engagement, 
cooperation and honesty more than they do in hierarchical ones (Putnam, 1993, p. 116). He 
does not, however, say anything about the development of leadership competencies as a spin-
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off of membership in these social networks, which we observe to have occurred in Cederberg. 
This point is discussed in more detail below in the section on active and passive membership.  
In the previous section the emergence of leadership, the flow of information and modes of 
communication were identified as spin-offs that emanate from social group membership. 
Community leadership, as we will see, is a central factor explaining participation and 
ultimately, development outcomes.  
7.2.2  Active Versus Passive Membership 
The quantitative data exercise did not gather information on the activity of membership but 
some insightful information nevertheless emerged from the interviews. Active and passive 
social group membership varied depending on the nature of the social groups as well as the 
calibre of leadership they had.   
According to several key informants who were both internal and external to the community, 
such as the community development worker, the municipal manager of Cederberg Municipality 
and the Sports Group Coordinator suggested that membership in these social groups are very 
active. For example 
The networks and associations are very strong. They have regular meetings and are funded. They also 
hold AGMs.24  
They are strong and meet bi-monthly, or at least monthly.25 
They are very strong and active.26 
That networks or associations are reported to have regular meetings, are funded and have 
regular AGMs suggests the presence of active and effective leadership. This in turn provides a 
                                                 
24 Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black 
25 Municipal Manager, Cederberg Municipality, Male, Coloured  
26 Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured 
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basis for leadership development among the younger members of the associations who are 
likely to take up meaningful social and political roles later in their lives. I propose that this 
informal “leadership academy” in itself is a form of social capital.   
In contrast, responses from “insiders and outsiders” of the African/Black community in 
Matzikama such as the Municipal Manager of Matzikama, the leader of the Women’s League 
in Matzikama and several other stakeholders from the community indicated that the networks 
and associations are not very strong, as evidenced from the excerpts below:  
The networks and associations are not very strong. People wait for the seasonal work, other than that 
they sit at home.27  
I think that some of these structures are badly managed and they have difficulties with working 
together. Politics also plays a major role as the local office of Social Services, which funds most of them, 
is highly politicised.28  
In cases where networks are hierarchical (as indicated in the previous section) they stifle 
broader participation and also reduce the probability of active membership and the 
development of leadership competencies.    
7.2.3 Heterogeneous Versus Homogeneous 
Formal associational life in both Cederberg and Matzikama is primarily concentrated among 
homogeneous groups that is groups where people are similar to each other in terms of culture, 
language, income, race, history and socioeconomic status. These similarities make it relatively 
easy to establish the social trust necessary for civic engagement and socioeconomic 
advancement, whereas in heterogeneous groups it has to be built gradually. Theiss-Morse and 
Hibbing (2005, p. 235) argue this point cogently saying that associational involvement in 
                                                 
27 Senior Representative of the ANC’s Women’s League, Female, African/Black  
28 Municipal Manager: Matzikama Municipality, Male, Coloured 
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heterogeneous groups is necessary so that people can interact with others who hold opinions 
different from their own for social trust to take root.  
In Matzikama, as in Cederberg, groups are homogeneous in terms of race and/or class. This 
homogeneity is reinforced by the spatial division of groups that was enforced through the 
panoply of planning strategies under Apartheid which effectively prevented heterogeneous 
social group membership from being formed.  
Although there was no significant heterogeneity in terms of group membership, the 
heterogeneity of social group structures was present, as evidenced in Table 6-3 and from the 
interviews with informants in Cederberg. This increases the opportunity for bridging and 
linking social capital which connects groups and individuals to others as well as with those 
who occupy different social positions (e.g. the more powerful or socially advantaged). 
Woolcock (2001, pp. 11-17) and Mani (2001, p. 3) are of the view that linking social capital is 
characterised by the connections between those with differential levels of power or social 
status, for example links between the political elite and the general public or between 
individuals from different social classes. The leaders of associations and networks in Cederberg 
were seen to open up opportunities for bridging and linking social capital between different 
associations, particularly in the context of heterogeneous social group structures and, through 
these groups, creating the opportunity for linking between the political elite and different social 
classes. For example, one of the community leaders in Khayelitsha (Cederberg) is a past 
chairperson of the local ANC branch. He has been involved in several social groups in the 
African/Black community but also has strong links with the municipality and councillors. He 
is responsible for facilitating meetings with the local authority as well as other groups outside 
the community.     
7.2.4 Political Versus Non-Political  
Association type is another lens through which associations are viewed in the diagram in Figure 
7-2. In Wollebæk and Selle (2002) and Putnam (1993), non-political associations had different 
impacts on trust and participation and hence, socioeconomic outcomes, when compared to 
political associations. This was confirmed by Stolle and Rochon (2001, pp. 154–155) who 
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showed that political organisations have the least levels of public and political trust and 
efficacy.  
Research on the African/Black community in Matzikama revealed that political 
networks/associations that received their funds from government departments were considered 
to be highly politicised and tended to crowd out participation and a sense of collective identity. 
In Cederberg, by contrast, non-political associations were seen as promoting community 
cohesion and participation in community development. The sample of responses listed below 
to questions in the interviews provide some evidence of this (respondents were asked which 
cultural, social, or community traditions affect the way in which people in the community help 
each other and stand together). 
In Khayelitsha they have stokvels and the imbizo where people talk and communicate among each 
other.29 
In the African community people have shebeens for music, dancing and traditional dancing. Choirs and 
sport also help people stand together. Coloured people participate in these activities, especially in the 
sport and music. 30 
Non-political associations like stokvels, choirs and sport groups in Cederberg would appear 
then to not only enable people to bond and stand together but also offer an opportunity for them 
to engage with other racial groups (especially Coloureds) and thereby build trust and cohesion 
between them. This clearly facilitates the flow of information and enhances communication 
between and within these groups.  
One of the other findings from the research in this thesis is that non-political associations affect 
the ways in which political participation occurs. Here we see the impact that these associations 
have on the type of political participation that occurs. Although we will deal with a more 
detailed analysis of political participation later in this chapter, the thesis shows how non-
political networks disseminate important information about community needs and issues. This 
                                                 
29 Community Representative, Male, African/Black 
30 Senior Community Representative, Female, African/Black 
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is taken up by community leaders who are active within and outside these structures which, in 
turn, disseminate this information to the relevant local authority officials. In the context of rural 
South Africa, where participation is often confrontational and antagonistic in nature, it changes 
the way in which people participate and respond to problems in the community. Social group 
membership in non-political groups provides the type of institutional infrastructure which may 
seem to be pertinent for more engaging and less violent types of political participation. Leaders 
in these non-political organisations act as interlocutors between government and the ruling 
political party on the one hand and the community on the other. They appear to assume this 
role regardless of political affiliation though it was found that leaders in the African/Black 
community in Cederberg do have links with the ANC which provide a mechanism through 
which dialogue takes place between the community and the municipality. This does not appear 
to have occurred in Matzikama among the African/Black community.    
A feature of the political culture of the local African/Black population is its readiness to 
organise protests and marches to express dissatisfaction over government policy or other social 
and economic issues. Such mass action has become a particularly strong feature of the response 
to service delivery issues. Respondents in Cederberg and Matzikama indicated that such 
oppositional and antagonistic behaviour has become part of the arsenal of actions available to 
their community to protest poor service delivery. I argue, however, that the probability of 
marches and violent protest over service delivery issues is diminished due to the existence of 
numerous non-political associations31. These non-political organisations, supported by their 
leaders, act as interlocutors between government and the ruling political party on the one hand 
and the community on the other. The mediation efforts of community leaders within these 
structures often play a decisive role in non-violent outcomes. In Cederberg, the more subtle 
form of participation (engagement through interlocutors) might turn out to be more enduring 
over time. Over time, conflict is bound to ensue in communities that feel their efforts to channel 
their grievances are frustrated. That Cederberg has not had violent outbreaks could well be 
attributable to the role that the array of non-political associations has played until now. Were 
                                                 
31 Informal discussion with Cederberg Municipality indicated that there have been no violent protests in the African/Black 
community in Cedeberg since the research was undertaken in 2007. 
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these non-political associations not to exist, the political climate in Cederberg might well be 
more volatile32. 
Seen in this context, the cohesion of political associations (as opposed to non-political 
associations) is more likely to be short-lived especially if it is formed around a particular issue 
(as was found to be the case in Matzikama), because it does not possess the social glue required 
for a more organic solidarity capable of sustaining the resolution of broader community issues.  
7.2.5 Private and Public Good-Producing   
The next lens through which we examine social group membership is through “type” and 
“scope” of activities. By type of association we refer to whether an association provides public 
or private goods. Boix and Posner (1996, p. 5) succinctly describe a public good as that which  
can be enjoyed by everyone in the community irrespective of whether or not they participate in the 
association that provides it. . . . the social capital formed in a . . . public goods-producing organization 
is likely to be far stronger than that formed in the provision of private goods. . . . . It lay(s) the basis for 
very strong norms of reciprocity and trust and to forge an especially sturdy template for future 
cooperation.  
The Cederberg community is predominantly engaged in issues around the provision of public-
type goods which has given rise to a dynamic that facilitates cooperation and reduces free 
riding.  
The key informants were questioned regarding the type and scope of activities of the social 
groups of which they were members of. In both Cederberg and Matzikama the activities 
identified by the informants were predominantly public-good type goods and services like 
sports groups, church choirs, etc.   
From Woolcock and Narayan’s (2000, p. 229) “communitarian perspective” it can also be 
argued that poor communities are more adept at providing public rather than private goods. It 
would be more plausible, however, to say that poor communities are likely to place more 
                                                 
32 See previous footnote.  
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emphasis on providing basic infrastructural services to meet the socioeconomic challenges that 
they face. As they move up the needs hierarchy, though, the nature and type of goods required 
change–which might cause a switch from more public-type goods to private goods. Argued 
differently, different classes use networks for different purposes. If a household has access to 
basic services then there is no need to mobilise around it. But where the state (national or local) 
does not provide an essential need such as security and protection against crime and where the 
individual household cannot do this on its own, networks are activated to achieve specific ends. 
It would appear then, that the response of the community to government failure is to mobilise 
their social and other resources to make their demands heard especially with regard to the 
provision of basic services. However the mobilisation of cooperative behaviour is not 
automatic. It requires a certain set of common beliefs and norms which include a strong sense 
of collective cooperative identity and good leadership. If any of this is not present in the 
community, impersonal social group formation will not take place. This will be further 
discussed in the chapter.     
Having evaluated the different types of characteristics of networks and associations, I proceed 
to assess their manifestations in the two municipalities. Table 7-1 below describes each type of 
characteristic and compares the presence/absence of each in Cederberg and Matzikama. The 
table assigns a scale where ∗∗∗ reflects a strong presence of a characteristic and ∗ reflects a 
weak one. Three stars reflect the presence of more than two thirds of the variables concerned, 
compared to one star where less than one third is observed.   
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Table 7-4: Characteristics of Networks, Comparing Cederberg and Matzikama 
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
OF NETWORKS DESCRIPTION CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
Horizontal 
 
• Mutuality and equality of 
participation 
• Densely populated 
• Enhances communication and 
cooperation 
• Facilitates generalised 
reciprocity 
• Equal division of power 
 
∗∗∗ 
 
∗ 
Hierarchical 
• Dependence rather than 
mutuality 
• Characterised with coercion 
and compliance 
• Unequal division of power 
∗ ∗∗∗ 
Active 
 
• Characterised by active 
engagement and involvement ∗∗∗ ∗ 
Passive 
 
• Passive participation in a 
network involves not 
participating actively, and 
usually letting others make 
decisions 
 
∗ 
 
∗∗∗ 
Homogeneous 
 
• Networks/associations that 
have the same kind of 
constituents 
• Generally racially and 
culturally-based networks 
 
 
∗∗∗ 
 
 
∗∗∗ 
Heterogeneous 
 
• Networks/associations that 
have unrelated constituents 
• e.g. Racially and culturally 
diverse 
 
∗ 
 
∗ 
Public Good-Producing 
 
• Public good-producing 
networks/associations are set 
up to  supply a universally 
consumable product like better 
schools 
• Public good-producing 
networks/associations’ 
existence depends on the 
ability of their members to 
overcome built-in incentives 
for free riding 
 
 
 
 
∗∗∗ 
 
 
 
 
∗∗∗ 
Private Good-Producing 
 
• Private good-producing 
networks/associations depends 
on convergent interests 
 
∗∗∗ 
 
∗∗∗ 
Non-Political 
 
• Examples of non-political 
networks/associations includes 
sport groups, cultural groups 
etc. 
∗∗∗ ∗ 
Political 
 • Unions, government agencies ∗ ∗∗∗ 
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Table 7-4 shows that more positive characteristics for effective networks are present in 
Cederberg when compared with Matzikama, indicating that these features might have a more 
enduring effect on the formation of trust, participation and ultimately socioeconomic outcomes.  
This occurred despite the general expectation that the process of in-migration and the 
accompanying cultural displacement that arises from rapid urbanisation are supposed to lead 
to a breakdown of the norms that engender cooperative behaviour. The evidence gathered 
points to a confluence of factors which provides the context for the development of a vibrant 
civic culture. 
7.3 TRUST   
The previous discussion highlighted the powerful role of networks and associations and how 
this strengthens and is strengthened by the presence of leadership and communication. In the 
analytical framework, networks and associations impact on trust and participation as is shown 
in Figure 7–2. It is with this in mind that I now proceed with the findings on trust in Cederberg 
and Matzikama.  
Figure 7-2: Analytical Framework – Trust 
 
As noted in the literature review, a large part of the literature on social capital involves the 
notion of trust. Uslaner (2006, p. 3) sees trust as allowing us to  
Thick or
personal trust
Political trust
Trust
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impersonal trust
Generalised or
social trust
 Political actors
 Institutions
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put greater confidence in other people’s promises that they mean what they say when they promise to 
cooperate. The “standard” account of trust presumes that trust depends on information and 
experience. 
In short, the concept of trust refers to the understanding that individuals or members of social 
groups will operate in a manner that is equally advantageous and that the norms established 
through that relationship will ensure that they adhere to shared values. 
The augmented analytical framework distinguishes between personal (family and friends) and 
impersonal trust (government and social). The quantitative findings report on both, with an 
emphasis on the latter, while the qualitative findings attempt to explain the difference in levels 
of trust between the two African/Black communities.  
The findings show that impersonal trust in government—or “political trust”—was higher in 
Cederberg among African/Blacks than for other race groups and higher than the levels found 
in the African/Black community in Matzikama. This was seen primarily as the result of the 
difference in the types of characteristics of networks and associations in the two municipalities. 
This section seeks to provide answers to questions that shed more light on the factors that 
influence trust. More specifically, the questions revolve around the following: (i) how trust 
manifests itself in the ability of community members to collaborate and help one another in 
order to solve problems, (ii) why the African/Black community in Cederberg is more likely to 
work together than in Matzikama (iii) why some households are likely to be excluded from 
collective activity, (iv) how the lack of trust acts as a constraint that limits peoples’ ability or 
willingness to work together, and lastly, (v) whether it is trust in local politicians and 
councillors that facilitates participation as the analytical framework indicates.  
7.3.1 Personal and Impersonal Trust  
This study examined trust at various levels including the family, neighbours and the public 
sector, including representatives of public institutions. The institutions that were examined 
were mainly political and party leaders, local government officials (the tier closest to 
communities) and central government. The following tables present the findings on trust at 
these various levels.  
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Table 7-5: Trust in the Family by Municipality 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA TOTAL 
Yes 95.7% 93.2% 94.6% 
No 2.5% 3.4% 2.9% 
Other  1.8% 3.4% 2.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 7-6: Trust in the Neighbours by Municipality 
 
In Cederberg trust in family and neighbours is high at 95.7% and 91.5% respectively compared 
to Matzikama where trust in family and neighbours is slightly lower at 93.2% and 90.1% 
respectively. The p-values suggest that there is no significant difference between the two 
municipalities.   
A political trust variable consisting of trust in political leadership (local) and local government 
was constructed for both Cederberg and Matzikama. The comparison revealed that there are 
lower levels of political trust in Matzikama compared to Cederberg at 60.5% for the latter and 
50.2% for the former. 
Table 7–7: Political Trust by Municipality 
 
The low level of political trust in Matzikama does not seem unusual when compared to 
international trends. According to Shakaryan (2007), the USA, Japan and developed countries 
in Europe are concerned with declining levels of trust in institutions. He also found that the 
situation is worse for countries that have recently democratised like those in the former Soviet 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA TOTAL 
Yes 91.5% 90.1% 90.9% 
No 5.6% 4.6% 5.2% 
Other 2.9% 5.3% 3.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
Yes 60.5% 50.2% 
No 25.0% 36.4% 
Other 14.5% 13.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
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bloc. These countries face a lack of confidence in all institutions but particularly in political 
institutions. In Poland, for example, he reports that confidence in parliament and the 
government decreased from 85% in 1989 to a current level of 20%.  
Figure 7-3 shows that people with low income have high levels of trust in both Cederberg and 
Matzikama Municipalities. As income increases political trust decreases. According to the Chi-
square test for both municipalities, the results are statistically significant. Roughly translated, 
this means that the poor have more faith in government than the non-poor. One possible 
explanation is that they are much more dependent on the state than the rich, that is, their need 
for basic services from the state such as water, sanitation and electricity is much greater than 
that of higher income groups.   
Figure 7–3: Political Trust by Income in Cederberg and Matzikama 
 
When political trust is examined on the basis of race the following results were obtained: 
Table 7–8: Political Trust by Race in Cederberg and Matzikama 
CEDERBERG CHI-
SQUARE  
P-
VALUE 
MATZIKAMA  CHI-
SQUARE  
P-
VALUE  
 YES NO OTHER  YES NO OTHER  
African/Black 95,3% 2,6% 2.1% χ2 – value 
= 157,625 
p-value = 
0.000 
45,7% 27,6% 26.7% χ2 – value 
= 10.658 
p-value = 
100 
Coloured 56,8% 22,4% 20.8% 53,5% 24,6% 21.9% 
White 33,8% 39,1% 27.1% 41,2% 31,1% 27.7% 
Total 61,8% 20,8% 17.4% 49,8% 26,3% 23.9% 
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The Chi-square test of association was used to test whether there is a significant association 
between race and political trust for Cederberg and Matzikama. The p-values are less than 0.05 
for Cederberg suggesting that there is an association between political trust and race in both 
municipalities. In Cederberg, African/Blacks (95.3%) have higher trust compared to Coloureds 
(56.8%) and Whites (33.8%). Whites in Cederberg have the lowest recorded levels of political 
trust. In Cederberg and Matzikama political trust among Coloured communities is roughly the 
same, 56.8% and 53.5% respectively, and are also in the same range for White communities. 
However, a big difference is apparent between the African/Black communities of Cederberg 
and Matzikama with political trust at 95.3% in the former and 45.7% in the latter. The causes 
of this huge differential in political trust require further investigation. Could the high levels of 
trust among the African/Black community in Cederberg be the result of the high prevalence of 
networks and associations in this area, or is it purely a result of a better relationship that exists 
between the community and the municipality in its provision of basic services?  
The high level of political trust that exists in the African/Black community in Cederberg could 
be a result of the high presence of particular types of networks and associations in this 
community coupled with the roles that effective leadership and communication play as enablers 
of trust and participation. These networks thus warrant further investigation using qualitative 
methods. 
7.3.1.1 Associations and Networks as Enablers of Political Trust  
In the previous section on networks and associations we discussed the numerous cross-cutting 
horizontal, active, non-political, public-type good-producing networks that enable information 
(on community needs) to flow through these community structures. With the help of their 
leaders, these structures often engage the state about a particular issue at hand that affects the 
community, such as the provision of housing. That many associations and networks have been 
set up to deal with the delivery of public goods and services suggests that an alternative channel 
or modus operandi has emerged to augment the operations of the local government. The 
municipality liaises with the community to seek solutions to the provision of goods and 
services—and this is mediated through the leadership found in these networks and associations. 
This raises trust in political leaders like councillors because they are seen to be assisting in the 
provision of basic services. The failures of government (local and provincial) thus appear less 
glaring. An observation that can be made here is that the more numerous the networks and 
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associations with capable community leaders are, the stronger the likelihood that trust will be 
sustained in the local authority. Furthermore, as these associations set up their own services 
and work with public institutions they are less likely to depend solely on the state for services 
to be provided.  
In contrast to the situation in Cederberg, the African/Black community in Matzikama appears 
to have little faith in the ability of politicians or public officials to deliver on promises made. 
Barely 46% indicated that they have trust in politicians and public officials. To reiterate, the 
explanation I offer in this study is that lower levels of trust can be attributed to the different 
types of networks and associations that are present in Matzikama. These were observed to be 
generally hierarchical and political in nature and were less numerous than the ones found in 
Cederberg. An analysis of the differences in characteristics of networks and associations 
between the two municipalities purport to show that hierarchical types offer less opportunity 
to work through structures to secure better outcomes for the community, particularly in the 
provision of basic services. Information flows in a hierarchical network are also less fluid than 
that of a horizontal network, which could frustrate the process of articulating the community’s 
needs to the leaders of these associations. The fact that such networks do not encourage the 
development of leadership in the community further inhibits the ability of sustained 
engagement with the municipality. One probable explanation for this is the centralised nature 
of leadership in a hierarchical structure or association which discourages broad participation 
and, in so doing, limits a more extensive engagement with the municipality. This lends itself 
to fewer platforms for engagement and a heightened sense of marginalisation. These factors 
undermine political trust (in public institutions and politicians) and increase the opportunities 
for more violent protest/participation from the community.     
7.3.1.2 Other Factors Impacting on Political Trust  
In Cederberg, associations and networks appear to influence political trust in the African/Black 
community by reinforcing trust in local politicians. For example, if the leadership in horizontal, 
non-political, active, public good-producing social networks can communicate and share 
information with their councillors (as we shall see in the next section on political participation) 
then these councillors are likely to make decisions based on the most pertinent needs identified 
by the community.  
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A cursory review of the responses by community leaders and representatives of Cederberg to 
the question, ‘why do you trust local politicians?’, supports this point:  
Because the councillor cares about my interest.33 
They have the interest of the people at heart.34 
They work for us.35 
Because I assume they will do their best.36 
The nature of the trust that has been engendered in Cederberg is such that it is able to sustain 
communication with the local authority aided by the latter’s political links with the ruling party. 
This could be interpreted as a variation of the classical western model of representative 
government where direct access to political elites affords a degree of influence over policies 
and/or delivery of services.     
From a peripheral standpoint, one can see another dimension to political trust in Cederberg, 
namely, that it appears to be influenced by the local political situation. Community leaders 
enjoyed close links with the ANC, the party in power at the time the research was undertaken. 
The ANC held six of the 12 seats on the local municipal council. Fifty percent of respondents 
interviewed indicated that they had political trust because the local 
politicians/officials/councillors were from the national ruling party, the ANC. In practical terms 
this meant that they would go to local politicians/officials/councillors for help or to convey 
their concerns about conditions in the community.  
                                                 
33 Community Representative, Male, African/Black 
34 Community Leader, Male, African/Black 
35 Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black 
36 Senior Community Representative, Female, African/Black 
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This was, however, not always the case in Cederberg. Respondents indicated that under the 
previous (non-ANC) local government, the African/Black community of Khayelitsha was 
neglected where service delivery was concerned. This was the initial catalytic event that 
mobilised people to establish associations for the provision of public-type goods and services. 
This community was also mobilised by the leaders of these associations, who were ANC 
members, to engage with the local authority to provide better services. Under the previous local 
government there was a sense of marginalisation among the African/Black population because 
some of the needs of the African/Black community such as provision of soccer fields were 
ignored. According to one respondent  
Most of the people felt that they would not go to White people to assist them.37 
With the change in political office holders, the African/Black community started to enjoy a 
more hospitable relationship with the local authority because its main community leaders were 
also ANC members. This made for effective communication between the community, the 
councillors and the local municipality.  
In contrast, Matzikama had a local authority run by the Democratic Alliance (DA) which held 
seven out of the total of 13 available seats in the municipality. The ANC held the remaining 6 
seats so they had considerable influence. Yet as far as political engagement was concerned, 
ANC councillors were perceived as being less than helpful by their own constituents. This is 
evident in the community’s responses when questioned about their trust in local 
politicians/officials/councillors.  
They are not here, they never come.38 
The local (ANC) councillor will not do anything.39 
                                                 
37 Community Development Worker, Female, Coloured 
38 Youth, Male, African/Black 
39 Youth, Female, African/Black 
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No, they are from the Democratic Alliance (DA), Independent Democrats (ID), the Mayor is from the 
DA.40 
No, people don’t have experience of what happens at a national level. They do watch TV but it leaves 
them confused. People are not interested because the politicians only come during elections.41 
When asked whether they trusted councillors and how much they thought people in their 
neighbourhood trusted them they gave the following responses:  
No, because trust must be earned and cannot be bought.42 
Actions speak louder than words.43 
Like who, we can’t go to politicians because they do nothing, they just want votes.44 
An important observation here is the remarkable difference between the responses and data 
from Matzikama and Cederberg, underscoring the role social group membership plays in 
political trust. Social group membership is the conduit through which a community’s priorities 
are filtered through to the municipality, via the councillor. As observed earlier, social group 
membership of the horizontal kind is low in Matzikama which means that the issues raised with 
the local councillor do not necessarily reflect the full spectrum or even the most important 
concerns of the community. It is also an indication of the low correlation between party political 
affiliation and political trust. A DA administration in Matzikama and an ANC administration 
in Cederberg would appear to make little difference in political trust. Rather, it is the behaviour 
                                                 
40 Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black 
41 Senior Representative Of The ANC Women’s League, Female, African/Black 
42 Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black 
43 Youth, Male, African/Black 
44 Youth, Female, African/Black 
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of councillors, which is partly influenced by the associations and networks with whom they 
engage, that seems to be more of a determining factor in this regard.       
From the interviews conducted it emerged that perceived racism from the local authority 
toward the African/Black community was cited as a factor impacting on political trust. The 
African/Black community in Matzikama indicated that they felt more acutely discriminated 
against in the provision of basic services, citing the support given to the Coloured and White 
communities as justification for this. I argue that even though discrimination may well play a 
role in their situation, it is more likely that the absence of social networks and its bridging and 
linking attributes of the horizontal and vertical kind heightens their sense of alienation and 
exclusion. This is borne out by the following statement:  
Yes even the Coloureds look only after Coloureds; they come to us when they need a Black face. We 
end up being used. 45 
Furthermore, there is a sense that politicians make promises and then leave, never to be heard 
from again.  
Dyanti was here in 2007 and made promises and we never heard from him again. The imbizo was here 
when the Premier came and then left and then nothing.46  
Another factor that has contributed to the sense of marginalisation is language. With Afrikaans 
as the working and business language, the local authority is perceived to be racist by the 
African/Black community because their home language is not accorded the same status. This 
is borne out by the following excerpts:   
It is racism that prevents development, racism by Coloureds against Blacks which happened even when 
the ANC was in power.47  
                                                 
45 Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black 
46 Senior Representative of the ANC’s Women’s League 
47 Senior Representative of the ANC’s Women’s League 
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Language and communication is a big problem, this Afrikaans thing is a big problem.48 
 The newspapers are in Afrikaans so if the jobs are advertised in Afrikaans we don’t know about it. The 
big problem is that family and friends work in the municipality, so there is lots of nepotism. Social 
services have a youth forum but no Africans are on it, yet they get their money from the state.49 
The role that social groups play in communicating their members’ needs to the council is a 
vital part of the relationship between a local government and its residents, as has been 
demonstrated with the statements quoted above. Clearly this does not happen in Matzikama 
where there is mistrust between African/Blacks and other racial groups as well as between the 
municipality and the black community. Language as we have seen, is a major factor in the gulf 
that separates the authorities from sections of the local population. The lack of networks, 
organisations and good leadership that can act as interlocutors between the community and the 
municipality heightens their sense of exclusion and further contributes to the erosion of trust 
in municipal officials.  
In the course of this study it became increasingly clear that networks with the positive attributes 
indicated in Figure 7-1 reinforce accountability and improve the way in which political officials 
behave toward their constituents. Where these networks are active and communicate with one 
another, as is the case in Cederberg, they are in a position to vote inefficient councillors out of 
power even when the representative is of the same race. In a racially divided society like South 
Africa, this is a particularly poignant observation. The spate of service delivery protests in other 
parts of the country that have taken place since data was collected would appear to support this 
contention.    
7.4 CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
The analytical framework below shows the relationship between trust and participation. There 
are different types of trust articulated in the framework and the previous section indicated how 
these impact on civic engagement and political participation. In this section I investigate 
                                                 
48 Municipal Manager, Matzikama Municipality, Male, Coloured 
49 Senior Representative of the ANC’s Women’s League 
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political participation in Cederberg and Matzikama and examine how the type of characteristics 
of networks has a direct effect on the type of participation that is found in the community. 
When this is mediated by community leadership, participation can take different forms and 
reduce the number of protest-type actions. 
Figure 7-4: Analytical framework: Civic Engagement Participation 
 
As noted in the literature review, there is much debate about the concept of “participation” in 
the literature on social capital. In general, there is consensus that participation is a form of 
active citizenship that enables people to develop responses to social and economic problems 
and disseminate them in different areas of public life and in a multiplicity of ways. Political 
participation is defined as taking part in the processes of formulation, passage and 
implementation of public policies (Parry et al., 1992, cited in Lowndes, 2006, p. 542). Verba 
(1987, p. 2) defines political participation as “activities by private citizens that are aimed at 
influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take . . . in acts that 
influence government decisions.” 
 For Jooste (2005, p. 2) the arguments underlying the theory is that social capital  
spurs on a host of behavioural and attitudinal mannerisms which contribute toward the strengthening 
of democracy, the development of cooperative culture and the establishment of harmonious social 
interaction. The more we trust and actively engage with one another, the more likely we are to 
cooperate, act tolerantly and embrace civic mindedness which helps democratic institutions to flourish 
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and societies prosper. [She states that the] flow of information between citizens and state is vital in 
sustaining a cooperative relationship between these actors as well as ensuring that the actions of 
government fit the demands of the people (2005, p. 12).  
In this section of the thesis I explore the degree of political participation or civic engagement 
in Cederberg and Matzikama. I also explore the relationship between trust and political 
participation with a view to finding out whether communities with higher levels of political 
trust will have higher levels of political participation. The aim here is to measure political 
participation in such a way that it is capable of capturing the active role that citizens play in 
their engagement with the state, including officials and institutions. In this study, the measures 
used to do this included the following: signing a petition, participating in an election campaign, 
attending a council meeting and voting in local elections. When participants indicated that they 
were not participating it meant that they were not involved in any of these activities.  
A political participation variable was constructed for Matzikama and Cederberg. Political 
participation measured is indicated below in Cederberg (45.0%) and Matzikama (56.5%).   
Table 7-9: Political Participation in Cederberg and Matzikama 
 
In Table 7-10 the Chi-square test of association was used to test whether there is a significant 
association between race and political participation in Cederberg and Matzikama. The p-values 
are less than 0.05 for Cederberg suggesting that there is an association between political 
participation and race in the municipality. In Cederberg, African/Blacks (96.3%) have higher 
participation compared to Coloureds (57.8%) and Whites (17.8%). In Matzikama 
African/Blacks (87.0%) have higher participation compared to Coloureds (35.6%) and Whites 
(14.3%).  
 
 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
Yes 45.0% 56.5% 
No 46.7% 40.7% 
Other 8.3% 2.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 7-10: Political Participation by Race 
 
CEDERBERG CHI-
SQUARE  
P-VALUE 
MATZIKAMA  CHI-
SQUARE  
P-
VALUE  
YES NO OTHER  YES NO OTHER  
African/Black 96.3% 2.6% 1.1% χ2 – value 
=  
118,324 
p-value = 
0.000 
87.0% 10,4% 2.6% χ2 – value 
=  
5.097 
p-value =  
0.000 
Coloured 57.8% 34.8% 7.3% 35.6% 61.8% 2.6% 
White 17.8% 61.8% 20.4% 14.3% 82.4% 3.4% 
Total 45.0% 46.7% 8.4% 56.5% 40.7% 2.8% 
 
African/Blacks (87.0%) have higher participation compared to Coloureds (35.6%) and Whites 
(14.3%).  
The table shows that in both Cederberg and Matzikama, African/Blacks display higher levels 
of civic engagement/political participation than other race groups. Levels of participation 
among Whites are lowest compared to other race groups in both areas. Coloureds record 
intermediate levels of participation in Cederberg and Matzikama.  
In the following subsections, the nature and extent of civic engagement/political participation 
is discussed in the context of Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities. Here examples of civic 
engagement/political participation is given before proceeding with a description of its 
dynamics in terms of the issues that triggered it, who organised and mobilised it, as well as 
those who participated in it.  
The factors that impact on civic engagement/political participation (relationship with the local 
authority, political structures and institutions, etc.) as illustrated in Figure 7-4 will be used as 
the basis for comparing the African/Black populations in the two municipalities.  
7.4.1 Relationship with the Local Authority   
A community can have high levels of engagement/participation either because they are ignored 
or because they have highly complementary relations with the local authority (Rao and 
Woolcock, 2001, p. 72). Having highly complementary relations with the state does not always 
lead to more effective participation because there is a possibility that communal social groups 
are at risk of either being co-opted into accepting outcomes which do not maximise their social 
welfare or running the risk of having their leadership bought off in the process.  
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The qualitative findings seem to suggest that this has not been the case in Cederberg. From the 
qualitative interviews with the African/Black community in Cederberg it was found that they 
engaged with the state primarily on the basis of the provision of basic services, particularly 
housing. For example, houses were built for the community but this entailed moving to a new 
location. The community opposed the move and there were ongoing meetings to address the 
issues. In addition to this, the community used structured and formal processes to address the 
issues and had the opportunity to engage the local authority in more ways than it had in the 
past. This is because of the presence of “social networks” which managed to facilitate a good 
working relationship between the political party in power (ANC) and leadership in these 
community structures and institutions. The result is that when the ANC came to power, 
community leaders were better able to communicate with the local authority but this did not 
mean that the mode and form of engagement changed.  
In Matzikama, key informants were asked about the history of the provision of services in the 
community. There were a number of striking features that stood out from the responses in 
Matzikama. The first was that the relationship between the community and the local authority 
was fraught with misunderstanding. This centred on the provision of basic services; that is, 
they did not fully understand issues relating to the indigent policy of the municipality which 
regulates special rebates on water, sanitation, electricity provision and refuse removal for poor 
households. Nor did they fully understand the level of service provision to which they were 
entitled. Those interviewed attributed this misunderstanding to the failure of the African 
National Congress (which most of them voted for) to come to power. The misunderstanding 
was further exacerbated by racial divisions: the community development workers (CDWs) who 
work with and in communities were Coloured rather than African/Black. As we shall see later, 
this was the cause of several problems. CDWs are an all-important link between communities 
and the local government’s poverty alleviation programmes and efforts to improve access to 
essential social services. Members of the community also felt that the ward councillors who 
were African/Black and ANC-aligned did not accomplish much. The instruments of the state 
that would normally facilitate participation between the local authority and the municipality 
were hence rendered ineffective. I return to this point in the next section which deals with 
political structures and institutions.  
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The feelings of exclusion harboured by the African/Black community in Matzikama are a major 
factor contributing to their strained relationship with local government. The African/Black 
community has often resorted to mobilising through political or politically affiliated institutions 
(rather than civic ones), such as Cosatu, to bring attention to their demands. This form of protest 
has its roots in the liberation politics of the Apartheid era when marches were a popular form 
of demand for change.  
The community’s feelings of frustration over housing issues is but one example of the nature 
of the relationship between it and the municipality. Similar feelings were expressed over 
concerns about other social and economic issues such as crime, high food prices and drug and 
alcohol abuse. The protests mainly take the form of marches and are openly antagonistic as 
indicated in the following quotes: 
Yes, we go and fight with the municipality, but nothing changes. Like Dyanti [former MEC for Housing] 
who came here and spoke to the Municipality but not to the people.50 
The . . . march . . . that took place was against crime on the 24th of September 2007.51 
Yes we marched with Cosatu to protest the high food prices.52  
There is also, however, a sense of disillusionment that these marches were ineffective and that 
nothing came of it as reflected in the following statements by informants:  
The march we had was against the food prices, but nothing happened—only a memorandum was given 
to the mayor. 53 
                                                 
50 Senior Representative Of The ANC’s Women’s League 
51 Community Development Worker, Female, Coloured 
52 Senior Representative Of The ANC’s Women’s League 
53 Youth, Male, African/Black 
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March against crime didn’t really have an impact. 54 
The march (was) against high prices but it had no effect whatsoever. 55 
Despite the fact that there have been marches where community members have been given an 
opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions—there is a 
sense that the participation in these marches has been low, particularly in the African/Black 
community. This seems to confirm Putnam’s idea that there is a link between social group 
membership and civic engagement.  
7.4.2 Political Structures and Institutions  
This section discusses the dynamics of collective action and political participation by looking 
at the platforms and structures available for engagement.  
The quality of participation depends on the political structures and institutions that exist 
between the state and civil society groups and the extent to which these institutions are used 
for specific purposes. Related to this is the issue of how the state and civil society interprets 
their respective roles and how this is given effect in the policies of the state.  
In the South African local government context, ward committees were created to facilitate 
meaningful participation of the community in local affairs. In most municipalities, though, the 
ward committees have not proved particularly effective and only in rare instances have they 
been commended for their role in addressing the concerns of local residents (Smith 2008, p. 4).  
A ward committee consists of a ward councillor and representatives from different civic bodies 
and community groupings. There are also mandatory forums that exist to include communities 
in the planning processes of the municipality such as the Integrated Development Plans (IDP) 
and Local Economic Development (LED). Ward councillors are either elected in local 
government elections or get appointed via the proportional electoral lists of their respective 
                                                 
54 Youth, Female, African/Black 
55 Senior Representative Of The Anc’s Women’s League 
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political parties. In both Matzikama and Cederberg the latter has been the preferred method but 
has been combined with community consultation.  
In Cederberg there is a general sense among the African/Black population that councillors are 
actively engaged in matters affecting the community and that they have done so through the 
ward committees. The evidence from the interviews suggests that the councillor is proactive 
and gets things done for the community. The following statements are examples of how 
members of the community feel about their councillor:  
The crèche in Khayelitsha. . . will be upgraded through the councillor.56  
Yes, in June we had lots of rain and the councillor got relief, blankets and food and shelter. 57 
This is reinforced by a respondent in Cederberg who indicated that ward committees hold 
monthly meetings which help people to get to know one another and where  
People have an opportunity to complain.58  
However, some noted that participation in statutory planning processes like the LED or IDP is 
not uniform across the communities of Cederberg.  
There are also street committees which are informal platforms that have been set up in the 
African/Black community through which residents can lodge complaints. Respondents 
indicated that the street committees are strongest in Khayelitsha.   
Community leaders in Cederberg indicated that collective action had been taken several times 
around housing issues and yielded results. According to respondents, the housing issue  
                                                 
56 Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured 
57 Youth, Male, African/Black 
58 Youth, Female, African/Black  
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is a hard one with lots of tension between the community and the council.59 
Despite the intensity of the issue, the community, through its leaders, engaged the municipality 
in a series of meetings. A community leader indicated that there were no marches, only “hard” 
meetings with the council which lacked support on this particular issue. The mechanisms and 
platforms available for dealing with issues relating to basic services are effective because the 
meetings they hold include consensus building processes. According to those who were 
interviewed, no violent incidents took place while the issues of housing provision were being 
discussed. Here again we see an illustration of how horizontal networks that are active, public-
type good-producing and non-political, enhance the process of political engagement when 
combined with political institutions that have clearly enunciated aims and objectives. The result 
is that the probability of violent protest is dramatically reduced.  
Even though the same formal structures and platforms for participation exist in Matzikama, 
they are not used in the same way as in Cederberg. Among the African/Black population of 
Matzikama, councillors are not seen as mobilising their communities and are thought of as 
being limited in what they can achieve. Many felt that nothing much was being achieved as 
evidenced by the statement:  
Not much except some tree planting. 60 
In Matzikama, participation in civic projects varied for different reasons. For example, marches 
and activities related to food price increases were supported by some people but were not 
connected with the provision of services, particularly basic services, which is the responsibility 
of the local authority. There was also little awareness of the relationship between state 
structures and civic capacity, and a limited understanding of the role of community 
development workers (CDWs) and their relationship with the community.  
From this description of ward councillors and community organisations, meaningful 
participation in Matzikama can be assessed as being low. A few questions arise from this. Are 
                                                 
59 Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured 
60 Youth, Male, African/Black 
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marches an indicator that the existing platforms are not working? If the platforms for 
engagement between the local authority and the community are effective, would there still be 
a need to march? Could marching be seen as a sign that the community has disengaged from 
the local municipality?  
The answers could very well point to the relationship between the methods of engagement used 
and the state/political structures and institutions that do not function optimally. When a 
community’s needs and expectations are not dealt with by a local authority, is the only 
alternative then to resort to extreme measures such as marching and boycotting or non-payment 
of services? That two very similar institutional orders should have such differential outcomes 
leads me to conclude that it is the social formations in Cederberg and their modus operandi that 
allow for more consensual engagement than is the case in Matzikama. 
7.4.3 Formal and Informal Rules, Customs and Conventions 
Formal and informal rules, customs and conventions affect participation (Lowndes et al., 2006, 
p. 540). Here it is important to remember the work of Douglas North as cited in Lowndes et 
al., (2006, p. 540) who emphasised “rules of the game” and correct incentives which structure 
participation. This includes institutional and policy design as a factor (that influences 
participation) including responsiveness of decision making by local authorities but also 
encompassing the social, cultural and legal constraints to participation. 
It can be argued that political associations with their inbuilt hierarchies do not always allow for 
the correct incentives for all to participate. This is in contrast to the more horizontal types of 
structures in which a very different set of incentives are at play.  
7.4.4 Social, Cultural, Legal Constraints to Participation  
In the interviews conducted among African/Black communities in Cederberg, social and 
cultural constraints were not considered impediments to civic engagement and political 
participation but rather as barriers to interaction between the different race groups. The history 
of Apartheid and its spatial segregation of different racial groups have meant that the Coloured 
community, which has numerical strength in Cederberg and Matzikama, has limited contact 
with the African/Black community.  
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A common view expressed in the interviews with the African community is that “there’s 
nothing preventing Black people from participating but Coloured people have different ways 
of participating than [African/Blacks]—they don’t march, it’s not their culture.” 
Social causes for the lack of participation particularly among the youth are drugs and alcohol. 
Another respondent indicated that in general, people are not interested in participating—they 
are apathetic.  
In both Cederberg and Matzikama, those who did not participate in civic action were identified 
as farm workers from the surrounding areas who were unable to attend meetings because of the 
long hours they worked. Others who tended not to participate were identified as those engaged 
in criminal activity. A minority of Sotho-speaking people also avoided participation in 
Cederberg as there was tension between them and the non-Sotho speaking African population. 
Illegal immigrants that were not in possession of identity documents were also reluctant to get 
involved in civic engagement.   
In Matzikama, the interviews indicated that since African/Blacks were a minority, they did not 
have a numerical critical mass for effective political participation. In their view they are 
excluded because they are not from the same cultural and social group as Coloureds and are 
therefore disadvantaged.    
Even the newspapers are in Afrikaans so if jobs are advertised in Afrikaans we don’t know about it. The 
big problem is also that family and friends work in the municipality, lots of nepotism. Social services 
have a youth forum but no Africans and they get money from the state.61 
There is also a keen awareness that “politicians will always be biased towards the people that 
supported their party in an election.” 62 
In both Matzikama and Cederberg customary laws do not seem to constrain the community 
from exerting influence over public institutions. There is, however, acknowledgement that 
                                                 
61 Youth, Male, African/Black 
62 Youth, Female, African/Black 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
Coloureds and Africans have their own culture and language and that each will use them to 
their own advantage. In the case of the Coloured community, who make up the majority, the 
perception is that they will use their influence to the extent allowed within the power structure. 
For example, when the new fire brigade was formed only Coloureds were appointed or were 
admitted in learnerships. 
7.4.5 Community Leadership as a Factor 
The dense networks and associations in Cederberg are an outcome of the coordination activities 
of numerous leaders in the African/Black community of Cederberg, particularly in the informal 
settlement of Khayelitsha. The leaders of this dynamic community are highly connected to one 
another, collaborate and maintain close contact with one another. They nurture broad-based 
ties making it easier to mobilise community members for collective action purposes.  
The leaders in the Cederberg community have, in the Purdue (2001) sense, the ability to 
connect various sub-groups determining the relative efficacy of the group. As noted earlier in 
the literature review, the greater the number of sub-group connections there are, the greater the 
leaders’ access to a diversity of information and social support from which leaders can draw 
since “groups that communicate more frequently with other groups have greater access and 
more potential resources to draw from (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006, p. 575). The leadership of 
Cederberg have more sub-group connections meaning that leaders are able to draw from a 
greater pool of resources.  
These leaders operate in both the private and public domain and comprise both males and 
females. The leadership activities of females and males differ in that females operate more in 
the private, social, religious and cultural domains compared to males who operate 
predominately in the political and economic domain. According to Warren et al. (2001), it is 
women who primarily bring together neighbours and relatives to support issues of daily life 
which are not met through the economic and political system. The authors highlight that women 
tend to have a comprehensive approach to community development which is based on human 
and needs-centred programmes and an open style of leadership. The authors also state that 
women develop strategies that are diverse but emphasise the integration of public and private 
spheres—“with a key focus on strengthening family and friends.” This is also reflected in the 
Cederberg experience.  
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Female leaders operate predominantly in the social, educational, cultural and religious sphere. 
Females are involved in stokvels, cultural and church activities, and support one another in 
these domains. Even though there is strong female leadership, male leaders still have more 
sway in the community because of the patriarchal system of African/Black communities. For 
example, male leaders in the community engaged with females and asked the women to form 
a committee to meet with Social Services and request financial support for a new crèche, which 
they subsequently did. Here we have females mobilising themselves to petition Social Services 
for a crèche—but largely as a result of their consultation with the male leadership.  
According to Purdue (2001, p. 2221), community leaders act as key points of contact between 
the state and local communities, putting them at the interface between internal “communal” 
and external “collaborative” social capital. This role, which is in the political domain, is largely 
spearheaded by male members of the community of Cederberg, particularly by Mr Welcome 
Manka, who holds considerable influence as the former chairperson of the ANC. This former 
position means that Mr Manka has strong links with the political leadership— making the 
interface between the community and state easier. This can be seen from the following 
excerpts:  
The leadership of the community is strong, everybody knows Welcome Manka. He meets with the 
people and discusses service delivery in Hopland and Khayelitsha.63  
The Khayelitsha communities participate in those meetings that are organised by him [Welcome 
Manka].64 
He has the support in the Khayelitsha community, and if he says people must move they will move.65 
When the informants were questioned about who organised engagement between the state and 
civil society the following responses were recorded: 
                                                 
63 Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black 
64 Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black 
65 Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black 
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 Welcome organised an imbizo. Welcome Manka is the main leader and a past chairperson of the ANC 
in the community.66 
Community leaders like John Mountain and others organises it.67 
Leadership has emerged as a key reason for the proliferation of social networks and 
associations in Cederberg. Community leadership also emerged as an important factor in the 
organisation of collective action. An example of how the leadership organises collective action 
is illustrated through a comment from one of the key community leaders:  
We had a problem last year with electricity, the municipality cut the wires. We called a meeting in the 
community. People were made to understand that they were using electricity illegally. The councillor 
was told that the people were forced because they waited long for electricity.68 
In Matzikama, political mobilisation happens primarily through state organs, trade unions and 
other political formations. Some respondents, however, indicated that these instruments of 
mobilisation had limited community support in so far as the issues they raised were not deemed 
important by the larger community.  
Here the extent to which the state forges dynamic alliances and partnerships between and within 
state institutions and civil society is emphasised. The augmented analytical framework 
indicates that the issue of leadership from the perspective of the state as well as the community 
is an important factor facilitating engagement with the state.  
7.4.6 Networks and Associations as an Explanation for Participation  
Social networks facilitate the flow of information through structured and unstructured 
engagement. Informants in Cederberg talked about their historical ties with one another and 
their personal interactions. Therefore the flow of information is both structured and 
                                                 
66 Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured 
67 Senior Community Leader, Female, African/Black 
68 Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black 
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unstructured or, as one respondent put it, "people interact informally as well as in formal 
structures." This link between informal and formal engagement was found to be important 
because it allowed all the pertinent issues to percolate to a structured discussion of how they 
should be tackled. One example of how this happens can be seen in issue-driven discussions in 
church. A respondent indicated that the informal interaction through church attendance is 
harnessed by community leaders. Engagement thus takes on a more formal character as groups 
of people are mobilised through the church by community leaders to tackle community-specific 
problems which generally involve the production of public goods through the establishment of 
associations.  
The process of how this happens in practical terms is outlined below:  
• In Cederberg the flow of information and personal interaction takes place through civic 
structures and informally—"people interact informally and in (civic) structures." This 
information is then disseminated through structured engagement which takes various 
forms in the different sectors in the society; through NGOs, the Community Police 
Forum, political parties, church events, etc.  
• The churches play an especially important role in the personal contact that people have 
and in terms of awareness creation and information sharing. The belief system (church 
values) serves as an anchor for the community.  
• The sense of cohesion is reinforced by the presence of other structures such as street 
committees, and other forms of civic structures. 
• The presence of ward committees creates a platform where the concerns of the 
community (through structures like street committees) can be aired and the political 
engagement with the local authority initiated.  
• The presence of community agency/leadership is a decisive driving force in the 
mobilisation of the community’s ambitions.  
Here the role of agency in the mediation between politics and the needs of the community is 
demonstrated—an important cog in the process of dealing with the pressing issues of service 
delivery. It is also useful to note the importance of community leadership in forging collective 
identity which was an essential aspect in the formation of networks for Campbell and McLean 
(2002, p. 550). 
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The following excerpt from a community leader in Cederberg captures this succinctly:  
The leadership of the community is strong, everybody knows Welcome Manka, I meet with the people 
and discuss service delivery in Hopland and Khayelitsha. Like our crèche is far but I asked the women to 
form a committee and to meet with Social Services to get money for a new crèche. Also we had a 
problem with the police because the community did not understand the work of the police. A drug 
merchant was selling drugs in the community but the people met and decided to get rid of the seller. 
Nonsokolo Phama is also a community leader and a strong woman leader and lives in Khayelitsha.69 
The research on networks and associations in Matzikama reveal a different set of circumstances 
at play. In the African/Black community in Matzikama the link between informal and formal 
engagement was found to be more tenuous than in Cederberg. To start with, people get to know 
each other informally through meeting and talking on the streets or in the shebeens but this 
does not translate into a collective voice on common community concerns. This is captured 
and confirmed in the following statement by one of the interviewees:  
"we get to know each other informally through just talking but there’s no structures except those who 
drink and go to the tavern–they have a structure." 70 
Because of the lack of dense social networks, respondents from Matzikama feel that they do 
not have a particularly vibrant community given the problems that they are facing: 
I do not think that the community is particularly vibrant. There is a distinct disinterest from the youth 
to participate and mobilise themselves into structures that may be of use to them and to contribute 
positively to their communities. Alcohol and drug abuse, teenage pregnancies, early school drop-outs 
are the order of the day. Matzikama has a young population and something needs to be done to get 
them to a point where they can become responsible members of society. 71 
                                                 
69 Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black 
70 Youth, Female, African/Black 
71 Community Development Worker, Female, Coloured 
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The lack of diverse social networks also meant that new migrants to Matzikama felt a strong 
sense of exclusion. According to one respondent  
there is a sense though that Matzikama used to be quite a closed community before the development 
of the mines at Brand-se-Baai when there was in-migration of skilled people from the Northern Cape, 
Cape Town and the Eastern Cape. The Vredendal community, before the influx, knew each other quite 
well, and people that moved here from outside Vredendal are still considered “inkommers” (outsiders) 
no matter how long you have lived here.72 
When compared to Cederberg, there seems to be less integration of “outsiders” into the 
community of Matzikama.  
Reasons for the low level of participation of African/Blacks in Matzikama in various networks 
and associations can be gleaned from Campbell and McLean (2002) who studied residents from 
an immigrant background in a small town. Their participation levels in beneficial community 
networks were also low. In the literature they found that a precondition for participation in 
community-level networks was a sense of collective identity which was relatively absent in the 
immigrant community. The community was small, dispersed and lacked economic and political 
influence and psychological confidence (2002, p. 643–657). The “inkommers” label attributed 
to migrants in Matzikama would appear to apply equally well here.  
In summary, associational activity appears to vary between races living in the same 
municipality but also within the same racial groups living in different municipalities. In the 
African/Black community in Cederberg, associational activity in general seems to be more 
pronounced than is found in the Coloured and White communities. This is not the case in 
Matzikama. Diverse, horizontal, active, public-type good-producing networks are found to 
have numerous spin-offs. Not only does it affect political engagement and participation but it 
also has broader social effects that is if done properly, it reduces the incidence of violent protest 
and improves socioeconomic outcomes.  
                                                 
72 Municipal Manager: Matzikama Municipality, Male, Coloured 
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7.5 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
OUTCOMES 
This section examines the performance of the two local authorities and the impact they have 
had on social and economic outcomes. I also consider the extent to which performance can be 
related to social capital in the two areas.  
The relationship between social networks and government effectiveness may not always be 
evident and it is perhaps helpful here to indicate how the former may influence the latter. In 
the early stages of parliamentary democracy, representative government was seen to rule on 
behalf of the governed. Legislation would be formulated, the government’s role in it defined 
and executive orders would be issued to the relevant government departments. With the 
development of democratic systems in the twentieth century, representative government in this 
form was seen as inadequate, and civil society, through various organisational forms, 
increasingly became an important appendage to the original governance models. In established 
democracies, such socio-political formations are viewed as “pressure groups,” but they are not 
necessarily deemed to promote government effectiveness. The same cannot be said of lobby 
groups who use their considerable resources to sway government policy to advance their 
interests and thereby influence both the structure and functions of the bureaucracy to ensure 
that it will duly perform its duties once the political decisions have been made.  
In young democracies, social movements and civic organisations are able to achieve similar 
results albeit through the “sound and fury” of their demands at the local level. Their impact can 
be attributable to the resource constraints from which this tier of government suffers. The 
example of South Africa is instructive. With the advent of political democracy in 1994, the 
promise of a better life for all after decades of exclusion and discrimination led to strong 
demands for basic services. The demands are often voiced by grassroots community 
organisations which then become the main transmission mechanism between political office 
holders and municipal officials. That this has become more pronounced here than in most other 
societies can in large measure be attributed to the limited capacity of local authorities to execute 
their mandate. By the same token, the acceptance of the role of civic groups that are often 
associated with these demands should be seen as an acknowledgement that a maturing 
democratic order requires such an extra tier of government for its full functioning. This is also 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
an example of linking social capital at work where sections of the government elite form 
partnerships with broad-based community organisations.  
The dynamics of the transmission of civil society’s demands to local government are not dealt 
with in the literature yet forms an essential part of the consequences of “social capital in 
action.” The primary role of local government in South Africa is to attend to living conditions 
and promote the economic development of the area/region. The assessment of needs has, 
generally speaking, been carried out with acceptable levels of competence, in most cases 
through consultants. The technical skills, however, relating to town planning, building plans, 
road construction, water reticulation and sewerage, and so on, are not always readily available 
which, when combined with relatively low levels of administrative competence, leads to lags 
in delivery. The formation of social networks introduces a consultation process that gradually 
induces accountability and efficiency on the part of administrative staff. 
Studies that have examined the effects of social capital on government effectiveness have used 
a host of administrative and technical indicators as measures of government 
performance/efficiency. In the literature review, a number of these studies were covered. For 
example, the study by Knack (2000, p. 22) measured government performance across five 
areas, including financial and capital management, human resources, information technology 
and what he refers to as “managing for results”. Within the five performance areas a total of 
thirty-five criteria were used to determine government efficiency, including adequacy of 
financial auditing, effective procurement management and involvement of stakeholders in 
developing strategic plans. While using financial, HR and other technical indicators of 
government performance Knack’s work does not relate well to municipalities that have 
capacity constraints such as Cederberg and Matzikama. This study augments Knack’s approach 
to measuring government effectiveness by using a “welfarist approach” which I show to be 
more suitable in such circumstances.  
In Chapter Four, where the analytical framework was introduced, government effectiveness 
was defined in both technical as well as in welfarist terms (the extent to which government 
maximises the social welfare function of the poor). The welfarist approach looks at a more 
subjective measure of performance—particularly from the perspective of the poor. It focuses 
on government effectiveness as experienced by citizens in so far as their social and economic 
welfare are concerned. 
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There are a few things that should be said about the more subjective measure. Firstly, it captures 
that which is not apparent in the more technical definition. Citizens are best placed to judge a 
government’s efforts to improve the welfare of its constituents—their welfare. 
Secondly, there are other ways to achieve social progress even if the local authority has capacity 
constraints. It is particularly in these circumstances that networks present another alternative, 
one that is more effective in ensuring positive outcomes by bringing pressure to bear on the 
local authorities through regular engagement, as in the case of Cederberg. The more responsive 
local authorities are to the needs of their communities the greater the prospect of improving the 
social and economic welfare of the poor.  
Both these approaches are captured in the diagram below. The diagram also illustrates the way 
in which social group membership affects trust and participation and ultimately government 
effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. 
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Figure 7-5: Augmented Analytical Framework 
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There is a two-dimensional approach to this analysis: the subjective dimension captures 
the perspective of constituents on how government is impacting on their lives and the 
objective measure examines independent criteria on efficiency and effectiveness. Both are 
discussed in the section that follows.  
7.5.1 Perceptions of Government Performance 
In the survey, residents were questioned about their perceptions of government 
effectiveness. On the whole, favourable perceptions of government performance were 
similar for Cederberg and Matzikama.   
Table 7–11: Perceptions of Government Performance by Municipality 
 CEDERBERG MATZIKAMA 
Yes, government is efficient 50,2% 52,6% 
No, government is not efficient 33,3% 37,9% 
Other  16.5% 9.5% 
Total  100.0% 100.0% 
 
 In Table 7-12 the Chi-square test of association was used to test whether there is a 
significant association between race and perceptions of government performance in 
Cederberg and Matzikama. The p-values are less than 0.05 for Cederberg suggesting that 
there is an association between government performance and race. In Cederberg, 
African/Blacks (87, 4%) have higher participation compared to Coloureds (42, 0%) and 
Whites (26, 5%).  
In Matzikama there is no statistically significant difference between race and perceptions 
of government performance. 
Perceptions of government effectiveness differ significantly between the two 
African/Black communities of Matzikama and Cederberg. Most of those surveyed in 
Cederberg (87.4%) agree with the perception that their municipality is performing well 
compared to 60.3% in Matzikama.  
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Table 7–12: Perceptions of Government Performance by Municipality and Race 
 
CEDERBERG 
CHI-
SQUARE  
P-
VALUE 
MATZIKAMA  
CHI-
SQUARE  
P-
VALUE  
YES NO OTHER   YES NO OTHER   
African/Black 87,4% 9,5% 3.1 χ2 – value 
=  
194,486 
p-value =  
0.000 
60,3% 30,2% 9.5 χ2 – value 
=  
5.995 
p-value = 
0.424 
 
Coloured 42,0% 41,5% 16.5 52,3% 38,2% 9.5 
White 26,5% 40,4% 33.1 46,2% 44,5% 9.3 
Total 50,2% 33,3% 16.5 52,6% 37,9% 9.5 
 
7.5.1.1 Objective Measures of Government Performance 
Previous studies have found that the quality of government was positively associated with 
levels of social capital at the national and local tiers. In the literature review we saw how 
various indicators were used to assess the quality of government and then correlated with 
social capital indicators.  
When these scores for the various key performance areas (KPAs) were aggregated into a 
total score the following emerged from the analysis73. 
 Table 7–13: Local Government Effectiveness Scores  
CATEGORY MATZIKAMA CEDERBERG 
Municipal transformation and 
OD 75% 83% 
Basic service delivery 42% 50% 
Good governance 72% 85% 
Financial viability 89% 74% 
Public participation processes 83% 67% 
LED strategies 67% 67% 
                                                 
73 The KPA scores were obtained from the Western Cape Provincial Government and not from the survey 
data gathered for the thesis. See page 96.   
 
 
 
 
201 
 
Cederberg (83%) scored higher than Matzikama (75%) in the area of municipal 
transformation and organisational development (OD), the provision of basic services and 
good governance. Matzikama performed better in the area of financial viability and public 
participation processes. Further research into the results will focus on whether the better 
marginal performance in the first three KPAs is the result of the level of social capital in 
Cederberg.     
While the differences between the two municipalities appear to be marginal the impact is 
nevertheless important in so far as welfare outcomes are concerned. Measurable 
differences in the performance of government thus have less to do with size and capacity 
and more to do with how resources are allocated and to whom. The research results indicate 
that allocation is largely a response to the way in which communities bring pressure to bear 
on authorities, especially with regard to delivery of basic services. I argue that the reason 
why Cederberg scores better on performance is that its civil society organisations were able 
to influence resource allocation. It is possible that municipalities with such capacity 
constraints can be more receptive to fulfilling the welfare needs of the poor. With regard 
to municipalities with considerable resource and capacity constraints, the role of social 
networks and associations becomes even more critical since their absence increases the 
possibility of funds being easily mismanaged or misappropriated. The watchdog role they 
play over the local authority acts as a bulwark against profligate or wasteful expenditure.    
The local government effectiveness scores indicate that the Cederberg municipality scored 
better than Matzikama municipality in the areas of Municipal Transformation and 
Organisational Development, Basic Service Delivery and Good Governance. On the other 
hand, Matzikama municipality performed better than Cederberg municipality in the areas 
of Financial Viability and Public Participation Processes.  
A more detailed analysis of the performance criteria reveals some interesting insights. In 
the area of Municipal Transformation and Organisational Development, Cederberg did 
better than Matzikama. This means that Cederberg municipality, although understaffed, 
had the necessary policies and systems in place to guide the management of human 
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resources in the municipality. Matzikama, on the other hand, was found lacking in this 
regard. The importance of this area of performance has to be emphasised since it informs 
how effective and efficient municipalities should be in responding to the needs of their 
communities. The strength of an organisation/institution depends largely on the hiring of 
competent staff, maintaining adequate staffing levels and having an effective HR system.  
The municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama are graded below according to their 
performance indicated by High (H), Medium (M) and Low (L)74.  
Table 7-14: Municipal Transformation and Organisational Development 
 
NUMBER OF VACANT 
POSTS 
TRANSFORMATION 
HR 
POLICIES 
AND 
SYSTEMS 
 
OVERALL 
SCORE 
MM AND 
S57 
OTHER 
MATZIKAMA H H M L 75% 
CEDERBERG H M M H 83% 
 
In the performance area of Basic Service Delivery Cederberg performed better than 
Matzikama even though both municipalities faced several constraints on their ability to 
deliver. One of the key roles of local government is to provide the local population with 
adequate access to basic services. Unfortunately, both municipalities had severe backlogs 
in basic service delivery and both municipalities spent only a fraction of their capital 
budget—an indication of how effective they are at supplying basic services.  
 
 
                                                 
74 The grading was developed by the Western Cape Provincial Department of Housing and local Government.   
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Table 7–15: Access to Basic Services 
 
HOUSEHOLDS 
WITHOUT 
ACCESS TO 
BASIC 
SERVICES 
BACKLOGS 
SPENDING 
OF 
CAPITAL 
BUDGET 
PROVISION 
OF FREE 
BASIC 
SERVICES 
 
OVERALL 
SCORE 
MATZIKAMA L L L M 42% 
CEDERBERG L L L H 50% 
 
Cederberg was more successful in providing basic services even though it had under-spent 
on its capital budget in the period under investigation.  
In the performance area of Good Governance, the indicators used include Performance 
Management and Other Indicators of Good Governance. It is worth noting here that the 
categories of Performance Management and Other Indicators of Good Governance directly 
relate to the performance of officials. For example, Cederberg has implemented an anti-
corruption policy while Matzikama has not. It might be that the effects of these policies 
permeate the lives of the different communities in Cederberg which would explain why 
Cederberg has enjoyed such high subjective ratings of government performance. 
Table 7–16: Performance Management 
 POLICY AND 
FRAMEWORK 
PMS IMPLEM. ON 
ALL LEVELS 
PMS LINKED TO IDP 
TARGETS 
MATZIKAMA  L L L 
CEDERBERG H M M 
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Table 7–17: Other Indicators of Good Governance 
 
 
DELEGATI
ONS ( 
ADMIN 
AND S59 
MSA) 
REGULAR 
COUNCIL 
AND 
MAYORAL 
COMMITTE
E 
MEETINGS 
QUORUM 
AT 
MEETING
S 
CHANGES 
IN 
POLITICAL 
LEADERSH
IP 
ANTI-
CORRUPTIO
N POLICY 
IMPLEM. 
 
OVERAL
L SCORE 
MATZIKAMA  H H H H L 72% 
CEDERBERG H H H H H 85% 
 
An emphasis on good governance generally comes from political will. This could come 
from political and community pressure in the form of demands for accountability. Also, 
good governance benefits all communities as government effectiveness is not intended to 
be exclusive to one constituency. This is one example of the link between policies and their 
impact on the performance of officials and, in turn, the impact on communities.  
It is interesting to note that even though Cederberg is less financially viable than 
Matzikama, Cederberg has managed to put various mechanisms and systems in place to 
manage (through its HR policies and systems), monitor and evaluate the performance of 
staff, making the municipality more accountable in the eyes of the communities it 
represents.  
Matzikama municipality scored more than Cederberg in the area of “Public Participation 
Processes.” On the face of it, this seems to challenge the earlier finding that Cederberg has 
higher political participation than Matzikama. The municipality, it seems, has a public 
participation strategy that is supposed to inform the processes of engaging the public.   
Table 7–18: Public Participation Processes 
 
 
PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION 
STRATEGY 
COMM. 
STRATEGY 
WARD COMS 
EST 
FUNCTIONING 
OF WARD 
COMS 
TOTAL 
MATZIKAMA H L H H 83% 
CEDERBERG L L H H 67% 
 
 
 
 
 
205 
 
The public participation strategy adopted in Matzikama appears to be a contradiction: one 
would have expected more participation because the strategy has been developed. Very 
little is said about how the strategy will be implemented. It is possible that the strategies 
were drafted by consultants but the implementation thereof does not appear to be fully 
outlined. With less community participation, the strategy would appear to be defeating its 
own objectives. Perhaps the lesson to be learned from this is that participation is rarely 
driven from the top down. When participation is effected from the bottom up, social group 
membership and strong leadership from the community informs and shapes its outcomes.  
7.6 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
A central theme of this study was to investigate whether a variation of the Putnam thesis 
holds in the context of marginalised African/Black communities in the rural municipalities 
of Cederberg and Matzikama. In the analysis of the research I sought to question whether 
social group membership can affect developmental outcomes if the municipalities 
concerned suffer from capacity and resource constraints. Up to this point various constructs 
in the analytical framework were examined without establishing whether there is a 
statistically significant relationship between them. In order to establish this, path analysis 
was used to estimate whether social group membership impacts on development outcomes 
as illustrated in Chapter Four. Unfortunately path analysis could not be used as an 
analytical tool to test the full augmented analytical framework because of the complexity 
of the data and modelling requirements.   
As explained in Chapter 5, path analysis is an extension of regression analysis which aims 
to provide estimates of the scale and importance of presumed causal relationships between 
sets of variables. According to the theory “a regression is done for each concept or construct 
in the model as a dependent on others which the model indicates are causes.”  
Figure 7-5 postulated a number of paths starting with social networks and ending with 
socioeconomic outcomes. In this section, a path coefficient will be estimated for each path 
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in the analytical model for Cederberg and Matzikama. A sequential step in this process is 
to do the same for African/Black communities and for the municipalities as a whole.  
7.6.1 Estimating the Effect of Social Capital on Socioeconomic 
Outcomes: Cederberg  
The path analysis in Table 7-20 gives a breakdown of the estimates and p-values for the 
path model for the African/Black population group.  
The definitions and compositions of the actual variables included for each of the items 
presented in the path analysis is described in the table below:  
Table 7-19: Definition and Composition of Variables  
VARIABLE DEFINITION COMPOSITION OF INDICATORS 
SGM Membership in formal social groups  Number of individuals who indicated that 
they or/and members of their family were 
members of a formal social group. 
POL TRUST  Trust in government and political leaders.  Trust in political leaders, local government 
and central government. Average of the three 
variables. 
POLITICP Political participation is the active role 
that citizens play in their engagement 
with the state, through government 
officials and institutions. 
Signing a petition, participating in an 
election campaign, attending a council 
meeting and voting in local elections. 
Average of the four variables. 
GOV EFF Effectiveness of government  Perception of government’s effectiveness 
OUTCOMES The socioeconomic outcomes variable is 
operationalised as people’s perceptions 
of government’s impact on their 
socioeconomic conditions. 
Perceptions of government’s action 
positively impacting on socioeconomic 
status? 
 
The estimates are for the relationship between social group membership (SGM) and 
socioeconomic outcomes (OUTCOMES). Social group membership and political trust 
(POL TRUST) are positively related and are statistically significant for the African/Black 
population in Cederberg Municipality. Being a member of a formal social group increases 
political trust by 0.16 compared to those who are not members of a formal social group. 
The path coefficients for all other concepts in the model are insignificant since all other p-
values are greater than 0.05 which suggests that the link from political trust and political 
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participation (POLITICP) and from participation to government effectiveness (GOV EFF) 
and/or socioeconomic outcomes does not hold for African/Blacks in Cederberg. What is 
interesting is that social group membership is directly and strongly related to 
socioeconomic outcomes in Cederberg municipality. In fact, being a member of a social 
group increases positive socioeconomic outcomes by 0.33 in the municipality concerned.  
Table 7–20: Standardised Regression Weights for the African/Black Population Group in Cederberg 
  ESTIMATE P-VALUE 
SGM POL TRUST 0.160 0.028 
POL TRUST POLITICP -0.019 0.795 
POLITICP GOV EFF 0.123 0.094 
POLITICP OUTCOMES -0.039 0.601 
GOV EFF OUTCOMES -0.098 0.186 
SGM OUTCOMES 0.33 <0.01 
 
One possible explanation for the link between social group membership and trust and 
between social group membership and socioeconomic outcomes is that political culture 
varies across the marginalised, migrant African/Black community in Cederberg. This was 
also observed in our earlier discussion on the individual component parts of the analysis.  
Social group membership was positively related to trust in political leadership in 
Cederberg. We should recall that political leaders are closely aligned to the community 
whose leaders have close relationships with the ANC structures. These community leaders 
also mobilise communities and act as interlocutors between the local authority and the 
municipality. However, the path analysis did not confirm a statistically significant 
relationship between political trust and political participation. This suggests that it was the 
leadership of Cederberg’s African/Black community which played an instrumental role in 
political participation. The interviews highlighted this with the following response to the 
question posed about who organises political participation in the African/Black community 
in Cederberg:  
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Welcome has the support of the Khayelitsha community, and if he says people must move they 
will move.75 
This confirms that political participation is driven by trust in community leaders and is, in 
turn, sustained by the almost zealous following they have in their communities. Their role 
as interlocutors between the municipality and community is what establishes the platform 
for negotiation and mediation on development issues. This is based on a type of direct 
democracy which is typical of traditional African/Black culture where community 
members go directly to the chief to solve their problems. This is also symptomatic of the 
paternalistic relationships that exist in a newly urbanised community where traditional 
patterns of behaviour find their own expression. This does not conform to the kind of 
political behaviour that is found in older democracies such as in Putnam’s account of Italy.  
The explication of the statistical relationship between various forms of social capital and 
socioeconomic outcomes allows us to now compare the African/Black communities in 
Matzikama and Cederberg. 
The table below gives a breakdown of the estimates and p-values for the path model for 
the African/Black population group in Matzikama. 
Table 7–21: Standardised Regression Weights for the African/Black Population Group in Matzikama 
  ESTIMATE P-VALUE 
SGM POL TRUST -0.016 0.871 
POL TRUST POLITICP 0.049 0.609 
POLITICP GOV EFF -0.076 0.432 
POLITICP OUTCOMES 0.517 <0.01 
GOV EFF OUTCOMES 0.117 0.157 
 
                                                 
75 Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black 
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The only variable in the path model that is statistically significant is the path from political 
participation to socioeconomic outcomes. All other variables are insignificant. What this 
means is that those who participate politically are estimated to increase socioeconomic 
outcomes by 0.52.  
This has very important implications for Matzikama. If they were to engineer better social 
group membership, the prospect of better socioeconomic outcomes would improve, as it 
has in Cederberg.  
7.6.1.1 Estimating the effect of social capital on socioeconomic outcomes by 
Municipality 
Upon examination of the path model for Cederberg as a whole, however, a very different 
picture emerges as indicated in Table 7-22. 
Table 7–22: Standardised Regression Weights for All Population Groups in Cederberg 
  ESTIMATE P-VALUE 
SGM POL TRUST 0.158 <0.01 
POL TRUST POLITICP 0.234 <0.01 
SGM POLITICP 0.241 <0.01 
POLITICP GOV EFF -0.047 0.249 
POLITICP OUTCOMES 0.416 <0.01 
GOV EFF OUTCOMES -0.025 0.492 
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Figure 7-6: Path Coefficients for All Race Groups, Cederberg 
 
It is interesting to note that formal social group membership and political trust is positively 
related and statistically significant (p-value = 0.01) for Cederberg as a whole. What this 
means is that in Cederberg, being a member of a social group increases political trust by 
0.16 compared to those people who are not members of a formal social group. There is also 
a positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.01) relationship between political trust 
and political participation and between political participation and socioeconomic 
outcomes. The path coefficient for the former is estimated at 0.23 and the latter is estimated 
at 0.42. In essence, this means that having political trust increases political participation by 
0.23. Citizens in Cederberg who politically participate experience a 0.42 increase in (better) 
socioeconomic outcomes than those who do not.  
It is interesting to note that there is also a direct link between formal social group 
membership and political participation. Formal social group membership increases 
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political participation directly by 0.24 (irrespective of whether they have trust in the public 
sector). The behaviour of the population as a whole seems to confirm the Putnam thesis, 
namely, that better socioeconomic outcomes are ultimately the result of one’s membership 
in social groups which influences trust and participation (see the diagram above). The red 
dots indicate the paths that are statistically significant.   
The behaviour of the population as a whole is similar to the one identified in the northern 
parts of Italy and very different to what we observe in Matzikama as we shall see. However 
it also differs from the behaviour of African/Black communities in Cederberg which is 
probably attributable to residents being relative newcomers within a paternalistic culture.  
The table below gives a breakdown of the estimates and p-values for the path model for all 
population groups in Matzikama.  
Table 7–23: Standardised Regression Weights for All Population Groups in Matzikama 
  ESTIMATE P 
SGM POL TRUST 0.022 0.606 
POL TRUST POLITICP 0.143 <0.01 
POLITICP GOV EFF -0.048 0.269 
POLITICP OUTCOMES 0.535 <0.01 
GOV EFF OUTCOMES 0.023 0.531 
 
It is interesting to note that unlike Cederberg, there is no statistically significant (p-value = 
0.606) relationship between formal social group membership and political trust for 
Matzikama as a whole. However, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between political trust and political participation and between political participation and 
socioeconomic outcomes. The path coefficient for the former is estimated at 0.14 and the 
latter is estimated at 0.54. In essence, this means that having political trust increases 
political participation by 0.14 in Matzikama compared to 0.23 in Cederberg. Citizens in 
Matzikama who participate politically have a 0.54 increase in experiencing better 
socioeconomic outcomes than those who do not. A diagrammatic representation of the 
model with the estimates is given in the figure below.   
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Figure 7-7: Path Coefficient for All Race Groups, Matzikama 
 
If Matzikama had the same density and characteristics of networks as Cederberg, it would 
be able to improve socioeconomic outcomes through improved trust and political 
participation. 
7.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter compared Social Group membership among the various race groups in the 
municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama and showed that African/Blacks had a vibrant 
culture of formal social networks and associations. These formal social groups were 
horizontal, active, non-political, and public-type good-producing which accounted for the 
differences in the socioeconomic outcomes among the African/Black communities in 
Cederberg which were not present in Matzikama.  
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The chapter highlighted the fact that informal associations and networks (like congregating 
in shebeens) are not as viable as formal networks and associations in impacting on 
development outcomes. Formal networks and associations are more beneficial since they 
provide the necessary structures for direct engagement with officials and decision makers 
and are better predictors of positive socioeconomic outcomes. Informal associations lack 
rules and procedures and accountability and are unable to exert the kind of pressure 
required for effective service delivery.     
The research findings and analysis thereof also show that the transmission mechanism from 
networks to socioeconomic outcomes is complex. While several factors appear to influence 
outcomes, no definitive conclusion can be drawn about which one has captive power over 
those outcomes. Some factors clearly have stronger correlations than others. Among these 
is the quality of leadership present in communities. This was shown to be decisive in the 
case of Cederberg and was visibly absent in Matzikama. If the level of social capital is high 
as in the Cederberg case, there is a strong probability that leaders emerge as interlocutors 
to negotiate the roll-out of services. The interlocutor role of leadership is instrumental in 
stimulating public participation and if well organised and managed, can significantly 
contribute to socioeconomic outcomes by virtue of the way it galvanises communities and 
local officials. In such cases government effectiveness is likely to improve in the areas of 
financial and capital management, procurement and general technical competence. An 
associated aspect of government effectiveness is the welfare function that a government 
performs (maximising social welfare benefits to the poor). Where networks and 
associations, however, prompt local authorities to be more responsive to demands for 
welfare programmes, the effect on socioeconomic outcomes is certain to be positive. 
Depending on the level of formal organisational structure and the scope they articulate, the 
networks and associations are an important community resource for development.     
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarises the findings of the thesis by considering the theoretical, 
methodological and empirical contributions made to the study of social capital and the key 
findings and conclusions that can be drawn from the research. Two municipalities were 
used as case studies to determine whether social capital is a significant contributor to better 
socioeconomic outcomes. Using Putnam’s framework as a point of departure, the study 
compared the experiences of two rural municipalities with severe capacity constraints that 
were similar in terms of their economic and social structure, and were located in the same 
geographic region76. The study found that the African/Black residents of Cederberg 
managed to establish a vibrant culture of social group membership and that their 
socioeconomic outcomes were considerably enhanced as a result of this. This was absent 
among the African/Black residents of Matzikama. These finding presented an opportunity 
to investigate which factors might be responsible for such social incongruity in the two 
municipalities concerned.   
8.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS  
8.2.1 Theoretical Contribution of the Thesis 
Putnam’s framework was used as a point of departure to develop a comprehensive model 
that depicts how associations/networks impact on socioeconomic outcomes. Putnam’s 
social capital thesis showed that social capital in the form of associations and networks has 
an impact on socioeconomic outcomes even if these associations have no connection to 
politics or the economy. Putnam hypothesised that this was because civic participation 
instils skills of cooperation and a sense of shared responsibility in individuals. This, in turn, 
                                                 
76 See Annexure A for a detailed socioeconomic profile of the two areas by race. 
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results in a better quality of government and better economic (and social) outcomes for 
communities. He elaborated on this by observing that citizens in civic communities demand 
more effective government and are prepared to act cooperatively to achieve their shared 
goals. But, the Putnam thesis left unexplored many underlying dynamics of social group 
membership, trust, participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. 
This opened up the opportunity to develop a more nuanced perspective of the theory.  
His theoretical framework (represented in Figure 8-1) was reviewed and augmented to 
develop a framework that was appropriate to rural, capacity constrained municipalities in 
South Africa. In turn, the new analytical framework was used to analyse the different 
outcomes among the African/Black communities in Cederberg and Matzikama. 
Theoretically the thesis built on Putnam’s existing social capital theory and expanded it to 
describe the transmission mechanism from social group membership to socioeconomic 
outcomes. This exploration of transmission mechanisms is one of the unique theoretical 
contributions of the thesis.  
The graphical representations of the static interpretation of the Putnam thesis and the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter Four are reproduced below in Figure 7-1 and 
Figure 8-2 respectively.  
Figure 8-1: A Graphical Illustration of an Interpretation of the Putnam Model 
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Figure 8-2: Analytical Framework Developed 
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Figure 8-2 delineated the numerous characteristics of networks which impact on 
socioeconomic outcomes. The thesis found that the extent of improved socioeconomic 
outcomes in impoverished rural communities is critically dependent on the characteristics 
of networks, particularly the ones highlighted under networks and associations (light green 
enclosed within the dashed red line) in Figure 8-2. Factors such as formal and informal 
rules, state agency, leadership, political structures and institutions and the relationship with 
the state (all highlighted under civic engagement/participation) in Figure 8-2 details the 
interpenetration of state and civil society in the development and promotion of civic 
engagement/participation. This challenges Putnam’s (1993, 1995) “society centred 
approach” which undervalues state agency, leadership, political structures and institutions, 
and so on, all of which are important variables that are not considered in Putnam’s 
framework. For example, if state agencies promote and respond to the needs articulated by 
communities through their representatives, a virtuous cycle of cooperation and dialogue is 
created which is one of the key mechanisms to reduce violent protests presently affecting 
the Western Cape province of South Africa.   
The role of leadership in the promotion of social capital cannot be underestimated. Leaders 
play a key role in transmitting social capital into better socioeconomic outcomes for 
communities. This was evident among the African/Black residents of Cederberg where the 
quality of leadership was instrumental in securing better socioeconomic outcomes and was 
visibly absent in Matzikama. In the Cederberg case, the interlocutor role of leadership was 
instrumental in stimulating public participation and, if well organised and managed, can 
significantly contribute to socioeconomic outcomes by virtue of the way it galvanises 
communities and local officials.  
Another contribution made by this thesis to the theory of social capital is the idea that 
formal social group membership is of greater significance than informal networks in 
impoverished, marginalised rural communities located in areas governed by resource-
constrained local government institutions. This is because formal social groups instil in 
their members the structures and processes necessary for coordinated collective action in                                    
a sustained and effective manner.  
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Marginalised communities that have (i) diverse formal social groups (cultural groups, sport 
groups, etc.) with (ii) cross-cutting membership that (iii) span across different age groups, 
are more likely to have improved socioeconomic outcomes since these equip members with 
skills which may be used in different settings, that is, their own private contexts. These 
skills and competencies are particularly relevant in the context of sports groups which have 
significant youth membership in the case of Cederberg, where leadership development 
takes place, acting as we have seen in Chapter Six as de facto leadership academies.   
I also argue that the probability of marches and violent protest over service delivery issues 
is diminished due to the existence of numerous non-political associations77 which we see 
in Cederberg. This is because of the mediation efforts of community leaders within these 
structures who play a decisive role in non-violent outcomes because they act as 
interlocutors between government and the ruling political party on the one hand and the 
community on the other hand.  
In the analytical framework government effectiveness is more broadly defined than in the 
Putnam model. In areas where governments are ineffective in terms of technical criteria, 
such as is found in Cederberg and Matzikama, it was established that the pressure exerted 
on the local authority by poor communities, organised in networks and associations, 
actually impacted on their wellbeing. Given the developing country context of our case 
studies, the augmented framework differs from Putnam’s original framework in that it 
allows for both technical efficiency criteria as well as social and economic welfare criteria. 
The augmented analytical framework implicitly argues that in (poor, marginalised) 
communities where there are numerous networks and associations of the kind that engender 
positive outcomes, the welfare function of such communities is by and large formulated 
and established through the ebb and flow of information in such structures. The social 
                                                 
77 Discussion with Cederberg Municipality indicated that there have been no violent protests in the African/Black 
community since the research was undertaken in the mid-2000s.  This is in contrast to many other parts of the Western 
Cape which have been prone to protests. 
 
 
 
 
219 
 
welfare function of communities then gets determined by what communities need/prefer. 
Thus social networks influence the formation and constitution of the social welfare 
function of poor communities. This can then be communicated to the local municipality 
through political engagement.    
8.2.2 Methodological Contribution of the Thesis 
The literature highlighted the different methodological approaches used to measure social 
capital. No particular methodology, on its own, could be used to analyse the findings of the 
research—and the need for an innovative approach capable of capturing the complexity of 
the analytical framework developed in Chapter Four was required.  
A mixed-method approach was used to analyse the findings of the research, since to merely 
quantify social group membership and other variables in the analytical framework through 
the use of descriptive and inferential statistics was not enough to obtain a deeper 
understanding of how social capital is formed. This compelled the need for qualitative 
research.  
A methodological innovation in this study was the application of “path analysis” to capture 
the “interactional” relationships that existed in the analytical framework. The use of path 
analysis to test the “interactional” relationships between social networks and 
socioeconomic outcomes at the local government level is an original contribution of the 
thesis.  
8.2.3 Empirical Contribution of the Thesis 
The study also made an empirical contribution since it measured a representative sample 
of the Cederberg and Matzikama populations, asking them detailed questions regarding 
their membership in formal social groups, the trust they have in political leadership as well 
as the political engagements they have with the state. This is a unique contribution since 
this is the first time that such comparisons have been made at a local government level in 
the context of marginalised rural communities.   
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Empirically it was demonstrated by Jooste (2005) that poor communities in the Western 
Cape had low levels of formal social group membership, because the opportunity cost of 
their time counted against such pursuits. This study however proves otherwise. The 
Cederberg experience show that poor communities use their membership in formal social 
groups as one of the few survival strategies available to them and that they achieve better 
socioeconomic opportunities precisely because these social groups are formal. Evidence of 
high levels of formal social group membership in an impoverished area is therefore another 
empirical contribution of the thesis. 
The empirical evidence also shows that there is no correlation of income levels and social 
group membership. For example in Matzikama membership across the different race 
groups were low, irrespective of whether some race groups were poorer than others.  
However the evidence does suggest that there are differences in the types of social groups 
to which different race groups belong to with Whites more likely to belong to Volunteer 
Groups and African/Blacks more likely to belong to Cultural and Sports Groups. Although 
no research has been done on why this might be the case, it is likely that it is as a result of 
the distinct demographic profile of the communities concerned - a more youthful 
African/Black population and an older White population.  
8.3 KEY INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Putnam thesis argued that social networks impact on socioeconomic outcomes. The 
original contribution of this thesis as presented in the augmented analytical framework 
demonstrates that the relationship between social networks and socioeconomic outcomes 
is complex and contingent upon several factors that are themselves the product of 
multifaceted social and institutional conditions. For social networks and associations to 
impact on socioeconomic outcomes a considerable confluence is required between a 
number of variables as the augmented analytical framework illustrates.  
The framework shows that not all networks and associations have the same impact on 
developmental outcomes. Rather, it is the characteristics of networks that are important 
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determinants of development outcomes. Networks and associations that are horizontal, 
active, heterogeneous, non-political and public good-producing maximise the impact on 
developmental outcomes as we see in the case of Cederberg. 
The presence of multiple networks that have the positive characteristics mentioned above 
facilitates the development of political trust in two ways. Firstly, it facilitates the flow of 
information, particularly in small communities (about their needs) through the structures 
of local government. With the help of their leaders, the communities are able to engage the 
state about issues they see as critical, such as the provision of housing and basic services. 
The existence of such networks/associations facilitates dialogue between the state and civil 
society.  
Secondly, horizontal networks that are heterogeneous, active and have been set up to 
deliver public goods and services facilitate the development of an alternative channel or 
mode in dealing with the provision of public goods and services. The activities of these 
networks and associations may at times augment current activities of the local authority. 
This sustains trust in the political leadership because their performance as interlocutors is 
valued for the way in which they attend to problems with regard to service delivery. This 
compensates for the failings of the state in such areas. The networks and associations 
coupled with strong community leadership thus engender trust in the local authority and its 
political actors. The organised activities of these associations around service provision 
lessens their dependence on the state for these services. The result is higher levels of 
political trust by residents as was found in Cederberg.   
The thesis conversely argues that associations and networks that are hierarchical, passive, 
political in nature and limited in the activities that they undertake are more likely to 
generate political mistrust even if they are involved in producing public-type goods and 
services. Information flows in a hierarchical network are less fluid than in a horizontal 
network which could frustrate the process of articulating and communicating information 
about the needs of a community to the leaders of these associations (as in the case of 
Matzikama). The lack of good, effective leadership in the community further inhibits the 
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possibility of sustained engagement with the municipality. This lends itself to fewer 
platforms for engagement and a heightened sense of marginalisation follows. All of this 
undermines political trust (in the public institutions and politicians since many of these 
networks have been initiated by political entities) and increases the prospect of violent 
protest/participation. The conceptualisation of networks and associations which imbue 
certain characteristics as an enabler of political trust is an original contribution of this 
thesis.  
The greater the number and more diverse the networks and associations involved in 
providing public-type goods and services, the more likely is their engagement with the 
state. In the case of Cederberg it has also meant that a larger segment of the African/Black 
population participates with local government in issues that concern them. Inevitably, this 
is tantamount to “pressure” being applied on local government officials to prioritise these 
issues. Thus, in spite of capacity and resource constraints in the municipality, networks and 
associations can be seen to have an impact on government effectiveness by helping to focus 
resource allocation. 
One of the most interesting outcomes in communities that have dense, integrated networks, 
such as in Cederberg, and where this is accompanied by sustained engagement with the 
state, is that they tend to assume a larger role in the social welfare function of the poor. 
This was particularly evident in the way housing provision was negotiated in Cederberg, 
where dissatisfaction with an allocated site led to some hard bargaining and the granting of 
an alternative, more acceptable location.  
A question that needs to be posed is why Cederberg has such vibrant associational activity 
compared to Matzikama. The answer, it seems, lies in the confluence of factors that 
precipitated the outcome. These factors are discussed below.   
The formation of networks and associations was established as a response to government 
failure and the perception that the community was marginalised—politically, socially and 
culturally—as was the case initially in Cederberg before the ANC came to power in the 
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local government. Under these conditions community leaders mobilised themselves to 
facilitate the production of basic public goods and services. This, however, cannot be the 
only factor as Matzikama, despite the fact that the African/Black community there faced 
the same challenges and experienced the same degree of marginalisation as the community 
in Cederberg, did not develop similar vibrant associations/networks. This suggests that 
other factors were co-responsible.  
In Cederberg, the presence of leadership was a decisive driving force in articulating the 
aspirations of their constituency and mobilising their participation in the process. The role 
of leaders as interlocutors between government and the ruling political party on the one 
hand and the community on the other should be seen as an important milestone. A unique 
feature of the leadership in the African/Black community in Cederberg is that it enjoyed 
links to the ANC and hence an automatic mechanism existed through which dialogue could 
take place between the community and the municipality. From the findings it appears that 
this has not happened in the African/Black community in Matzikama.    
In Cederberg, there is a sense of collective identity that facilitates the formation of 
networks/associations. This, too, is absent in Matzikama. In Cederberg the flow of 
information takes place through both structured engagement through civic structures as 
well as informally. Information is then disseminated through established channels in the 
different sectors in the society—through NGOs, Community Police Forums, political 
parties, church events, and so on. The churches indeed play an especially important role in 
fostering this sense of collective identity because it is through the church that relationships 
are established, awareness is raised and information shared. The belief system of the church 
(the values it espouses) serves as an anchor for the community. The sense of collective 
identity is reinforced by good leadership and the presence of other structures such as street 
committees.  
The presence and activities of such networks encourages a virtuous cycle of bridging and 
linking. Numerous horizontal networks are likely to have more channels established with 
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other communities and organisations, expanding the contacts and resources available to 
that community, as is the case in Cederberg. 
The research also showed dramatic variations in social capital by apartheid-designated 
racial groups which were more or less still inhabiting separate spaces. Significantly in 
Cederberg and Matzikama, African/Black residents displayed higher levels of civic 
engagement/political participation than other racial groups. However, participation was 
higher in Cederberg when compared to Matzikama. The augmented analytical framework 
unpacked the variables (other than demographic and socioeconomic) that are essential for 
participation. These included the relationships that communities have with the state, 
political structures and institutions that are in place that impact on participation, leadership, 
formal and informal rules and state agency. 
The findings showed that the African/Black residents in Cederberg had a better relationship 
with the state when compared to their counterparts in Matzikama. While the political 
institutions and structures that exist at a local authority level in South Africa are 
operationally the same, it is the way in which they give expression to their constitutional 
mandate that appears to determine their effectiveness. In Cederberg there is a sense of 
regular, structured engagement between the council/municipality and the community. This 
takes the form of regular meetings with the councillor and ward committee members, 
housing officials, municipal manager and the mayor. The findings show that the ward 
committee structure and community development workers in Cederberg worked hand in 
hand with the African/Black community, which was not the case for Matzikama.  
While the findings in Cederberg and Matzikama cannot be generalised for other places, it 
is hoped that the dissemination of this thesis will stimulate research in other locations 
where the characteristics of networks and associations can be assayed and their behaviour 
studied. This could serve a much larger purpose—that of enhancing developmental 
outcomes—which is of critical importance in South Africa at this stage of its development, 
when innovative approaches are desperately needed if government is to satisfy the 
aspirations of the poorest sections of the population.  
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Unfortunately the research has also shown that social capital in the Cederberg context in 
the mid-2000s could not break through Apartheid’s spatial legacy. Communities are still 
separated on the basis of race and geography, with Whites for the most part occupying 
spaces of privilege and African/Blacks relegated to second-class spaces and informal 
settlements. Spatial Apartheid continues to divide communities despite the vibrancy of 
associational activity in Cederberg among African/Blacks.  
It is interesting to note that the networks and associations primarily manifested themselves 
among members of the African/Black community and to a lesser extent, the Coloured and 
White communities. However this can be seen as an outcome of the historical separation 
required by the Apartheid state which led to structural barriers between White and 
African/Black groups. Hence social capital in Cederberg has demonstrated that it could not 
fundamentally recast relationships, especially those between the predominantly White 
landlord classes and the African/Black farm workers. Its applicability seems to be limited 
to the social, municipal and cultural domains, with no immediate demonstration of 
challenging existing class structures. There is also no demonstration that the vibrant social 
capital in Cederberg is used to significantly challenge White landholders’ unequal access 
to and control of assets and land.  
The localised manifestation of social capital in the African/Black community shows that it 
has limited application at the macroeconomic level and as such cannot be seen as an 
alternative to a strong developmental state. It seems to be more meaningful at the micro-
level since it can improve the livelihoods of poor households through the effect that it has 
on nurturing, supporting and coordinating initiatives for socioeconomic development in 
these communities. Unfortunately, without the re-engineering of Apartheid’s perverse 
economic, spatial and social legacy by a strong state, social capital cannot begin to alter 
years of historical discrimination and inequality in the short run.  
Social capital is therefore an important part of the livelihood strategies adopted by poor 
households who, it could be argued, cultivate it to ensure better socioeconomic outcomes 
and protection against external shocks (stokvels are a good example of such networks). It 
 
 
 
 
226 
 
is more likely to be cultivated as a mechanism to aid the socioeconomic and psychological 
wellbeing of poor communities that would otherwise be worse off and isolated.  
Social capital is unlikely to result in considerable changes in income levels of poor 
households and a reduction in inequality in the short-term without massive investments 
into public infrastructure and local economies. This is unlikely to happen through the 
constrained local authority alone, whose revenue base is ironically limited by the very 
poverty it needs resources to redress.  
8.4 FUTURE AVENUES FOR RESEARCH 
The theoretical framework developed on the back of Putnam’s thesis explaining the 
transmission mechanism from social capital to socioeconomic outcomes, can be tested to 
ascertain whether it has broader applicability and is robust in its explanation of how social 
capital impact on socioeconomic outcomes.  
There are also opportunities to build on this study in a longitudinal manner, particularly in 
Cederberg Municipality to see the long-term impact of social group membership on youth 
development, particularly what such membership has done to counter the dominant culture 
of violence and risk behaviour so prevalent among marginalised youth in Black 
communities.  
The study has shown that associational life develops certain capabilities like leadership, 
particularly amongst the youth. There are thus opportunities to ascertain if this is prevalent 
elsewhere and how leadership development takes place in the context of social group 
membership, particularly sports groups. 
There are opportunities to investigate the nature of social group membership in South 
Africa (and not merely the number of people in social groups) so as to ascertain whether 
they are imbued with the characteristics necessary for better socioeconomic outcomes.  
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Another area of further investigation is the interface between social groups and the state 
and how dynamic virtuous relationships are formed, i.e., the types of relationships which 
mitigate against violent protests against the state, promoting co-operation and negotiations 
particularly with a view to improving state/society relations. 
8.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The research provides insights into what capacity constrained local governments can do to 
enhance the welfare of their communities. In this regard, Figure 7–2 has particular 
resonance, particularly the factors that impact on civic participation and engagement.   
The findings of the research highlighted the fact that social capital is an important 
alternative resource that can be harnessed by the state for better socioeconomic outcomes 
in the face of dwindling financial resources and/or a weak local authority. The local 
authority can play an active role in the identification and development of social capital in 
poor communities through the forging of dynamic alliances and partnerships between and 
within government institutions and civil society, particularly with those groups who 
vocalise their unhappiness with service deliver issues, thereby reducing violent-type 
protests. However, this requires meaningful engagement with communities that takes the 
perspectives of communities as the starting point.    
Another policy implication is that there should be more support for sports and cultural 
groups, or any non-political institution which has broad-based participation or the 
opportunity for broad participation in impoverished communities.  
There is also sufficient opportunity for the establishment of complementary relationships 
between government and civil society, so that the synergies between state and citizen action 
ameliorate resource access problems and creates a virtuous cycle of social, institutional and 
economic improvement.  
From a national point of view, it would be prudent to foster better understandings of social 
capital in terms of how to grow it to foster civic engagement and participation in and 
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ownership of decision making, thereby directly contributing to the deepening of the 
national democratic project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
229 
 
REFERENCES 
Adato, M., Carter, M., & May, J. (2004). Sense in sociability? Social exclusion and 
persistent poverty in South Africa. Paper prepared for the BASIS Persistent Poverty 
Conference, 15-16 November, Washington, DC. 
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S.-W. (2000). Social capital: The good, the bad, and the ugly. In 
E. Lesser (Ed.), Knowledge and social capital: Foundations and applications (pp. 89-115). 
Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Alexander, P. (2010). Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's service delivery protests–a 
preliminary analysis. Review of African Political Economy, 37(123), pp. 25–40. 
Allum, N., Patulny, R., & Sturgis, P. (2007). Re-evaluating the links between social 
trust, institutional trust and civic association. Social and Political Trust Briefing paper No. 
2, Department of Sociology, University of Surrey, UK.  
Amlani, A. (2010). Migration Studies Unit Working Papers. 
Andrew, N., & Jacobs, P. (2009). Nourishing rural poverty: South Africa's unchanging 
land relations. Pretoria, South Africa: Human Science Research Council. Retrieved from 
http://www.hsrc.ac.za?document-3217-phtml. 
Anhier, H. K., & Kendall, J. (2000). Trust and voluntary organisations: Three 
theoretical approaches. London, Civil Society Working Paper.  
Arrow, K. J. (2000). Observations on social capital. In P. Dasgupta, & I. Serageldin, 
(Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted perspective, 3-5. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Askvik, S., & Bak, N. (Eds.). (2005). Trust in public institutions in South Africa. 
Aldershot, England: Ashgate. 
 
 
 
 
230 
 
Babbie, E., & Mouton, J. (2001). The practice of social research. South African 
Edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, Southern Africa. 
Baker, W. E., & Faulkner, R. R. (2004). Social networks and loss of capital. Social 
Networks, 26, 91-111. 
Balkundi, P., & Kilduff, M. (2006). The ties that lead: A social network approach to 
leadership. The Leadership Quarterly, 17(4), 419-439. 
Bankoff, G. (2015). “Lahat para sa lahat” (everything to everybody): consensual 
leadership, social capital and disaster risk reduction in a Filipino community. Disaster 
Prevention and Management: An International Journal. 
Baron, S., Field, J., & Schuller, T. (2000). Social capital: A review and critique. In S. 
Baron, J. Field, & T. Schuller (Eds.). Social capital: Critical perspectives (pp. 1-39). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bayat, A. (2005). Defining social capital: A brief overview of the key aspects and 
debates. Project on Policy Management, Governance, and Poverty Alleviation in the 
Western Cape. University of the Western Cape, Bellville, South Africa. Available from 
http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2006/11/bayat_abdullah_defining_social_capital_b
rief_overview_key_aspects_debates.pdf 
Bekker, S. B. (2002). Migration study in the Western Cape 2001. Cape Town: 
Provincial Government of the Western Cape. 
Bélanger, E., & Nadeau, R. (2005). Political trust and the vote in multiparty elections: 
The Canadian case. European Journal of Political Research, 44, 121-146. 
Best, M., & Dustan, L. (2006). The civic participation of visible minority Canadians: 
A literature review. In: For the communities within: diversity and exclusion in Ottawa 
project. Social Planning Council of Ottawa, Canada. 
 
 
 
 
231 
 
Bjørnskov, C. (2006). The multiple facets of social capital. European Journal of 
Political Economy, 22, 22-40.  
Bjørnskov, C., & Svendson, G. T. (2003). Measuring social capital – Is there a single 
underlying explanation? Working Paper 03-5. Aarhus School of Business, Department of 
Economics, Denmark. 
Bodin, Ö., & Crona, B. I. (2008). Management of natural resources at the community 
level: Exploring the role of social capital and leadership in a rural fishing 
community. World Development, 36(12), 2763-2779. 
Boix, C., & Posner, D. (1996). Making social capital work: A review of Robert 
Putnam’s Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Working Paper 
Series. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs. 
Booth, J. A., & Richard, P. B. (1998). Civil society, political capital, and 
democratization in Central America. The Journal of Politics, 60(3), 780-800. 
Bourdieu, P. (1983). The field of cultural production, or: The economic world reversed. 
Poetics, 12, 311-356. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.). Handbook of 
Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (pp. 241-258). New York: Greenwood 
Press.  
Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and 
consequences of social capital. American Journal of Political Science, 999-1023. 
Campbell, C., & McLean, C. (2002). Ethnic identities, social capital and health 
inequalities: factors shaping African-Caribbean participation in local community networks 
in the UK. Social Science and Medicine, 55, 643-657. 
 
 
 
 
232 
 
Chang, H-J. (2006). Understanding the relationship between institutions and economic 
development: Some key theoretical issues. WIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for 
Development Economics (UNU-WIDER), No. 2006/05, ISBN 9291908452. 
Cheong, P. H., Edwards, R., Goulbourne, H., & Solomos, J. (2007). Immigration, social 
cohesion and social capital: A critical review. Critical Social Policy, 27(1), 24-49.  
Chiesi, A. (2007). Measuring social capital and its effectiveness. The case of small 
entrepreneurs in Italy. European Sociological Review, 1–17. doi:10.1093/esr/jcm010, 
available online at www.esr.oxfordjournals.org  
 Coffé, H., & Geys, B. (2005). Institutional performance and social capital: An 
application to the local government level. Journal of Urban Affairs, 27(5), 485-501. 
doi:10.1111/j.0735-2166.2005.00249.x 
Coffé, H., & Geys, B. (2006). Community heterogeneity: A burden for social capital? 
Social Science Quarterly, 87(5), 1053-1072. 
Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal 
of Sociology, S95-S120. 
Coleman, J. S. (1994). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Coleman, J. S. (1998). Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal 
of Sociology, 94, 95-120. 
Collier, P. (2002). Social capital and poverty: a microeconomic perspective. In C. 
Grootaert, & T. van Bastelaer, (Eds.). The role of social capital in development (pp. 19-
41). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Cook, K., Hardin, R., & Levi, M. (2005). Co-operation without trust? New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
 
 
 
233 
 
Côté, S. (2001). The contribution of human and social capital. ISUMA, Canadian 
Journal of Policy Research, 2(1), 29-36. 
Crête, J., Pelletier, R., & Couture, J. (2006). Political trust in Canada: What matters: 
Politics or economics? Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Canadian 
Political Science Association York University, June 1-4, Toronto, Ontario.  
Crudeli, L. (2002). Social capital and rents. Retrieved from: 
http://www.dse.unibo.it/prin/wp/at2_4_2002.pdf 
Dasgupta, P. (2000). Economic progress and the idea of social capital. In P. Dasgupta, 
& I. Serageldin (Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted perspective. Washington, DC: World 
Bank.  
Dasgupta, P. (2005). Economics of social capital. The Economic Record, 81(255), S2-
S21. 
Dasgupta, P., & I. Serageldin, (Eds.). (2000). Social capital: A multifaceted 
perspective. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
De Filippis, J. (2002). Symposium on Social Capital: An Introduction. Antipode, 34(4), 
790-795.   
Djupe, P. A., & Grant, J. T. (2001). Religious institutions and political participation in 
America. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40(2), 303-314. 
Donovan, T., Bowler, S., Hanneman, R., & Karp, J. A. (2004). Social groups, sport and 
political engagement in New Zealand. Australian Journal of Political Science, 39(2), 405-
419. 
Dudwick, N., Kuehnast, K., Nyhan Jones, V., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Analyzing 
social capital in context: A guide to using qualitative methods and data. Washington, DC: 
World Bank Institute. 
 
 
 
 
234 
 
Durlauf, S. (2002). On the empirics of social capital. Economic Journal, 112(483), 
459-479. 
Easterly, W., Ritzen, J., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Social cohesion, institutions, and 
growth. Economics and Politics, 18(2), 103-120.  
Evans, P. (1996). Introduction: Development strategies across the public-private 
divide. World Development, 24(6), 1033-1037. 
Evans, P. (1997). State structures, government-business relations, and economic 
transformation. Business and the State in Developing Countries, 63-87. 
Fattore, T., Turnbull, N., & Wilson, S. (2003). “More community!” Does the social 
capital hypothesis offer hope for untrusting societies? The Drawing Board: An Australian 
Review of Public Affairs, 3(3), 165-179. 
Fine, B. (2001). Social capital versus social theory. London: Routledge. 
Fine, B. (2005) social policy and development: social capital as point of departure. In: 
T. Mkandawire (Ed.). Social policy in a development context (pp. 80-96). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
Foundation for Contemporary Research. Developmental local government: the rural 
context and challenges. Available from www.fcr.org.za/publications/list-of-
publications/developmental-local-government_the-rural-context-and-challenges.pdf/view 
Freedman, D. A. (2005). Linear statistical models for causation: A critical review. In 
B. S. Everitt and D. C. Howell (Eds.). Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science. 
Chichester, UK: John Wiley. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Social capital and the global economy. Foreign Affairs, 74(5), 
89-103. 
 
 
 
 
235 
 
Fukuyama, F. (1997). Social capital and the modern capitalist economy: Creating a 
high trust workplace. Stern Business Magazine, 4(1). 
Garson, G. D. (2008). Path analysis. from Statnotes: Topics in Multivariate Analysis. 
Retrieved, 9(05), 2009. 
Gerritsen, D., & Lubbers, M. (2010). Unknown is unloved? Diversity and inter-
population trust in Europe. European Union Politics, 11(2), 267-287. 
Gillinson, S. (2004). Why cooperate? A multi-disciplinary study of collective action. 
Working Paper 234, London: ODI. 
Gomulia, C. (2006). Bridging the gap – Establishing networks between communities 
and government. Bellville: University of the Western Cape. 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. The American Journal of 
Sociology, 78, 1360-1380. 
Granovetter, M. S. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problems of 
embeddedness. The American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481.  
Grootaert, C., & van Bastelaer, T. (Eds.). (2002). Understanding and measuring social 
capital: A multidisciplinary tool for practitioners. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Gutiérrez, N. L., Hilborn, R., & Defeo, O. (2011). Leadership, social capital and 
incentives promote successful fisheries. Nature, 470(7334), 386-389. 
Gutmann, A. (Ed.). (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Harriss, J. (2002). Depoliticising development: The World Bank and social capital. 
London: Anthem Press. 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
Healy, T. (2003). Social capital: Challenges for its measurement at the international 
level. UCD, Ireland: Institute for the Study of Social Change. Workshop: Social Capital 
and Economic Development. 
Hellevik, O. (2007). Linear versus logistic regression when the dependent variable is a 
dichotomy. Quality & Quantity. Online first. doi: 10.1007/s1113500790773. 
Helliwell, J. F., Huang, H., & Wang, S. (2014). Social capital and well-being in times 
of crisis. Journal of Happiness Studies, 15(1), 145-162. 
Hemson, D., Meyer, M., & Maphunye, K. (2004). Rural development: the provision of 
basic infrastructure services. Pretoria: HSRC. 
Hjerppe, R. (2003). Social capital and economic growth. Government Institute for 
Economic Research, Finland. Presentation on the International conference on social capital 
arranged by Economic and Social Research Institute of the Cabinet Office of the Japanese 
Government, March 24-25, Tokyo.  
Hooghe, M. (2007). Social capital and diversity. Generalized trust, social cohesion and 
regimes of diversity. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 40, 709-732. 
Hooghe, M., Reeskens, T., Stolle, D., & Trappers, A. (2009). Ethnic diversity and 
generalized trust in Europe: A cross-national multilevel study. Comparative Political 
Studies, 42(2), 198-223. 
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and 
political change in 43 societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Ikeda, K. (2002). Social capital and social communication in Japan: Political 
participation and tolerance. CSD Papers 02-05. Center for Democratic Studies, University 
of California, Irvine CA. 
Ikeda, K., & Richey, S. E. (2005). Japanese network capital. The impact of social 
networks on Japanese political participation. Political Behavior, 27(3), 239-260. 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
Jankowicz, A. D. (2000). Business Research Projects (3rd ed.). London: Thomson 
Learning. 
James, H. S. Jr., & Sykuta, M. E. (2004). Generalized and particularized trust in 
organization. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the International Society for New 
Institutional Economics in Tucson, Arizona, USA, October 1. 
Jenkins, K., Andolina, M. W., Keeter, S., & Zukin, C. (2003). Is civic behavior 
political? Exploring the multidimensional nature of political participation. Presented at the 
Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 3-6, Chicago. 
Jooste, T. (2005). Examining the link between measures of social capital and 
democracy. CSSR Working Paper no. 141. University of Cape Town. 
Kankainen, T. (2009). Voluntary associations and trust in Finland. Research on Finnish 
Society, 2, 5-17. 
Kawachi, I., Kim, D., Coutts, A., & Subramanian, S. V. (2004). Reconciling the three 
accounts of social capital. International Journal of Epidemiology, 33(4), 682-690. 
Kesler, C., & Bloemraad, I. (2010). Does immigration erode social capital? The 
conditional effects of immigration-generated diversity on trust, membership, and 
participation across 19 countries, 1981–2000. Canadian journal of political science, 
43(02), 319-347. 
Khan, F., Munir, K., & Willmott, H. (2007). A dark side of institutional 
entrepreneurship: Soccer balls, child labor and postcolonial impoverishment. Organization 
Studies, 28(7), 1055-1077. 
Kilby, P. (2002). Social capital and civil society. National Centre for Development 
Studies, Australian National University. Available from http://www.fdc.org.au/files/ pk-
sccs.pdf.  
 
 
 
 
238 
 
Kim, S. (2004). Political trust, institutional reform, and democratic deepening in 
Korea. Paper presented at the International Conference on Political Challenges and 
Democratic Institutions. December 3-4, Taipei. 
Klesner, J. L. (2007). Social capital and political participation in Latin America. Latin 
American Research Review, 42(2), 1-32. 
Knack, S. (2000). Social capital and the quality of government: Evidence from the 
United States. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2504. Available from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=632574. 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic pay-off? A cross 
country investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-1288. 
Krishna, A. (2000). Creating and harnessing social capital. In P. Dasgupta, & I. 
Serageldin, (Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted perspective (pp. 71-93). Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Krishna, A. (2002). Active social capital: Tracing the roots of democracy and 
development. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Krishna, A., & Shrader, E. (1999). Social capital assessment tool. Social Capital 
Initiative Working Paper no. 22. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Kuenzi, M. T. (2008). Social capital and political trust in West Africa. Working Paper 
No. 96. Afro barometer Working Papers.   
Kwon, S. W., & Adler, P. S. (2014). Social capital: Maturation of a field of 
research. Academy of Management Review, 39(4), 412-422. 
Lesser, E. L. (2000). Leveraging social capital in organizations. In E. L. Lesser (Ed.), 
Knowledge and social capital: Foundations and applications (pp. 3-16). Boston: 
Butterworth- Heinemann. 
 
 
 
 
239 
 
E. Lesser, E. L. (Ed.). (2000). Knowledge and social capital: Foundations and 
applications (pp. 89-115). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Lin, N. (2001). Social capital: A theory of social structure and action. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., Finn, A. & Argent, J., (2010). Trends in South African 
income distribution and poverty since the fall of apartheid. OECD Social, Employment 
and Migration Working Paper 101, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Paris. 
Lowndes, V., & Wilson, D. (2001). Social capital and local governance: Exploring the 
institutional design variable. Political Studies, 49(4), 629-647. 
Lowndes, V., Pratchett, L., & Stoker, G. (2006). Local political participation: the 
Impact of rules-in-use. Public Administration, 84(3), 539-561. 
Maluccio, J., Haddad, L., & May, J. (2000). Social capital and household welfare in 
South Africa, 1993–98. The Journal of Development Studies, 36(6), 54-81. 
Maloney, W., Smith, G., & Stoker, G. (2000). Social capital and urban governance. 
Political Studies, 48(4), 802-820.  
Mani, D. (2001). Social Capital for Development. Second Thematic Training Course 
(1-30 November 2001), United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD), 
Nagoya, Japan. 
 
McCallum, S., & O'Connell, D. (2009). Social capital and leadership development: 
Building stronger leadership through enhanced relational skills. Leadership & 
Organization Development Journal, 30(2), 152-166. 
Meehl, P. E., & Waller, N. G. (2002). The Path Analysis Controversy: A new statistical 
approach to strong appraisal of verisimilitude. Psychological methods, 7(3), 283. 
 
 
 
 
240 
 
Muhlberger, P. (2003). Political social trust vs. generalized trust in political 
participation. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, 16 August, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel. 
Nannestad, P. (2008). What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything? 
Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 413-436. 
Narayan, D. (1999). Social capital and the state: Complementarity and substitution. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2167. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=623906 
Narayan, D., & Pritchett, L. (2000). Social capital: Evidence and implications. In P. 
Dasgupta, & I. Serageldin, (Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted perspective (pp. 269-295). 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Narayan, D., & Cassidy, M. F. (2001). A dimensional approach to measuring social 
capital: Development and validation of a social capital inventory. Current Sociology, 49(2), 
59-102. 
Nie, N. H., Powell, G. B., & Prewitt, K. (1969). Social structure and political 
participation: Developmental relationships. American Political Science Review, 63, 361-
78, 808-32. 
North, D. C. (1997). Some fundamental puzzles in economic history/development. In 
W. B. Arthur, S. N. Durlauf, & D. A. Lane, (Eds.). The economy as an evolving complex 
system II (pp. 223-237). MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Oh, H., Labianca, G., & Chung, M. H. (2006). A multilevel model of group social 
capital. Academy of Management Review, 31(3), 569-582. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2001). The contribution 
of human and social capital to sustained economic growth and well-being. J. F. Helliwell 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
(Ed.) with A. Bonikowska. International Symposium Report. OECD and Human Resources 
Development, Canada. 
Oliver-Hoyo, M., & Allen, D. (2006). The use of triangulation methods in qualitative 
educational research. Journal of College Science Teaching, 35(4), 42. 
Ostrom, E. (2000). Social capital: A fad or a fundamental concept? In P. Dasgupta, & 
I. Serageldin, (Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted perspective (pp. 172-214). Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Paldam, M. (2000). Social capital: one or many? Definition and measurement. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 14(5), 629-653. 
Paldam, M. (2007). Generalized trust. The macro perspective. Economics Working 
paper, School of Economics and Management, Aarhus University. 
Pantoja, E. (2002). Qualitative analysis of social capital: The case of community 
development in coal mining areas in Orissa, India. In C. Grootaert, & T. van Bastelaer, 
(Eds.). Understanding and measuring social capital: A multidisciplinary tool for 
practitioners (pp. 108-151). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Pollitt, M. G. (2001). The economics of trust, norms and networks. CIBAM January 
2001 Colloquium Papers. 
Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1-24. 
Portes, A. (2014). Downsides of social capital. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 111(52), 18407-18408. 
Portes, A., & Landolt, P. (1996). Unsolved mysteries: the Tocqueville Files II. The 
downside of social capital. The American Prospect, 7, 18-21. 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
Portes, A., & Vickstrom, E. (2011). Diversity, social capital, and cohesion. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 37, 461-479. 
Prakash, S., & Selle, P. (2001). Investigating social capital comparative perspectives 
on participation, civil society and local governance. Nordic Association for South Asian 
studies Conference, September 20-22, Voss, Norway. 
Purdue, D. (2001). Neighbourhood governance: Leadership, trust and social 
capital. Urban Studies, 38(12), 2211-2224. 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Putnam, R. (1995). Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital 
in America. Political Science and Politics, 28, 664-683. 
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Putnam, R. (2001). Social capital. Measurement and consequences. ISUMA, Canadian 
Journal of Policy Research, 2(1), 41-51. 
Rao, V., & Woolcock, M. (2001). Social networks and risk management strategies in 
poor urban communities: What do we know? Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Reid, C., & Salmen, L. (2002). Qualitative analysis of social capital: The case of 
agricultural extension in Mali. In C. Grootaert, & T. van Bastelaer, (Eds.). Understanding 
and measuring social capital: A multidisciplinary tool for practitioners (pp. 85-107). 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Rose, R. (2000). Getting things done in an antimodern society: Social capital networks 
in Russia. In P. Dasgupta, & I. Serageldin, (Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted 
perspective (pp. 147-171). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
Rothstein, B., & Eek, D. (2006). Political corruption and social trust: An experimental 
approach. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia. 
Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2001). Social capital and street-level bureaucracy: An 
institutional theory of generalized trust. Presented at the ESF Conference “Social Capital: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives.” Exeter. 
Sabatini, F. (2005). Social capital as social networks: A new framework for 
measurement. Working Paper No. 83, Department of Public Economics, University of 
Rome La Sapienza. 
Sandefur, R. L., & Laumann, E. O. (1998). A paradigm for social capital. Rationality 
and Society, 10(4), 481-501. 
Savage, M., Tampubolon, G., & Warde, A. (2004). Social capital and political activism: 
A social network approach. In J. Franklin (Ed.). Politics, trust, and networks: Social capital 
in critical perspective (pp. 23-37). London: London South Bank University. 
Schield, M. (1995). Correlation, determination and causality in introductory statistics. 
American Statistical Association, 8, 1-6. 
Serageldin I., & Grootaert, C. (2000). Defining social capital: An integrating view. In 
P. Dasgupta, & I. Serageldin, (Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted perspective (pp. 40-
58). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Shakaryan, A. (2007). Civic trust and governance in Armenia. Demokratizatsiya.  
Skocpol, T. (1996). The Tocqueville problem: Civic engagement in American 
democracy. Presidential address for the annual meeting of the Social Science History 
Association, October 12, New Orleans, LA.  
Sobel, J. (2002). Can we trust social capital? Journal of Economic Literature, 40,139-
154. 
 
 
 
 
244 
 
Spies-Butcher, B. (2003). Social capital in economics: Why social capital does not 
mean the end of ideology. The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, 
3(3), 181-203. 
Statistics South Africa. (2014). Poverty trends in South Africa. An examination of 
absolute poverty between 1996 and 2011. Pretoria. 
Stevens, J., & Adams, C. (2013). “Together we can make it better”: Collective action 
and governance in a girls’ ice hockey association. International Review for the Sociology 
of Sport, 48(6), 658-672. 
Stiegler, N. (2006). Personal Communication.  
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). Formal and informal institutions. In P. Dasgupta, & I. Serageldin, 
(Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted perspective (pp. 59-70). Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
Stolle, D., & Rochon, T. R. (2001). Are all associations alike? In R. Edwards, M.W. 
Foley, & M. Diani, (Eds.). Beyond Tocqueville: Civil society and the social capital debate 
in comparative perspective (pp. 143-156). Hanover, NH: Tufts University Press. 
Stone, W. (2001). Measuring social capital. Australian Institute of Family Studies, 
Research Paper No. 24/2001. 
Stone, W., & Hughes, J. (2002). Social capital: empirical meaning and measurement 
validity. Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies. 
Sturgis, P., Patulny, R., & Allum, N. (2007). What makes trusters trust? Paper 
presented at the ‘Reciprocity: Theories and Facts’ Conference, Verbania, Italy, February 
22–25 2007. 
Suhr, D. (2008, November). Step your way through path analysis. In: Western users of 
SAS software conference proceedings, November 2008. 
 
 
 
 
245 
 
Swedberg, R. M. (1991). The battle of the methods: Toward a paradigm shift? In A. 
Etzioni & P. R. Lawrence (Eds.). Socio-economics: Toward a new synthesis (pp. 13-34). 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.  
Szreter, S. (2000). Social capital, the economy, and education in historical perspective. 
In S. Baron, J. Field, & T. Schuller (Eds.). Social capital: Critical perspectives (pp. 56-
78). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Terpstra, N. (2006). De-institutionalizing confraternity studies: Fraternalism and social 
capital in cross-cultural contexts. In C. F. Black, & P. Gravestone (Eds.). Early modern 
confraternities in Europe and the Americas: International and interdisciplinary 
perspectives (pp. 264-283). Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Theiss-Morse, E., & Hibbing, J. R. (2005). Citizenship and Civic Engagement. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 8, 227-249.  
Tonkiss, F. (2004). Trust and Social Capital. In J. Franklin (Ed.). Politics, trust, and 
networks: Social capital in critical perspective (pp. 17-22). London: London South Bank 
University. 
Turner, J. H. (2000). The Formation of social capital. In P. Dasgupta, & I. Serageldin, 
(Eds.). Social capital: A multifaceted perspective (pp. 94-146). Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
Uphoff, N. (2000). Understanding social capital: Learning from the analysis and 
experience of participation. In P. Dasgupta, & I. Serageldin, (Eds.). Social capital: A 
multifaceted perspective (pp. 215-249). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Uslaner, E. M. (1999). Democracy and social capital. In M. E. Warren (Ed.). 
Democracy and trust (pp. 121-150). New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
 
 
 
246 
 
Uslaner, E. M. (2006). Does diversity drive down trust? FEEM Working Paper No. 
69. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=903051. 
Van Staveren, I. P. (2000). A conceptualisation of social capital in economics: 
Commitment and spill-over effects. ISS Working Paper Series/General Series, 324, 1-27. 
Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1987). Participation in America: Political democracy and 
social equality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. R. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic 
voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Wallis, J., Killerby, P., & Dollery, B. (2004). Social economics and social capital. 
International Journal of Social Economics, 31(3), 239-258. 
Warner, M. (2001). Building social capital: The role of local government. Journal of 
Socio-Economics, 30, 187-192.  
Warren, M. R., Thompson, J. P., & Saegert, S. (2001). The role of social capital in 
combating poverty. Social Capital and Poor Communities, 1-28. 
Winter, I. (2000). Towards a theorised understanding of family life and social capital. 
Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies.  
Wollebæk, D., & Selle, P. (2002). Does participation in voluntary associations 
contribute to social capital? The impact of intensity, scope, and type. Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31, 32-61 
Woodhouse, A. (2006). Social capital and economic development in regional Australia: 
A case study. Journal of Rural Studies, 22, 83-94.  
Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Towards a theoretical 
synthesis and policy framework. Theory and Society, 27(2), 151-208. 
 
 
 
 
247 
 
Woolcock, M. (2001). The place of social capital in understanding social and economic 
outcomes. Canadian Journal of Policy Research, 2(1), 11-17. 
Woolcock, M., & Narayan, D. (2000). Social capital: Implications for development 
theory, research and policy. World Bank Research Observer, 15, 225-250. 
Wright, S. (1960). Path coefficients and path regressions: alternative or complementary 
concepts? Biometrics, 16(2), 189-202. 
Wuensch, K. L. (2008). An introduction to path analysis. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
248 
 
ANNEXURE A: DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
1. INTRODUCTION  
A system of local government in rural areas was practically non-existent under Apartheid 
(Davids, I., n.d., p. 32). A large part of South Africa’s rural areas at that time were 
concentrated in the former homelands (“self-governing” ethnic enclaves). The provision of 
services usually associated with local government was devolved to traditional authorities. 
In rural areas which were predominantly under the control of white commercial farmers, 
these services were performed by provincial administrations or national departments 
(Pycroft, 2002, as cited in Davids, I., n.d., p. 32). In the view of Davids (n.d., p. 33), a 
workable system of local government for rural people was formalised during the transition 
period in the form of Transitional Rural Councils and Transitional Representative 
Councils. The former had more power than the latter—where it had both legislative and 
executive authority to carry out programmes whereas the latter had fewer less 
responsibilities and minimal capacity.  
According to Davids (n.d., p. 33) the first few years of the newly elected government saw 
a move “towards the establishment of a nation-wide developmental government system” 
starting in 1996 with the new Constitution of South Africa. The Constitution provided the 
framework for three spheres of government— a central, provincial and local sphere. Given 
its proximity to the local population, this third tier was required by the Constitution to: 
 “(a) provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
(b) ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
(c) promote social and economic development; 
(d) promote a safe and healthy environment; and  
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(e) encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government.”  (Chapter 7, South African Constitution) 
The South African Constitution provided for the establishment of the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) whose mandate was and still is to transform, develop 
and capacitate local governments to execute the constitutional mandate of providing for 
the development needs of communities.  
The various mandates of local government are rooted in this legislative mandate and 
government sees it as the main interface between citizens and the state, securing their basic 
services and promoting social and economic development in a participatory manner. The 
Constitution therefore confers on local government responsibilities relating to the social 
and economic development and of deepening democratic practices and norms.  
The White Paper on Local Government issued in 1998 further crystalised the notion of 
“developmental local government” by defining it as ‘local government committed to 
working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet 
their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of lives.’ The notion of 
citizen participation was cemented by Section 19 of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 
of 1998) which states that municipalities are required to consult the communities and civil 
society organisations to perform their functions. Hence, as part of its developmental role, 
local government is required to take a “leadership role, involving and empowering citizens 
and stakeholder groups in the development process, in order to build social capital and 
generate a sense of common purpose in finding local solutions for sustainability” (Binns & 
Nel, 2002).  
After years of primarily centralised decision making under the Apartheid state, the 
formulation of developmental local government was a deliberate step toward decentralised 
service delivery and enhanced participation—making local governments (on paper) more 
responsive to the needs of citizens. This increase in powers and functions has not been 
commensurate with increases in the necessary financial and human resources to realise 
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these new mandates. This has led to serious problems in areas with smaller populations 
(generally this means rural municipalities), which do not have the capacity to fulfil all their 
functions.  
According to Davids (n.d., p. 37) “following the adoption of the white Paper, a series of 
acts and bills were enacted to give effect to the provisions of the white Paper and provide 
a legislative reform framework for developmental local government. The Municipal 
Structures Act (1998), the Municipal Demarcations Act (1998), the Municipal Systems Act 
(2000) and the Municipal Finance Management Bill (2002) form the foundations of the 
future local government system. Taken together, these pieces of legislation establish 
municipal types and their governance structure, pronounce the powers and functions of 
local government, provide for the rationalisation of local government through the 
demarcation process and restructure local government systems, procedures and processes.”  
2. CURRENT CONFIGURATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
A brief overview of local government is presented here to indicate the extent of its powers 
and functions and the institutional arrangements that exist particularly with regards to state-
civil society participation.   
The Municipal Demarcation Act provided for the establishment of the Municipal 
Demarcation Board. One of the tasks of the Board was to reduce the number of local 
municipalities in South Africa from 843 to 284 (6 metropolitan, 231 local, and 47 district 
municipalities). According to Kallis and Fast (n.d., p. 15) many municipal authorities were 
merged (on average, between 3-5 municipalities), “and urban boundaries were expanded 
to include their rural hinterland.” The demarcation process and the concomitant 
amalgamation of municipalities has had a profound effect on participation and 
consequently on state-civil society interactions.  
It is the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 that provided for the different types of local 
government and their respective powers and functions. Briefly, there are different types of 
municipalities:  
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• Metropolitan Municipalities [Category A]: In South Africa there are six 
Metropolitan municipalities with each of them having more than 500 000 voters. 
The cities with metropolitan municipalities are: Johannesburg, Cape Town, 
Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and the East Rand. These metros are made up of 
different wards and the residents of each ward are represented by a ward councillor. 
• Local Municipalities [Category B]: The areas that are outside the six metropolitan 
municipal areas are divided into 231 local municipalities. There are also District 
Management Areas (DMAs) that generally have very small populations and fall 
directly under the District Municipality. Local municipalities are also made up of 
different wards with the residents of each ward represented by a ward councillor.  
• District Municipalities [Category C]: District municipalities generally consist of 4-
6 local municipalities in one district some of which also have district management 
areas that typically comprise nature reserves and have low population density. The 
district municipality has its own administration and coordinates development and 
service delivery in the district.   
The two municipalities under discussion are characterised as Category B municipalities.  
The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 provided for the different types of local government 
and their respective powers and functions. 
Local government is generally made up of the following:  
• Elected members – they represent the local community and are responsible for 
approving policies and laws. 
• Executive committee – exercises oversight and is responsible for coordinating the 
making of policies and bylaws and see to it that implementation by the different 
local government directorates takes place.  
• Local government directorates and municipal officials who do the actual work.  
The municipality is made up of a Council that makes decisions and municipal officials and 
staff who are responsible for implementation. The Council, which is made up of the elected 
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members, passes a municipal budget, approves policies and bylaws for the municipal area 
and decides on development plans and municipal service delivery for the area. 
The councils’ work is convened and coordinated by a mayor, who is elected by the council 
and who is assisted by an executive or mayoral committee made up of councillors. The 
mayor and the executive committee oversee the municipal manager and departmental heads 
that are responsible for the implementation and administration of council decisions.  
The actual work of the municipality is done by the municipal administration that is run by 
the municipal manager with appointed senior managers. The municipal manager is 
responsible for appointing staff and coordinating them to execute and implement the 
councils programmes and initiatives.  
A council typically has the following structures: 
• A mayor – who is the head of the council.  
• An executive or mayoral committee – that meets frequently to coordinate the work 
of the council and make recommendations to council. 
• A speaker, except where there are very small councils, who chairs council meetings.  
• Council meetings – where the full council takes decisions.    
• Committees – various committees are constituted and comprise few councillors 
who meet to discuss specific issues. 
Ward Committees 
Ward committees are elected by the communities they serve and consist of local 
community organisations, residents’ associations, CBOs, NGOs and other civil society 
structures. A ward committee generally does not have more than 10 members and the ward 
councillor typically acts as the chairperson. Ward committees have no formal powers but 
they advise the ward councillor or make submissions directly to council. Ward committees 
typically are involved in the range of statutory development planning activities of the local 
area such as the drafting of Integrated Development Plans. 
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The objectives of ward committees are:  
• To facilitate more meaningful participation from the community to inform council 
decisions.  
• To effect more effective communication between the council and the community.  
• To assist the ward councillor with consultation and report-backs to the community. 
Ward committees are supposed to present the material concerns of a community such as 
service delivery and may therefore offer the opportunity for citizens to raise broader 
concerns regarding how the system functions.  
Responsibilities of Local Government  
The municipality is responsible for the following functions: 
• Water for household use  
• Sewage and sanitation  
• Storm water systems  
• Refuse removal (household and business) 
• Electricity provision  
• Fire-fighting services  
• Municipal health services  
• Decisions around land use  
• Municipal roads  
• Municipal public transport  
• Street trading  
• Abattoirs and fresh food markets  
• Parks and recreational areas  
• Libraries and other facilities  
• Local tourism. 
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National and provincial governments also delegate other responsibilities to municipalities. 
When this occurs, it means that the local municipality is asked to perform the role of 
another sphere of government, as in the case of housing which is not a local government 
responsibility. If the municipality is not provided with a budget by the other sphere of 
government then this is considered an "un-funded mandate". 
Municipal councils have the power to: 
• Pass by-laws  
• Approve budgets and development plans as is the case with IDPs (Integrated 
Development Plans)  
• Impose rates and other taxes—such as property rates which are an important source 
of revenue.  
• Charge service fees—for municipal services such as water.  
• Impose fines—for breaking municipal by-laws or regulations. For example, traffic 
fines. 
• Borrow money—where the council may take a loan to finance development and 
use municipal assets as surety. 
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ANNEXURE B: MAPS OF CEDERBERG AND MATZIKAMA 
MUNICIPALITIES 
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ANNEXURE C: SOCIOECONOMIC, 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
  
 In clear ID Number 
Region         
Municipality          
District area           
Survey area            
Household          
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Table 1 : Table Household 
Id 
# 
Name Gender Date of 
birth 
Marital 
status 
Relation 
with the 
head of 
household 
Family 
number 
Family 
status 
Work 
status 
Education 
level 
Mother 
tongue 
Belong 
to 
social 
group 
Amount 
spend 
on 
social 
group 
Belong 
to 
political 
party 
Amount 
spend 
on 
political 
party 
Belong 
to 
religious 
org 
Amount 
spend 
on 
religous 
group 
Monthly 
net 
income 
Pop. 
group 
TB 
status 
HIV 
status 
Date 
of 
arrival 
in the 
area 
  
    
    
    
M    F MM/YY 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1                                            
2                                           
3                                           
4                                           
5                                           
6                                            
7                                           
8                                           
9                                           
10                                           
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Table 2. Events in the household happening during the last 12 months (from 1st December 2005 to 30th November 2006) 
  
Name 
Relationship to Ref 
person 
Marriage Divorce Left household Victim of crime Sickness Death (reasons) 
Live birth Month of 
the event 
Date of Birth    
DD/MM/YY                                          M F 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8   9   10 11 12 
1                                               
2                                              
3                                              
4                                              
5                                              
6                                              
7 Total                                           
Q3. Type of housing :    
 Q4. Number of rooms :   
Q5. Tenure status:     
Q6. Access to piped water 
1 Inside house   
2 Inside yard   
3 Community stand less than 200m   
4 Community stand further than 200m   
5 No access   
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Q7. Source of water 
1 Local water scheme   
2 Borehole   
3 Spring   
4 Rain water tank   
5 Dam/ pool/ stagnant water   
6 River / stream   
7 Water vendor   
8 Other  
Q8. Toilet facility 
1 Flush toilet (connected to system)   
2 Flush toilet (septic tank)   
3 Chemical toilet   
4 Pit latrine (ventilation)   
5 Pit latrine (no ventilation)   
6 Bucket latrine   
7 None   
Main Energy 
Cooking Heating Lighting 
Q9 Q10 Q11 
1 Electricity       
2 Gas       
3 Paraffin       
4 Wood       
5 Coal       
6 Candles       
7 Animal dung       
8 Solar       
9 None       
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Q12. Main system of refuse disposal 
1 Local authority at least once a week   
2 Local authority less than once a week   
3 Communal refuse dump   
4 Own refuse dump   
5 No disposal   
6 Other   
Q13. Is your dwelling equipped with? 
Appliances: Y N Distance 
1 Electricity       
2 Piped water       
3 Toilet inside       
4 Bathroom inside       
5 Kitchen       
6 Refuge removal       
7 Used water evacuation       
Q14. Is the household equipped with: Number 
1 Fridge   
2 Cooker   
3 Phone ground line   
4 Cell phone   
5 TV   
6 VCR / DVD player   
7 Satellite dish   
8 Hi-Fi   
9 Car   
10 Bicycle   
11 Motorcycle   
12 Truck   
Q15. During October 2006, state the 
different type of incomes in Rands, 
net of taxes In rand Net 
1 Salary   
2 Investment   
3 Rent   
4 Pension   
5 Grant   
6 Familial aid   
7 Community aid   
8 Total   
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Q16. During October 2006, state the different type of 
expenditure in Rands 
  In rand Net 
Place of  
expenditure 
1 Home loan     
2 Rent     
3 Car mortgage     
4 Food     
5 Clothing     
6 Health     
7 School fees     
8  Transport     
9 Leisure     
10 Other     
11 Total     
Q17. Financial assets 
Do not 
know 
Know 
but have 
not 
Have 
some 
1  Saving account with banks       
2  Stokvel       
3  Unit trust       
4  Shares       
5  Policy       
6  Work savings       
7  Others       
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Q20.  From 1st December 2005 to 30th November 2006, please state all your visits to anyone in your community 
  
Person or Institution Date Reason Help receive? Date of solution Cost related External expenses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1               
2               
3               
4               
5               
6               
7               
8               
9               
10               
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 Q21. Access to services Y N Distance  
1 Municipal offices       
2 Public Transport       
3 Public Primary school       
4 Public high School       
5 Public phone       
6 Medical doctor       
7 Nurse       
 8 Public hospital       
9 Private clinic       
10 Bank       
11 Supermarket       
12 Lawyer       
13 Clothing        
14 Sport facilities       
Q22. Table migration (from 1st January 2002) 
  
Date 
Place of 
departure 
Place of 
arrival Reason 
1 2 3 4 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
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Q24. Table employment (from 1st January 2002) 
  
Position Sector 
Type of 
Company 
Date of entry Date of exit Reason 
Distance from 
home 
Net month 
salary 
Publicity of 
position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1                       
2                   
3                   
4                   
5                   
 
  
Q23. Table health (from 1st January 2002) 
  
Date Symptoms Medical visit Diagnosis Distance Expenses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
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Q25. Do you trust: Y N DK 
1 Neighbours       
2 Family       
3 Political leaders       
4 Local government       
5 Central government       
Q26. Can you get help from Y N DK 
1 Neighbours       
2 Family       
3 Political leaders       
4 Local government       
5 Central government       
Q27. Do you get information 
from: Y N DK 
1 Neighbours       
2 Community board       
3 Community agents       
4 Local newspapers       
5 National newspaper       
6 Radio       
7 TV       
8 Groups / associations       
9 Business        
10 Internet       
Q28. Social cohesion and differences 
Divide 
community 
Provoke 
violence 
Have no impact 
1 Education       
2 Age       
3 Wealth       
4 Landholding       
5 Social status       
6 Gender       
7 Religion       
8 politics       
9 Ethnicity       
10 Duration of stay       
Q29. Safety Y N DK 
1 Area safe       
2 Feel safe alone at home       
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Q30. Political action in 2006 Y N DK 
1 Feel you have control       
2 
Has positively  impacted 
on living conditions       
3 Feel you are heard    
4 Have signed petition    
5 
Have attended council 
meeting    
6 Met politician    
7 Demonstrate    
8 Part in election campaign    
9 Alerted media    
10 Notified police or court    
11 Vote last local election    
12 Vote last national election    
13 
Would you vote for 
candidate from other pop 
group    
14 Vote last  local election    
15 Vote last  local election    
Q31. Honesty Y N DK 
1 Local gvt officials       
2 Traditional village leaders       
3 Medical workers    
4 Teachers    
5 Staff of post office    
6 Police    
7 Judges and court staff    
8 NGO’s    
Q32. Main household economic activity 
1 Shop   
2 Shebeens   
3 Crafts   
4 Laundry services   
5 Food   
6 Transport   
7 Agriculture   
8 Other   
9 None   
 
 
 
 
